of belief, dismisses them from the list | reasons by "explicitly recognizing" of the beliefs due to Authority. He that the Authority causing our belief classes them as due to reasoning from is trustworthy (p. 220); but we think "Authorities." "Authority, as I have he insufficiently recognizes how often been using the term," he writes, "is it has been implicitly both reason and thus converted into an Authority' or cause before it became a reason exinto Authorities.' It ceases to be the plicitly. opposite or correlative of Reason. It Let us take a simple instance of this. can no longer be contrasted with Rea- I go to my banker for guidance as to son. It becomes a species of Reason." investing a sum of money. I do so, so Yet a moment's consideration will show that by this statement he very seriously curtails the list of beliefs which the argument with which he had set out would assign to Authority. It is obvious that a large amount of that trust in Authority which is natural and necessary to the social life of the community, is open-eyed and reasonable. We trust to our wine-merchant to get us good wine; but in choosing one rather than another we are guided by reasons drawn perhaps from the quality of the wine which he has supplied to our friends. We trust ourselves to the care of the railway train; but if we hear of a dozen fatal accidents on one line in a single week, we shall be slow to travel by it. If then we hand over to the side of Reason and dismiss from the ranks of Authority all cases where our trust is based on reason - if with Mr. Balfour we distinguish between Authority and "Authorities," and place them in opposite scales- much less is won for Authority by the argument than would appear from the statement of the case with which Mr. Balfour had set out.

Mr. Balfour points out with subtle observation the unconscious action of Authority. When we appear to be reasoning, we are really affected by a "psychological climate," by the intellectual preconceptions of the age, by the views of an influential person, by early prejudice. Our conclusion is really determined, not by the reasoning to which we may ascribe it, but by the Authority of which we are unconscious. This is true and most important. But we think that he fails to note that Reason often acts latently as well as Authority. He speaks of turning non-rational causes of belief into

far as I am aware, simply because my father always went to him. I have not chosen him. He suggests distributing the money through many securities. I am somewhat inattentive to details, as I habitually leave such matters entirely in his hands. I vaguely remember the names of the stocks, and that is all. Later in the day I see in the newspaper that Australian banks are in a very bad way. This calls to my mind the fact that one of my investments was a deposit in the Bank of Australasia. I at once question the wisdom of the investment, and write to my banker. Thus it becomes obvious that, however vague and shadowy, there was a basis of reason for my trust in the banker, the implicit assurance that "he knows all about such invest

ments." The news in the paper brought the latent motive to light by throwing doubt on its consonance with fact.

It is obvious that if this explanation be true its effect is far-reaching. There is some latent reasoning process of this kind in nearly all the trusts which make up the daily habits of life. Baker, butcher, lawyer, doctor, all are trusted with some latent motive of the reason. Be it observed that there is no question here of right reason. The question at issue is whether among causes of belief, true or false, Authority, legitimate or illegitimate, or Reason, right or wrong, is the cause of the greater number. And it appears to us that if all instances where there is a trust based on reason are described as instances of reasoning from "authorities," and placed on the side of Reason rather than on that of Authority, the working out of this distinction removes the large proportion of beliefs which at

first sight are attributable to Authority | influence of a "psychological climate,” back again to the side of Reason.1 which, even if ineffectual at the time, If we pursue this question further, it in the long run may purge it of its exis not for the sake of cavilling at what, aggerations. This has come to pass in after all, is partly only a form of ex- our own time in the case referred to pression for Mr. Balfour does not by Mr. Balfour, of the rationalistic appear to contemplate latent reasoning incredulity which so long discredited as reasoning at all. It is rather to get Mesmerism. And this instance is at the practical difference involved in typical of many others. It really Mr. Balfour's statement of the case shows the connection between Mr. and our own. Some of the practical Balfour's two omissions. His omission consequences of Mr. Balfour's view to recognize fully the share taken by may be seen by considering an amus- Reason in framing the beliefs which ing simile in his book, whereby he the individual may accept on Authority illustrates the statement that the influ-leads him to do insufficient justice to ence of Rationalism, which would at first sight seem to be a form of the influence of a process of reasoning, is often in reality for individuals the influence of Authority. Rationalism, though it began in reasoning, has come by degrees to form a "psychological climate." It often influences the individual, not in virtue of the antecedent reasoning which he has not, it may be, This holds good even in the more apprehended, but by its contagiousness limited sphere of party allegiance and as a temper of mind which has come permanent adherence to a religious into existence through that reasoning. sect. However much is due to the Mr. Balfour suggests that, like a mere influence of contiguity with others schoolboy's tears over a proposition of who profess the creed in question, Euclid," beliefs due to its influence there is generally some degree of may be "consequences of reasoning, mental assimilation of the characterbut not conclusions from it." istic trains of thought on which it rests, and we believe - which is passing to a further and separate question — that by reflective minds, even where no idea of independent enquiry enters, religious creeds are adhered to in virtue largely of the true elements they contain.

