The Louisville, New Albany and Chicago R. W. Co. v. Thompson. of the judgment theretofore rendered against the appellant in said cause, together with the costs of this proceeding. To which order of the court below the appellant excepted, and has appealed therefrom to this court. The appellant has assigned in this court the following alleged errors of the court below: 1. In not sustaining the motion to set aside the notice upon the appellant to answer; 2. In granting an order against the appellant, upon the appellee's application, for the reason that the notice did not show a service upon the appellant's agent, to whom the notice was directed; 3. In sustaining the appellee's application, when the summons in the appellee's suit was not against the same defendant upon whom notice was served in this proceeding; 4. In not setting aside the notice in this proceeding, when the sheriff's return thereon showed that the notice was not served upon the appellant's agent, William F. Leming. It will be readily seen, from our statement of this case, that it was a proceeding by the appellee, against the defendant, under the provisions of the 5th section of "An act to provide compensation to the owners of animals killed or injured by the cars, locomotives or other carriages of any railroad company in this State, and to enforce the collection of judgments rendered on account of the same, and to repeal all laws inconsistent therewith," approved March 4th, 1863. 1 R. S. 1876, p. 753. In this 5th section it was provided, in substance, that where a judgment had been rendered in a circuit court, in an action there commenced against a railroad company for the value of the animal or animals. killed, or for the injury done to them or it, the circuit court should, on motion of the plaintiff or plaintiffs, on the rendition of such judgment, or afterward at any time, The Louisville, New Albany and Chicago R. W. Co. v. Thompson. when notice of such motion had been served on the railroad company at least ten days before the first day of the term at which such motion was to be heard, order a writ to issue, directed to the sheriff of the proper county, for any agent, conductor or employee of such railroad company, or of its lessees, receivers or assignees, named in such motion, to appear forthwith or at a time directed by court, and answer upon oath as to the amount of money in their hands, if any, and also as to the probable amount of money received by them belonging to such railroad company, or to its lessees, assignees or receivers; and if such agent, conductor or employee should answer that he had any such money, or that he was in constant receipt of money as such agent, conductor or employee, the court should order him to pay into the clerk's office of such court, at such times as might be named by the court, such portions of the money so held or received, not exceeding one-half the amount thereof, as may be deemed just by the court, until the judgment and costs are fully paid and satisfied. motion, is, "that The first error assigned by the appellant is, that the circuit court erred in not sustaining its motion to set aside the notice upon the appellant to answer. The first objection to the notice, stated in appellant's said notice is insufficient." But this objection was too vague, uncertain and indefinite, in this, that it failed to show in what particular the said notice was "insufficient." This was necessary for the purpose of informing both the circuit court and this court of the nature and extent of the objection. Campbell v. Swasey, 12 Ind. 70; Lucas v. Smith, 54 Ind. 530; and Hadley v. Gutridge, 58 Ind. 302. The second objection to said notice, stated in said motion, is not properly an objection to the notice in this case, but it is an attempted and intended objection to the summons and the service thereof in the original action. The Louisville, New Albany and Chicago R. W. Co. v. Thompson. The grounds of this objection are, that the appellant had no notice of the appellee's suit at the preceding October term of said court, that there was no summons directed to the appellant from said court, and that the sheriff's. return to said summons was an insufficient return. It seems to us that these grounds of objection to the notice, in this case, are also too vague, uncertain and indefinite to constitute a valid objection to said notice. It is evident, we think, that it was the intent and purpose of the appellant, in and by these grounds of objection, to attack the validity of the judgment recovered by the appellee, against the appellant, in the original action. It is unnecessary for us to determine in this case whether or not the validity of the original judgment might be attacked and impeached in the supplemental proceedings for the collection of the judgment, authorized by said section 5, above cited, of the statute under which said judgment was rendered. It is enough for us to say, in this case, that the appellant has wholly failed to show, by any of its objections, that the original judgment recovered by the appellee was necessarily invalid. For, even if the summons was defective, and the service thereof invalid and void, it would not follow of necessity therefrom, that the judgment in the case was absolutely null and void. The appellant failed to show in any manner that it did not appear fully in the original action; and such an appearance would obviate a defective summons, or the defective service thereof. It seems very clear to us, that the objections urged by the appellant to the notice in this case were not well taken, and that the court did not err in overruling the motion to set aside said notice. It is claimed by appellant's counsel, that the notice of the appellant's motion in this case ought to have been served on William F. Leming, the particular agent of the appel Graves v. Braden. lant, who the appellee moved might be required to answer as to his receipts of moneys belonging to the appellant. There is nothing in this objection. It will be seen from said section 5 of the statute, that the notice is to be served upon the railroad company; and it may be served, we think, in the manner authorized by statute for the service of a summons on a railroad company. 1 R. S. 1876, p. 752, sec. 3. After appellee's motion was sustained, it would have been necessary that a writ should issue for said William F. Leming and be served on him personally, if the issue of such writ had not been expressly waived, and the said Leming had not voluntarily appeared and answered with out such writ or the service thereof. We find no available error in the record of this cause. The judgment is affirmed, at the appellant's costs. GRAVES V. BRADEN. MORTGAGE.-Husband and Wife.—Encumbering Wife's Inchoate Interest in Lands.-Sheriff's Sale.—Descents.— Foreclosure. Conveyance.-Where a judgment debtor and his wife, by a duly recorded mortgage, executed in either the ordinary form or as a deed absolute on its face, convey to a creditor, to secure the payment of a debt, lands of the debtor which are subject to the lien of a personal judgment against him, she thereby encumbers her inchoate interest in such lands; and, though such lands be subsequently conveyed by the sheriff to the assignee of the certificate of a sheriff's sale of the same on an execution issued on such judgment, and also by a conveyance by such debtor and his wife, one-third of such lands are, on the death of the debtor, subject to foreclosure under such mortgage. From the Shelby Circuit Court. O. J. Glessner and N. L. Wray, for appellant. G. M. Wright, F. Wright and W. W. Spencer, for appellee. Graves v. Braden. PERKINS, J.-Suit to foreclose a mortgage.. The complaint alleges, that on the day of its date Albert G. Hanks and Eliza M. Hanks, his wife, executed the following deed: "This indenture witnesseth, that Albert G. Hanks and Eliza M. Hanks, his wife, of Shelby county, in the State of Indiana, convey and warrant to Charles C. Graves, in Boone county, in the State of Kentucky, for the sum of seven thousand five hundred dollars, the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, the following real estate in Shelby county, in the State of Indiana, to wit: "The east half of the south-east quarter of section thirtyone (31), in township eleven (11) north, of range eight (8) east; also the west half of the south-west quarter of section thirty-two in township eleven (11) north, of range eight (8) east, containing one hundred and twenty-five acres more or less, excepting the cemetery or burying-ground on said land. "In witness whereof the said Albert G. Hanks and Eliza M. Hanks, his wife, have hereunto set their hands and seals this eighth day of August, A. D. 1867. "U. S. S. $7.50. ALBERT G. HANKS. [SEAL.] This deed was acknowledged and recorded. On the 10th of August, 1867, said Albert G. Hanks executed his note to Graves as follows: "One day after date I promise to pay to Charles C. Graves three hundred and thirty-five dollars, for value received, waiving valuation or appraisement laws. "ALBERT G. HANKS." The complaint avers, that it was agreed by the parties. that said deed should operate as a mortgage to secure the payment of said sum of money, which it is alleged is due and unpaid. The complaint further avers, that, on the 6th of March, |