66 breach of good faith. His ideal of em- | dence. Sir John Lawrence himself pire, says his biographer, was a per-placed little reliance on Herbert Edvading influence rather than a system wardes' treaty with Dost Mahomed, of administration," -a view directly which was, however, loyally mainopposed to that of Lord Dalhousie. | tained, with the result that an Affghau Notwithstanding his known disapproval invasion was withheld. Lord Canning, of the transaction, Sattara on its annex-it was, who eventually decided against ation was intrusted to him as commis- the surrender. There were those, insioner. Afterwards, he was appointed cluding the Sikhs, who attached more commissioner in Scinde, which had importance, as far as the stability of been annexed by Lord Ellenborough, British empire was concerned, to the and held that office when the Mutiny retention of Peshawar than even to the broke out, and when all the conse- fall of Delhi. In this as well as in all quences which he attributed to reckless other critical emergencies, including annexation had to be faced. the arduous work of resettling the empire after the suppression of the Mutiny, Sir Bartle Frere's decisions were always animated by a resolute belief in British destiny and duties of empire, aud by a steady resolve to resist any tendency to shrink from our almost superhuman task as one beyond the resources of Great Britain. Mr. Martineau adduces evidence to show that Frere, as far back as 1858, His part during those four summer months of 1857, when the Mutiny was spreading unchecked, was to preserve Scinde as a base of operations, and establish communications with the Punjab and the north-west via Kurrachee and the Indus valley, after the Punjab had been cut off from Calcutta and the seat of government. He defeated the attempt of the mutineers to seize Hyderabad and make it a rallying was urging on his official superiors place like Delhi. His reputation for courage was sustained during all the horrors and panic of that time. Mr. Martineau says that he carried on as nearly as he could the ordinary routine of his daily life, maintaining throughout unruffled temper and courtesy with unvarying cheerfulness. "I always prepare,' the vital importance of establishing friendly relations with, and keeping a sharp lookout in the direction of, Affghanistan and Persia, and of the great value of Quetta as a means to that end. In 1867 the British government peremptorily refused to establish Quetta as an outpost of the empire; but after the expedition of Lord Lyttou, Quetta was occupied in force, fortified, and connected by railway with the port of Kurrachee. One of the last events brought to Frere's notice before his death was the eventual completion of that railway by Mr. Gladstone's government, notwithstanding the fierce opposition which had been made to it as a part of Lord Beaconsfield's frontier policy. At the present moment Quetta is one of the most important military stations in all India, with the consent of both parties in the State, thus justifying in the end the prescience of Sir Bartle Frere. ," he said in a letter to his wife in England, "to the best of my power, and then make up my mind by the blessing of God we shall succeed, and I have found it so hitherto." As might have been expected, a man so capable of maintaining his equanimity in emergency, however trying, who knew that, placed as we were, a forward and unshrinking policy was the only safety, -regarded the proposal to abandon the Punjab to the Affghans as a suicidal expedient, not to be resorted to even in the utmost extremity. He was as strongly opposed to a policy of scuttle, even in extremis, as he was to a policy of annexation. He courageously The rest of Frere's Indian career denuded his own province of troops to may be passed over briefly. He was assist in the taking of Delhi and in the the first Bombay civilian who was ever preservation of the Punjab, and awaited appointed to the Supreme Council the result with calmness and confi- i.e., the council of the governor-gen been sent to the Transvaal on a special commission, to confer with its president on the subject of confederation, and in the result the annexation of that country was proclaimed a few days after Frere's arrival. The latter does not seem to have had the slightest responsibility for either the policy or the manner of its execution. He had merely to accept an accomplished fact, although at the time public opinion was considerably mistaken as to the part which he had played. There is no room for doubt, however, that he approved the policy of the transaction, for in a letter a few years afterwards (vol. ii., p. 183) he says that if England had declined to interfere, Germany would have stepped in, which would have added infinitely to our troubles. Lord Carnavon ratified the annexation, and the Boers accepted it at the time with satisfaction. eral; and he held that post while most of Frere, Sir Theophilus Shepstone had of the problems of reorganization were being worked out. But in a very short time the governorship