This is very true and very important up to a certain point. Yet the fact that Rationalism is what the schoolboy's tears are not, the embodiment of a reasoning process in the race (even though an inexact one), makes a great difference even in the mode of its action on individuals. If it affects them largely as a "climate," it also affects some of them in varying degrees through their reason, as they enter into the line of thought and the historical conditions to which it was due. And thus it is that persons of philosophic minds can make some stand against the

It is quite true that we may allege (as Mr. Balfour says) different reasons at different times for the same conviction; but this does not surely prove that it is really due to Authority and not to Reason. It may prove a not uncommon case with women- that we do not frankly recognize the real reason influencing us; but it does not necessarily prove that there is no reason.

the tendency of individuals in varying degrees either to travel back along the lines of reasoning whereby their ancestors or teachers may have come to their conclusions, or to have an instinctive sense of the watchful reason and criticism of the race, which protects social customs and beliefs from going very far astray.

2 In the last section of his chapter Mr. Balfour states his position in a way which, while it comes

Reason in forming individual conviction from its

nearer to recognizing some of the questions here raised than the earlier part, seems still to show that he does not clearly separate the province of province in forming corporate convictions which may act on individuals as Authority. Speaking of the action of Reason in producing belief, he writes: it has played in the evolution of human affairs by the disintegration of ancient creeds, by the alteration of the external conditions of human life, by the production of . . . psychological climates,' we can in this connection say nothing. For these are no rational effects of the reason; the causal nexus by which they are bound to reason has no logical aspect." This, as we have pointed out, is partly (though not wholly) true in respect of the action of such results of reasoning on this or that

"Of its immense indirect consequences, of the part

While then we sympathize to the full | viction. It is well to keep Reason in with Mr. Balfour's exposition of the its place, and to find out its limitations, absurdity of supposing that the indi- and the absurdities in which it lands us vidual is to form or could form an inde- if it makes excursions on its own acpendent judgment in many matters count instead of submitting to proper where the community supplies him the guidance. But if we depreciate Reason machinery of its own customs and prin- too much, we paralyze it. Not merely ciples ready to hand; while we recog- philosophic scepticism, but practical innize the force of his exposition of the action is reached. An uppish man of large share taken by Authority, often real ability is often made far more useunconsciously to ourselves, in moulding ful by a certain amount of snubbing, our convictions; while we agree that which teaches him the necessity of this is at least in many cases benefi- working in harmony with others and cial; while we go so far as to admit the value of self-distrust. But the that for the majority, total emancipa- point may be reached at which he betion from this subtle influence of Au- comes disheartened and useless; and thority is utterly impossible, even in so with Mr. Balfour's treatment of cases where it is desirable, and that Reason. Teach it, if you will, its own even for the few it can only be partial limitations, the necessity of submis- for there are inmost habits of the sion, the danger of a spurious origicritical intellect which have been nality; but do so in order thereby to largely fashioned by Authority we make it more reverent, more alert, to should say that this is as much as the ensure its efforts being better and more evidence warrants; and that Mr. Bal- profitably directed. We believe most four, if he appears to establish more, of our convictions to be due, not to does so in virtue of the omission of what Mr. Balfour calls in the latter distinctions which are essential. Be- part of his chapter Authority, but to yond these limits his scathing attack what he terms Authorities, trust in on Reason is, if we are right in our which is not absolutely blind or without observations, both destructive of his a reasoning element; and we believe own methods and untrue to fact. His the highest characteristic of man, the last words are in keeping with this un- development of which would be most due extension of his theory. He finds helpful to him, to lie not in blind subour chief superiority over the brute mission to Authority, but in cultivating creation "not so much in our faculty that finer and truer estimate of the of convincing and being convinced by province of Reason which Mr. Balfour the exercise of reasoning, as in our so eloquently vindicates in his exposé of capacity for influencing and being in- the folly of private judgment, which fluenced through the action of Author- should make it sensitively alive alike to ity." Had he said of intelligently its weakness in isolation, and to all the surrendering ourselves to trustworthy signs which should enable it to discern Authority, we should have no quarrel in what direction it should look for with him. But as a great deal of the capacity of being influenced by Authority of which he speaks is common to ourselves and the brutes, his statement, as it stands, does not carry conindividual, but it is not true if we consider the human race as a whole. And that Mr. Balfour still has in his mind the action of Reason on the race as a whole we see in the very same paragraph, where he says, "To Reason is largely due the growth of new and the sifting of old knowledge," etc., which, though quite true of the race, is not true of the individual, who in many cases simply

