.

There is, however, another and a larger view in which many are disposed to regard the conflict of Navarino as unsatisfactory and embarrassing, considering it as having tended to the undue aggrandisement of Russia, and, consequently, to the disturbance of the equilibrium of Europe. This is a consideration which well deserves to be examined. If that conflict did, indeed, tend to disturb the equilibrium of Europe, and thereby to endanger the general independence, it was mischievous in its ultimate operation, however justifiable in regard to its immediate occasion and principle. Before, however, it can be shown that the victory of Navarino has disturbed, or has tended to disturb, the general equilibrium of Europe, it must be shown that there is actually existing a federative system liable to be so disturbed. The contrary may, we apprehend, be clearly established. A federative system supposes, not merely a number of states mutually connected by treaties, but a number of states, a considerable part of which is bound by a common interest to resist the encroachments of some one more powerful than the rest Russia may be considered as from this time the predominant state, but we nowhere discover an association of other states combined in some common principle of resistance. There is, therefore, at present no systematic distribution of states, by which a balance of power may be maintained. Even the principle of such a distribution is non-existent, for we do not see any common interest acknowledged among governments, unless it be that of the Holy Alliance, which would be subversive of external independence, as of internal freedom.

The world has as yet witnessed but one perfect example of a system of federative policy; for the combination opposed to the ambition of the house of Austria was blended with the interior constitution of the German empire, from which it had emanated. The single example of a federative system supporting itself by its own inherent energy, is that which was constituted by William III., in opposition to the ambition of Louis XIV. From this alone, therefore, we must form our judgment in framing a conjecture concerning the future policy of Europe. We must consider what was the essential nature of that arrangement, and then reflect in what manner a corresponding arrangement may now be effected.

In that system, Great Britain, Germany, and the Dutch provinces were confederated to resist the power of France; and, in this confederacy, they were finally bound together by the barrier treaty, which constituted the Spanish Netherlands the bond of their political union. Here we see a number of states closely combined for a specific purpose, and a particular territory placed in circumstances so peculiar, that each of the confederating powers had a special interest in maintaining the existing arrangement, while that

territory

territory was, beyond others, exposed to the encroachments of the common enemy. By this treaty, the emperor acquired the dominion of the Spanish Netherlands, which were, however, to be maintained as a barrier for the Dutch states, Great Britain being bound to afford assistance in the case of a war; and, by the same treaty, the commercial interest of these provinces was sacrificed to the two maritime governments, so that the three confederating powers were all interested in supporting the convention. We perceive, therefore, that, in the only perfect example of a federative policy, there was not merely a confederacy of a number of states to restrain the encroachments of one more powerful and more ambitious than the rest, but also a special bond of union formed by so connecting these states in the maintenance of a common arrangement, that each should find its own separate interest, either of territory, of security, or of commerce, in defending that part of the political order which was immediately exposed to aggression.

In the present state of Europe, no arrangement of this kind is yet discoverable. The several governments are connected by treaties, but they are not combined in any determinate order of political interests. They resemble a number of individuals who have met together in a state of nature, and have agreed to live in peace and amity, but have not yet entered into the relations of any common government. In such a situation, the governments of Europe have yet to learn what is that general order which confederating states should have an interest in maintaining, and what is the precise interest by which each should be concerned in maintaining a league for their common protection. Where these things are not determined, there can be no federative system.

The operations begun in Greece seem to us, far from menacing the destruction of the equilibrium of Europe, to be the very commencement of the process by which it may eventually be adjusted. The governments of Europe cannot long continue to be connected only by treaties, without any orderly combination of political interests, any more than a multitude of individuals, not united under the restraint of civil government, could continue to live together in the relation of general amity. Some predominant state must arise among governments, as some powerful and ambitious man would arise among individuals; and fixed combinations of policy must be formed and established among governments, as the interests of individuals would require to be protected by civil institutions. To us it seems, that the Turkish empire may, in the new order of things, be found to hold the same place which the Spanish Netherlands held in the old; and, instead of menacing Europe with disorder and calamity, to be the very state in which its interests shall find the means of their adjustment and combination.

Russia has long looked to the dismemberment of Turkey, as affording the opportunity of her own most valuable aggrandisement; Austria is eager to obtain possession of the Sclavonian provinces bordering her own territories, and adjacent to Italy, her favourite object; France, connected with the Mediterranean, and desirous of acquiring the advantages of commerce, looks with hope and expectation to the independence of Greece; and Great Britain, interested, generally, in the protection of commerce, and, specially, in the maintenance of her own maritime importance, must regard, with anxious apprehension, every power which should seek to obtain a predominance in a country so favourably situated for maritime purposes. Here, then, is a country, in which Russia seeks to magnify her already vast dominion, and where Austria, France, and Great Britain, have each a direct and urgent interest in restraining and moderating her encroachments. Here, therefore, we may conclude, the political interests of these great powers will, in some manner or other, be brought to an adjustment, and a regular and efficient combination of federative policy be at length constituted.

