you.

ral ones, by which God governs the world in the natural course of his providence. And they are so analogous to what Religion teaches us concerning the future punishment of the wicked, so much of a piece with it, that both would naturally be expressed in the very same words, and manner of description. In the book of Proverbs, for instance, Wisdom is introduced as frequenting the most public places of resort, and as rejected when she offers herself as the natural appointed guide of human life. How long, speaking to those who are passing through it, how long, ye simple ones, will ye love folly, and the scorners delight in their scorning, and fools hate knowledge? Turn ye at my reproof. Behold, I will pour out my spirit upon you, I will make known my words unto But upon being neglected, Because I have called, and ye refused, I have stretched out my hand, and no man regarded; but ye have set at nought all my counsel, and would none of· my reproof: I also will laugh at your calamity, I will mock when your fear cometh; when your fear cometh as desolation, and your destruction cometh as a whirlwind; when distress and anguish cometh upon you. Then shall they call upon me, but I will not answer; they shall seek me early, but they shall not find me. This passage every one sees is poetical, and some parts of it are highly figurative; but their meaning is obvious. And the thing intended is expressed more literally in the following words: For that they hated knowledge, and did not choose the fear of the Lord-therefore shall they eat of the fruit of their own way, and be filled with their own devices. For the security of the simple shall slay them, and the prosperity of fools shall destroy them. And the whole passage is so equally applicable to what we experience in the present world concerning the consequences of men's actions, and to what Religion teaches us is to be expected in another, that it may be questioned which of the two was principally intended.

Indeed, when one has been recollecting the proper proofs of a future state of rewards and punishments, nothing methinks can give one so sensible an apprehension of the latter, or representation of it to the mind; as observing, that after the many disregarded checks, admonitions, and warnings, which people meet with in the ways of vice and folly and extravagance; warnings from their very nature; from the examples of others; from the lesser inconveniences

1 Chap. i.

which they bring upon themselves; from the instructions of wise and virtuous men: after these have been long despised, scorned, ridiculed; after the chief bad consequences, temporal consequences, of their follies have been delayed for a great while; at length they break in irresistibly like an armed force; repentance is too late to relieve, and can serve only to aggravate their distress, the case has become desperate, and poverty and sickness, remorse and anguish, infamy and death, the effects of their own doings, overwhelm them beyond possibility of remedy or escape. This is an account of what is in fact the general constitution of nature 1.

It is not in any sort meant that, according to what appears at present of the natural course of things, men are always uniformly punished in proportion to their misbehaviour; but that there are very many instances of misbehaviour punished in the several ways now mentioned, and very dreadful instances too, sufficient to show what the laws of the universe may admit; and, if thoroughly considered, sufficient fully to answer all objections against the credi bility of a future state of punishments, from any imagina tions, that the frailty of our nature and external temptations almost annihilate the guilt of human vices, as well as objections of another sort, from necessity2, from suppositions that the will of an infinite Being cannot be contradicted, or that he must be incapable of offence and provocation3.

Reflections of this kind are not without their terrors to serious persons, the most free from enthusiasm, and of the greatest strength of mind; but it is fit things be stated and considered as they really are. And there is, in the present age, a certain fearlessness with regard to what may be hereafter under the government of God, which nothing but an universally acknowledged demonstration on the side of

1 Hence may be deduced experimental answers to many popular objections and excuses; as, that God is too merciful to inflict eternal punishment; that we were sincere in our intentions; that we did not know it was a sin which we were committing, &c. Our misery, like our neglect, is selfinduced.-(H.)

2 That is, as is more fully explained in chap. vi., the supposition that men are compelled by necessity to sin: a doctrine which, by destroying the doctrine of free will, overthrows all notions of moral responsibility, saps the foundations of morality and virtue, and destroys God's attribute of justice.

3 See Chap. iv. and vi.

atheism can justify, and which makes it quite necessary that men be reminded, and if possible, made to feel, that there is no sort of ground for being thus presumptuous, even upon the most sceptical principles. For, may it not be said of any person upon his being born into the world, he may behave so as to be of no service to it, but by being made an example of the woful effects of vice and folly? That he may, as any one may, if he will, incur an infamous execution from the hands of civil justice; or in some other course of extravagance shorten his days; or bring upon himself infamy and diseases worse than death? So that it had been better for him, even with regard to the present world, that he had never been born. And is there any pre

tence of reason, for people to think themselves secure, and talk as if they had certain proof that, let them act as licentiously as they will, there can be nothing analogous to this, with regard to a future and more general interest, under the providence and government of the same God?

CHAPTER III'.

OF THE MORAL GOVERNMENT OF GOD.