acquiesces on authority in the sifting process car

ried on by competent minds. LIVING AGE.

VOL. VI. 303

trustworthy Authority in the judgment of its fellows and of the society in which it finds itself.

Nearly eighty years ago another statesman raised the question here discussed by Mr. Balfour; but his conclusions, up to a certain point remarkably similar, involve a far fuller recognition of the rational element in the surrender to Authority. Vicomte de Bonald, the first half of whose long life was spent in the France of the eighteenthcentury philosophers, and who had

witnessed alike the decay of Faith and But while this view of the case marks the deification of insubordination in strongly the truth which impresses Mr. which their teaching culminated, pub- Balfour that the individual Reason is a lished his work "Les Connaissances disintegrating force, M. de Bonald's Morales," in 1818. Partly owing to conclusion is not so adverse to the imthe somewhat fanciful conclusions portance of Reason in human affairs as drawn in the latter part of the book, it that of the English statesman. “If,” is almost forgotten; but its earlier adds the French writer, "human Reapages are very instructive. Like Mr. son, the Reason of each of us, is so Balfour, he noted how small a share noble and precious a faculty, if it is the the individual Reason takes in the car-light which enlightens us and the Aurying on of social life. "We are thority which governs us, what Authorguided," he wrote, "by the habits ity is there more imposing, what light which we find established in society. more brilliant than the universal ReaWe have no reason to conform our ac- son, the Reason of all peoples and all tion to them but the example of others. societies, the Reason of all times and We make no use of our Reason of all places." The Reason, then, of the that Reason of which we are so proud." | race does much; the Reason of the He further maintained that what we individual, if used in isolation from, or do instinctively in respect of daily still more in opposition to, the Universal habits, we ought equally to do in re- Reason, can do little or nothing. spect of the moral convictions on which We now reach our third point. How the society rests. If the man who re- and where the foregoing considerafuses to eat until he has analyzed for tions, suggested both in our criticism himself the whole physiological process of Mr. Balfour and in M. de Bonald's involved, and thus assured himself that treatment of the subject, may help us it is reliable, will die in the interval, so to supplement Mr. Balfour's own rethe society whose members postpone marks. In the first place, a good deal obedience to its ethical convictions un- of what he says as to the small share of til they have examined them critically, reason in the conduct of daily life, apwill perish. Further, the examination plies in a very different degree to the is necessarily to a large extent futile, uneducated and to persons of reflective as a man owes many of the ideas which habits. In some of his observations he he uses in his criticism to that very seems to contemplate a very extended society the basis of whose structure he suffrage. Living as we do in society, is criticising. His action thus becomes the intellectual insight of the thinker, an irrational revolt. "He places him-like the spiritual insight of the Saint, self by the very act," writes Bonald, "in a state of revolt against society. He assumes to himself, a single individual, the right of reforming what is general, and he aspires to dethrone the universal Reason to make his own particular Reason reign in its stead, that Reason which he owes entirely to society." And if one man has the right to do this, all have; experience shows that if each examines independently they will never agree; thus the universal application of this method which fortunately common sense has ever prevented — would mean the absolute destruction of society.1