of Bombay fell vacant, and Frere concluded his Indian career by a five years' tenure of that important post. Mr. Martineau discusses his claims to the highest office of all, and insists that had he gone to India as viceroy in 1876 instead of Lord Lytton, his tact and faculty for commanding the confidence and respect of semi-barbarous chieftains, and the enthusiasm with which he could inspire the foremost British officers, would in all probability have enabled him, without recourse to arms, to have convinced Shere Ali that his best course lay in a return to the policy of Dost Mahomed, and a cordial alliance with the British government. In support of that theory, he cites the authority of the head missionary at Peshawar, as a sort of witness to character, who disparages both Lord Lytton and Cavagnari, and draws a glowing picture of what might have been under Frere as viceroy. It is useless to speculate on what might have been: Lord Lytton went to Calcutta and Sir Bartle Frere to the Cape, and each forced on a war in his respective dominions, at a most inopportune moment for the British government, which was weighted with the task of completing the execution of the Berlin Treaty. The result was most disastrous to the fortunes of Lord Beaconsfield's ministry at the general election. The work of confederation, however, did not progress. A bill to enable the South African colonies to confederate with the consent of the crown was passed by the English Parliament, but public opinion at the Cape was very languid on the subject. Security and peace amongst the frontier natives was the first condition for bringing the older and more settled provinces to agree to any plan of confederation which would cause the expense of guarding the frontier to be shared by all. Those removed from the frontiers regarded the native tribes as peaceful It was Lord Carnarvon as colonial and Kaffir wars as things of the past; secretary who selected Frere to be those close to the frontier believed that high commissioner of South Africa, the natives were growing in strength "as the statesman who seems to me and restlessness, and stirred by a genmost capable of carrying my scheme of eral movement against the white popuconfederation into effect." Lord Car-lation. Frere went to the frontier, and narvon had, by the British North the first things that happened were a American Act, 1867, successfully car- Kaffir outbreak and a native war. ried out a policy of confederation in Canada; and for two years had been steadily laboring for the union of the South African colonies and states, policy which he considered to have been ripened by the recent war between the Transvaal republic and the natives. Previous to the appointment a Difficulties arose with the Cape government as to the conduct of military measures, and eventually Frere asserted the prerogative of the crown, and dismissed a colonial minis ry which possessed the confidence of the Assembly, and appointed Mr. Gordon Sprigg prime minister. Eventually the Kaffirs were beaten; and just at this point the disputed territory the Boer farmers Lord Carnarvon, who was at variance should be either compensated or prowith his colleagues in the Beaconsfield tected, according as they elected to ministry on matters of European for- leave or to remain; and that a British eign policy, resigned his office, and resident with Cetewayo should be spewith his disappearance the policy of cially charged with this duty. Differconfederation was no longer so ear-ences with the Zulus grew apace. nestly insisted upon by statesmen at Cetewayo pursued a policy of menace home. Frere, as the special exponent and violence, and maintained a miliof that policy in the colony, found his position considerably weakened. Still the native war had ended successfully, and Mr. Sprigg's new ministry cooperated with him cordially. The year 1878 was not merely an eventful year for Europe, where the termination of the war with Turkey, the conclusion of the peace at San Stefano, the resolute enforcement of Great Britain's claim to have that treaty revised by a conference, and the eventual substitution of the Treaty of Berlin, exhausted the energies of statesmen. At the Cape it was considered that the native outbreaks resulted from the general conviction that the English power could be overthrown, and that a spirit similar to that which pervaded the natives of India before the Mutiny was abroad. Sir Bartle Frere slowly adopted this view, forced on him, he said, by a hundred little bits of evidence from different quarters. The Zulus were by far the most powerful of the native tribes. They and their king, Cetewayo, were regarded as the leaders in the contest, and to them Sir Bartle Frere directed his attention. Not merely were horrible barbarities and massacres perpetrated on our borders; but a serious dispute arose between the Boers whom we had recently annexed and the Zulus as to a belt of territory which the Boers claimed as purchasers, but which the Zulus declared had been leased for a limited term. The Boers had to