In the succession of a new confederacy of policy to that which perished in the wars of the French revolution, and, indeed, had even previously lost the principles of its combination, it might be expected by those who believe in the improvement of mankind, that something more perfect should be discoverable. This, at least, we may perceive in the case which we are contemplating. By the barrier treaty, the Spanish Netherlands served, indeed, as a connecting link to bind together the interests of the powers confederated against France, but to this combination the interest of those provinces themselves was sacrificed, for they were by that treaty precluded from maritime commerce. If, in the new political order, the independence and consequent prosperity of Greece should be the political bond, no such sacrifice would be made, but Europe would find its common advantage in the highest improvement of the very country to which it should be indebted for the combination of its international policy. Another important advantage, also, might perhaps result from such an arrangement. The country of adjustment, if the expression may be allowed, would not in this case be placed in the centre of the system, as in the arrangement constituted by the barrier treaty, but would be an exterior state, so that the agitations, to which the adjustment might occasionally be exposed, would not necessarily convulse the entire system. An invasion of the Netherlands, in the former system, would unavoidably have produced a general commotion throughout Europe; but hostilities commenced by any power in Greece, however destructive of the general equilibrium, would not be felt by any of the confederating

powers

powers as a blow struck at its own security and separate independence.

Let it not then be imagined, that the interest of Great Britain requires her to maintain at all events the dominion of Turkey, and thus to link her fortune with the permanence of Ottoman barbarism. It is the true interest of Great Britain, that an orderly combination of governments should be formed which should guarantee the independence of all. This is the honourable object for which she has struggled in the conflicts of war; this is likewise the object for which she should struggle in the negotiations of peace, or the long struggle of war would have been maintained in vain. But this object is not attained by the governments of Europe in their present state of incoherence, in which no two states can be said to have any common interest, or any determinate relation. The purpose, for which the dominion of France was overthrown, is not yet accomplished. Europe is independent, but that independence has no guarantee of its continuance. The deliverance of Greece, by giving occasion to a combination of three great powers for its protection, may furnish this guarantee, and thus complete the arrangement of the policy of Europe.

We have not, therefore, any reason to consider the aggrandisement of Russia, which might be the result of interference in the concerns of Turkey, as necessarily prejudicial to the interests of the British empire. If this aggrandisement should be balanced by a reciprocal adjustment of interests, why should it be prejudicial to any one state? The interest of Great Britain, in particular, is that other nations should be independent and prosperous; and the independence and prosperity of nations are best protected by the reciprocal adjustments of a balanced policy, which secure to each the prompt assistance of others, as they are connected by a common interest in some collective arrangement. In the present state of Europe, no state can be said to have any certain means of defence beyond its own separate power, because there is not any combined system of political interests on which it can rely for assistance; it may form an alliance, as an emergency may render it necessary, but it is not previously assured of receiving support, in virtue of an existing confederacy of nations, actuated by a sense of a common interest, and forward to avert any danger by which any of them might be menaced. By entering into a new arrangement, of which the independence of Greece should be the object, the British empire would receive advantage, first, as a commercial nation, from this augmentation of the general prosperity of Europe; and, secondly, as the guardian of the general security, in a combined adjustment of the political interests of the great governments of Europe.

No reflecting man can believe that, amidst the general progress

of

of human improvement, the fine countries of Europe, which are comprehended in the Turkish empire, can long remain in their present barbarism and wretchedness. Let not a subject of the British government believe that this empire has a real interest in the perpetuation of abuses so grievous. It seems to be the high function of our government to present to other nations the model of their political improvement, as it had previously maintained for them that independence without which improvement must be sought in vain. The faith of treaties should, indeed, be respected, but this is a distinct consideration. The question now considered is, not whether we should disregard the obligation of existing treaties, but whether we should so firmly attach ourselves to the present order of things, that we should see no safety in a change which might raise up a people of Christians into the enjoyment of civil and religious liberty. It is not the duty of our government to agitate other countries by instigating them to speculative changes; but neither can it be our duty, or our interest, to link our fortune with abuses because they exist, and to oppose ourselves to a progressive improvement, which seems to be the characteristic of the moral government of God. For ourselves, if the independence of Greece were secured by a confederacy of Austria, France, and Great Britain, we should not entertain any apprehension on account of any aggrandisement which political events might confer upon Russia in another part of the Turkish empire.

It most fortunately happens, that the question concerning Greece may probably be settled without involving the Christian governments of Europe in any considerable hostilities. The sanguinary and protracted struggle with France is too recent in recollection, and the burdens, which it has imposed, are still too heavily oppressive, to suffer those governments to be forward in committing their interests to the dread arbitrement of war. In such circumstances, it may well be hoped that their relative pretensions may be peaceably adjusted by negotiation; and that a new and more perfect system of federative policy may be quietly constructedmore perfect, as comprehending, in a single combination, the interests of all the great governments of Europe, without sacrificing the prosperity of any territory to the advantage of others, and, also as, on that very account, less liable to be destroyed by the operation of those changes which time must introduce into all the combinations of human wisdom. Nor can it fail to inspire general hope and confidence of a favourable termination for the impending or incipient crisis, both here and elsewhere, that the interests of England are placed, on such a momentous occasion, under the guidance of such an eye and arm as we now see at the helm of the state.

ART.