benefits his fellows; and thus even apart from the question of social traditions, which have approved themselves by their practical success, the community is far more enlightened and its habits far more superintended by Reason than would appear from considering instances of the inertness of Reason which might be more or less true of nine hundred and ninety-nine men out of a thousand. The thousandth man makes his genius or sanctity permeate the society. Thus, in considering the part played by Reason, it is necessary either very explicitly to treat of this

ou rejeter les croyances qu'il trouve établis . . 1 "Tout périt dans la société, lois et mœurs, telle que l'existence de Dieu... la distinction du pendant que l'homme délibère s'il doit admettre | bien et du mal," etc. (Vol. i., p. 110.)

1

difference between minds, and of this has so much to do with the matter, mutual influence, of the power of the there is also Bonald's other factor in Saint or the genius of awakening other the Universal Reason the Reason minds, and drawing from them an echo" of all times." Allowing fully for the which would seem beyond their spon- futility of a vast amount of thought in taneous exhibition of rational insight every age, there is surely, within ceror to make, as Bonald does, the dis- tain limits, a lesson to be learnt from tinction between the Universal Reason, the evolution of thought. "Psychowhich includes this power, and the logical climates," which represent the individual Reason. Newman lays characteristic thought of different down the groundwork for the distinc- periods, do not succeed each other at tion we have in our minds so far as it random. Their very exaggerations applies to religious subjects, in his witness to the underlying Reason at account of Faith and Wisdom, both of work. If scepticism succeeds creduthem distinct from rationalistic reason, lity, if a speculative age is followed by Faith being the more or less instinctive an age which will not trust itself betrust of the many, Wisdom the prop-yond an experience which is almost erty of the few reflective and spiritual within reach of the blind, we see the minds. We conceive the ideal of the human instinct for truth at work, early Church to have been somewhat though passion and prejudice consimilar, however insufficiently it was stantly convert what should be a corcarried out. The ancient traditions rection into a reaction. In spite of the and the original Revelation were sifted see-saw of exaggerations, a distinct and applied by the Saints and Doctors line of advancing truth can be traced. of the Church, and the results communicated as the teaching of the Church to the many, who could indeed receive it and in varying degrees enter into the collective Wisdom which determined it, but could not for themselves have ascertained it. Thus the reasonable basis of a belief would necessarily mean two distinct things: for the whole body, the premises used by the collective wisdom and sanctity of the teachers; for the individual, the grounds he has for trusting that his teachers are endowed with wisdom.

As we have said, we are speaking here of the ideal and not of its historical realization. But, as an ideal, this is at least analogous to the part played by Reason in fashioning a very large number of the secular convictions of human society; directly for the few, by the medium of Authority for the many. And we should be inclined to view it as an illustration of Mr. Balfour's own statement that there is hardly such a thing as unaided Reason for individuals.

But, again, while the simultaneous communication between unequal minds

1 University Sermons, p. 276 seq.

And again we have, by extending our view to the workings of the human mind semper et ubique, a far larger field for the kind of induction which gives Mr. Balfour's own argument from human needs a proportionately greater force. The needs of the race, never ceasing to display themselves, and the religious instinct of man in history, supply a far more urgent exhibition of the need for religion than the capricious experience of the individual, or his own observations of his living fellow-creatures. Of the perversities and eccentricities characterizing many of the systems in which the religious instinct has found some expression, something shall shortly be said. But the constant display of the need, and the highest products of its satisfaction, are noteworthy. The wonderful results, in the stories of heroic devotedness and sanctity in the past, of faith in the power and aid of God, make the argument far stronger than any which most of us could derive from our own halting Faith and inconsistent lives. "Idle gleams to thee are light to me," says the holy Sage in Tennyson's poem, when the dissipated sceptic complains that his religious aspirations are "idle