fly for their lives from the disputed territory. English arbitrators investigated the question and reported in favor of the Zulus. The report was adverse, in substance and in language, to the Boers; and Frere in accepting it, as he was bound to do, introduced stipulations that when the Boers handed over tary system which, now that the Boers were British subjects, was considered to be intended exclusively against the British power. An ultimatum was sent to him early in December, demanding that it should be abolished. Frere in the exercise of his judgment believed that the future of South Africa depended on the firmness and consistency of his own policy, and it may fairly be said that so far from shrinking from responsibility he was forward to assume it. The Boers, on the other hand, were indignant beyond measure that we had failed to give them that protection against the Zulus to gain which was their object in consenting to annexation. It became doubtful what part they would take in the impending war. In September, 1878, Frere was writing home for reinforcements. But Sir Michael Hicks Beach, the new colonial secretary, received the application coldly; and in October and November made and repeated his refusal, deprecating a Zulu war in addition to other greater and too possible troubles. The position in Europe and the policy towards Affghanistan made the Cabinet regard with dismay the further prospect of war in South Africa, and prescribe forbearance and reasonable compromise. In November and December came renewed letters, urging a postponement of warlike operations owing to the danger of war in Europe. The ultimatum was delivered on the 11th December, after telegrams and despatches had been received from the Colonial Office, deprecating war. They were dated from October 12 to November 7-the last of which, however, only reached Frere two days after the ultimatum was sent. On the 10th January, 1879, English troops entered Zululand, and in less than a fortnight the rout at Isandhlwana occurred, in | sanction, a course almost certain to which the British force was cut to result in war, which, as I had previpieces; and a week afterwards there ously impressed upon you, every effort arrived another forcible protest from should have been made to avoid." The the colonial secretary against a policy Cabinet pointed out that, under the of war. To Frere the shock of the dis- circumstances, even if war could not aster was, his biographer says, the ultimately be avoided, it was their most terrible he had ever experienced; business to decide as to the time and in Natal there was panic such as Frere manner of coming to an issue, and that had not witnessed even at the most meanwhile "the forces at your discritical time of the Indian Mutiny; to posal were adequate to protect Natal the Cabinet of the queen the disaster from any serious Zulu inroad, and to was a heavy blow and discouragement provide for any other emergency that in the midst of European complications could have arisen" during the referand in the face of a general election. Fortunately, the Zulus in Natal did not rise against us; Cetewayo did not attempt a raid; some, though not many, of the Boers co-operated with us. Sir Garnet Wolseley, preceded by reinforcements, arrived at Cape Town on the 28th June; but before he could assume command of the army, Lord Chelmsford had won the battle of Ulundi (July 5), and the Zulus confessed themselves beaten. The Boers, however, began to insist on regaining their independence, and Sir Bartle Frere had to explain to them at a critical interview that the annexation should not be undone, though local government would be conceded. ence home. When we remember that, even after the disaster of Isandhlwana, no Zulu inroad, serious or otherwise, was undertaken by Cetewayo, it is impossible not to agree that this remonstrance was justified. This remarkable proceeding is the determining incident in Sir Bartle Frere's career, the one which arrests the attention of all who are interested in it. It is not surprising, therefore, that his biographer should have done his utmost to justify it. The case which he makes is that, up to the time of Lord Carnarvon's resignation, Frere's action and policy had been cordially accepted and indorsed by him; that after Sir M. Hicks Beach's The Cabinet at home were divided in accession to office there had not been opinion as to the course to be pursued. a hint or a word from him to indicate The majority wished to recall Frere. any new departure; that up to OctoLord Beaconsfield supported him; and ber 2, the letters of the new secretary probably the queen, who had sent a approved his conduct, sanctioned the prompt and gracious message of en- boundary award notwithstanding its couragement (vol. ii., p. 281) on the encouragement to Cetewayo, and news of the disaster, disapproved his added that of course Cetewayo must be recall. In the result a despatch was kept in order, and compelled to give up sent censuring him, with a general those Zulus who violated, as lately, expression of continued