As the manifold appearances of design and of final causes, in the constitution of the world, prove it to be the work of an intelligent Mind; so the particular final causes of pleasure and pain distributed amongst his creatures prove that they are under his government; what may be called his natural government of creatures endued with sense and reason. This, however, implies somewhat more than seems usually attended to, when we speak of God's natural government of the world. It implies government of the very same kind with that which a master exercises over his servants, or a civil magistrate over his subjects. These latter instances of final causes as really prove an intelligent Governor of the world, in the sense now mentioned, and before distinctly

1 The subject is thus introduced. From the particular final causes of happiness and misery, it has been argued in the last chapter that we are actually under God's government, under what may be called his natural government. But the moral character of this government has not been, as yet, directly determined. As then, in the last chapter, the fact of God's natural government was proved, so in this is the fact of his moral government established.-(W.)

2 Chap. ii.

treated of, as any other instances of final causes prove an intelligent Maker of it.

But this alone does not appear, at first sight, to determine anything certainly, concerning the moral character of the Author of Nature, considered in this relation of governor; does not ascertain his government to be moral, or prove that he is the righteous judge of the world. Moral government consists not barely in rewarding and punishing men for their actions, which the most tyrannical person may do, but in rewarding the righteous, and punishing the wicked-in rendering to men according to their actions, considered as good or evil. And the perfection of moral government consists in doing this, with regard to all intelligent creatures, in an exact proportion to their personal merits or demerits.

Some men seem to think the only character of the Author of Nature to be that of simple absolute benevolence1. This, considered as a principle of action and infinite in degree, is a disposition to produce the greatest possible happiness, without regard to persons' behaviour, otherwise than as such regard would produce higher degrees of it. And supposing this to be the only character of God, veracity and justice in him would be nothing but benevolence conducted by wisdom. Now, surely this ought not to be asserted, unless it can be proved, for we should speak with cautious reverence upon such a subject. And whether it can be proved or no, is not the thing here to be inquired into; but whether in the constitution and conduct of the world, a righteous government be not discernibly planned out, which necessarily implies a righteous governor. There may possibly be in the creation beings, to whom the Author of Nature manifests himself under this most amiable of all characters, this of infinite absolute benevolence, for it is the most amiable, supposing it not, as perhaps it is not, incompatible with justice; but he manifests himself to us under the character

This objection may be examined by tracing it into its consequences. Simple absolute benevolence implies a disregard of moral character; but truth and justice imply a regard of moral character; it would follow, then, that these two qualities could not exist in the same subject. But may there not be a point above our sight in which both simple benevolence and simple justice meet together? There may be beings towards whom God shows simple benevolence; nay, in the sense explained a little below, he may exercise simple and absolute benevolence even towards us.-Ed.

of a righteous governor. He may, consistently with this be simply and absolutely benevolent in the sense now explained; but he is (for he has given us a proof in the constitution and conduct of the world that he is) a governor over servants, as he rewards and punishes us for our actions. And in the constitution and conduct of it he may also have given, besides the reason of the thing, and the natural presages of conscience, clear and distinct intimations that his government is righteous or moral; clear to such as think the nature of it deserving their attention; and yet not to every careless person who casts a transient reflection upon the subject'.

But it is particularly to be observed, that the divine government, which we experience ourselves under in the present state, taken alone, is allowed not to be the perfection of moral government. And yet this by no means hinders, but that there may be, somewhat, be it more or less, truly moral in it. A righteous government may plainly appear to be carried on to some degree; enough to give us the apprehension that it shall be completed, or carried on to that degree of perfection which religion teaches us it shall: but which cannot appear, till much more of the divine administration be seen, than can in the present life. And the design of this chapter is to inquire how far this is the case: how far, over and above the moral nature3 which God has given us, and our natural notion of him as righteous governor of those his creatures, to whom he has given this nature; I say how far besides this, the principles and be

1 The objections against religion, from the evidence of it not being universal, nor so strong as might possibly have been, may be urged against natural religion, as well as against revealed. And therefore the consideration of them belongs to the first part of this Treatise, as well as the second. But as these objections are chiefly urged against revealed religion, I choose to consider them in the second part. And the answer to them there, Chap. vi., as urged against Christianity, being almost equally applicable to them as urged against the Religion of Nature, to avoid repetition, the reader is referred to that chapter.

2 This expression is, perhaps, liable to be misunderstood. It does not, of course, mean to assert that there is any error or defect in God's moral government, but only that, owing to the partial view which alone we can obtain on earth of a system so great and comprehensive, it seems to us, as it were, imperfect and unfinished.-Ed.

3 Dissertation II.

• Chap. vi.