confidence. Natal or Transvaal territory. Mr. MarThe censure was to the effect that he tineau insists that the later despatches, ought not, without first obtaining the which refused reinforcements and depsanction of the British government, to recated war, were like those of a man have insisted in an ultimatum on the from whose memory had suddenly disbandment of Cetewayo's army, on been obliterated all prior correspondhis receiving a resident, or on the ful-ence, including letters which he himfilment of his promises of better gov- self had written. Reading that prior ernment. The despatch pointed out correspondence by the light of what that no evidence had been produced of subsequently passed, it may no doubt urgent necessity for immediate action, be open to the criticism that a too san"which alone could justify you in tak-guine colonial governor would be apt ing, without their full knowledge and to find in it more encouragement than pire nearer home. There is no trace that Frere ever gave the smallest attention to what was passing in Europe at the time, and to the extreme inconvenience his policy would occasion to the government at home. Even if his invasion of Zululand had been as successful as it was in the first instance was intended. The colonial secretary in a distant war without the smallest probably never contemplated that a reference to the exigencies of the empolicy of war and actual hostilities and invasion would be undertaken without specific approval from home. The moment that a demand for reinforcements and the tone of Frere's letters showed what he was aiming at, there was no uncertainty about Sir. M. Hicks Beach's telegrams and letters. That of October 12 showed that the home disastrous, the Cabinet at home would government regarded the Cape hostili- not at that conjuncture have approved ties at an end, and that war was no it. But when events proved that the longer in prospect. Frere went on in invasion had been badly planned and spite of the Colonial Office, and his unsuccessfully executed, and that the defence must rest upon this, that, as very motive for it, the necessity of his biographer puts it, it was as impos- anticipating attack, was founded on a sible at this eleventh hour to reverse mistaken view of the surroundings, his policy and withdraw from the posi- every one must feel that Frere encountion he had taken, as it would have tered a respousibility which it is for been for Wellington to decline a battle the public interest should not be minion the eve of Waterloo. It fails be-mized or concealed. It ought to be cause the ultimatum was not delivered regarded as a sacred and elementary till after it was known that the secre- rule of colonial administration, that tary of state counselled prudence, com- except in cases of extreme urgency a promise, and the avoidance of war. colonial governor is altogether exceedSir Bartle Frere had, no doubt, de- ing his duty who places his relations to cided in his own mind that a forward his neighbors on the inclined plane and determined policy was the only which leads to war without a clear unway to deal with the barbarous army derstanding beforehand with the auwhich hung like a black cloud on his thorities at home, so that they may not frontiers. His mind was so constituted merely understand and approve the that he could not displace his convic- issue of peace or war being raised, tion and act on that of an official supe- but may also themselves decide as to rior whom he believed to be mistaken. the time and mode of conducting As in the Indian Mutiny he felt that hostilities. This vast colonial empire to retire from Peshawar meant the roll- would be a source of infinite embarrassing out of the Punjab in the flames of ment to the home government, if every rebellion, so to show reluctance to en- colonial governor deemed it within his counter the Zulu power was the very power and duty to act as Sir Bartle way to invite its aggression, and to Frere did in 1878. There is or ought make territories inhabited by British to be the strongest disinclination to subjects the seat of warlike operations. give a grudging support to an absent The mistake lay in assuming that a colonial governor struggling against supreme colonial governor may detach overwhelming difficulties. It is felt his mind from all other interests and that even criticism should be lenient. concentrate it exclusively on those in But there is a correlative duty on his his immediate locality, in the way that part to observe perfect loyalty and a subordinate provincial ruler in India frankness to the government at home, may do. As the representative of the and not to avail himself of any of the crown, he, as well as the Colonial Of- opportunities which an official on the fice, had to consider not merely the spot possesses of forcing the hand of immediate needs of the colony, but the his superiors by presenting to them a general position of the empire, and state of circumstances in which it is no ought not to have involved his country longer possible to exercise a free judg |