punishments, which may be drawn from the frailty of human nature as doing away with the guilt of human vices; or from the doctrine of necessity and fatalism; or from an idea that the will of a Supreme Being cannot be contradicted, or that He cannot be provoked.

Now, even on the lowest and most sceptical ground, such analogies as these are full of awe. In daily life it is a common observation that a man may so conduct himself that it had been better for him never to have been born. And is there, then, any pretence of reason why sceptics should talk as if there could be nothing analogous to this with regard to a future state, under the providence and government of the selfsame Being?

CHAPTER III.

OF GOD'S MORAL GOVERNMENT.

The next point to be proved is, that the Analogy of Nature shows the government of God to be moral; in other words, that men will not simply be rewarded and punished hereafter, but according to their behaviour here. And this Bp. Butler goes on to establish by two distinct lines of argument; first, from admitted facts and common experience, and afterwards from the nature and fitness of things.

Now it is allowed, from experience, that the government of this world is not Moral Government in its perfection. But still we do contend, that among the imperfection and confusion of this world the beginnings of a righteous Moral Government may be discerned—seeds, as it were, which shall hereafter be brought to perfection.

I. In general, experience shows us that God allows us to feel less uneasiness and more satisfaction in a virtuous than in a vicious course of life; and here is an instance of Moral Government to some extent. It may be difficult to lay down precise limits; but, upon the whole, it is certain that Virtue is happier than Vice in this present world. For it is no tto Virtue, but to Vice, that we must charge the pain which we feel in reforming from a course of vice to a course of virtue, from the fact that our passions are only partially subdued and still crave for their wonted gratifications.

II. It has been proved that God governs us here by a system of rewards and punishments. Surely, then, there is a presumption that He will finally award them according to the rule of distributive justice.

III. Vice and imprudence generally bring unhappiness; virtue and prudence, happiness: and our capacity to foresee these facts and to reflect on them as plainly discloses to us facts of a right Moral Government, as the correction of children according to their deserts is a fact of right education.

IV. It is necessary to the very being of society that vices destructive of its existence shall be punished as such: and this punishment is equally natural as society itself, and so affords an instance of Moral Government. The natural fear of these punishments is a declaration against such vices on the part of nature.

Against this it has been objected, that actions which are good and beneficial to society are often punished, as in the case of persecution, while bad actions are often rewarded. To this objection we answer, that such is in no way necessary to be the case; and therefore that it is not natural, at least in the same sense in which it is both natural and necessary that bad actions shall be punished. Again, we may reply that good actions are never punished, nor are bad actions rewarded, simply considered as beneficial or hurtful to society, but only to gratify the malice of some individual. It is, therefore, as certain that God has directed us to punish what is hurtful to society, as it is that He has enjoined us to preserve our lives by food.

V. In the natural course of things, Virtue, as such, is rewarded, and Vice, as such, is punished. For, judging from their inward effects respectively, it is clear that Virtue at once produces more of tranquillity, and Vice more of mental uneasiness; that while Virtue has its hopes, Vice has only its fears, of a future state. And, judging from their outward effects, "Honesty is " proverbially "the best policy;" Virtue will almost always be well treated by both the virtuous and the vicious; whereas Vice will be distrusted by both.

VI. The fact that God has given us a Moral Nature is in itself a proof that He will finally support virtue. The fact that God influences mankind to act in the same way, and to favour virtue and to discourage vice, is not the same proof, but an additional proof, of his Moral Government. It shows that He does at present

favour and protect virtue.

VII. Besides the above facts, we may mention a few particular instances which are not frivolous, though often deemed so. In civil governments it is supposed that those actions only are punished which are hurtful to society. Yet we find that immorality is the real cause why they are punished; for offences that are not morally wrong are seldom punished. Besides this, in domestic government, children and servants are punished and rewarded according to their actions; and this is an instance of a natural Moral Government.

Whence, then, is it that Virtue, as such, is rewarded among mankind, and Vice, as such, is punished?

We answer, it arises from the complexion of our moral nature, which makes us feel unhappy from Vice, and happy from Virtue. It arises also from our moral nature, joined with the fact that God has put our happiness and misery in the power of each other,

and that "honesty" is therefore "the best policy." If there are instances (which is almost incredible) of men approving vice as such, it is evidently not natural, but monstrous, and is not to be taken into our account at all. Neither can it be justly said, because virtuous actions are sometimes punished and vicious actions sometimes rewarded, that therefore Nature or the Author of Nature intended it to be so. Perhaps the world is governed by laws too general to allow of universal certainty in their application to particular instances: our natural constitution, too, is different, and much disorder is and must be brought about by our own perversion of those passions which have been implanted in us for the best of purposes.

Thus far we have been arguing from facts, that God's government is moral. We now alter our line of argument, and, by à priori reasoning, drawn from the immutable relations of things and from the abstract fitness and unfitness of actions, we conclude that there is, in the nature of things, a tendency in Virtue and Vice to produce the above good and bad results respectively; and that Virtue has a like tendency to superiority as Reason has, and that this tendency, where it does not actually take effect, is only hindered by various accidental circumstances.

1. With regard to individuals, this tendency of Virtue and Vice is obvious: good and bad men, it is certain, would respectively be far more generally rewarded and punished than now, if justice were not often eluded by artifice, men's characters not known, &c.

2. With regard to society, Virtue has the same tendency to prevail over Vice as Reason has to prevail over brute force; only it needs certain conditions to ensure its effect, such as sufficient length of time, proper scope and opportunities. A number of brutes might combine and overcome a number of men by a sudden attack. So it may be with Vice. The complete success of Virtue, as of Reason, must be gradual. Virtue is militant here, but there is no reason to doubt that it will triumph hereafter. We might easily fancy it triumphant even in this world, as would be the case in a perfectly virtuous state invested with universal dominion.

But it may be asked, "How has Virtue this tendency towards victory?" Our answer is, "By destroying all factions, by uniting every member of society in the most powerful bonds, by causing every one to perform his part conscientiously, by making prudence, diligence, &c., universal."

Again, the objection may arise, "Still, why may not things go on hereafter as they do now, Virtue sometimes prospering and sometimes again depressed?"

To this we reply, that it is not the purpose of this treatise to prove God's perfect Moral Government, or the Truth of Revelation; but simply to observe what there is to be found in the con

stitution and course of nature, calculated to confirm the proper proofs of it, which are supposed to be already known and admitted. Still, we maintain that the above remarks do strongly confirm the proof of a future state of restitution, and also of Revelation; for,

1. They show that the Author of Nature is not indifferent to Virtue and Vice-the very course of nature exhibiting at the least a high probability that Virtue will in the end be victorious.

2. Distributive justice does not differ in kind, but only in degree, from what we experience now. It will be that in effect

which we now only see in its tendencies

3. Our experience shows us that Virtue and Vice are actually rewarded in part, even under the present course of things; hence we derive a hope that they may be rewarded and punished in a higher degree hereafter.

4. The good and bad tendencies of Virtue and Vice, respectively, are essential and founded in the nature of things; and hence, whatever hinders them now from taking effect, is not a necessary hindrance, but only artificial and accidental; for the tondencies are more likely to remain hereafter than any such impediments can be.

CHAPTER IV.

OF A STATE OF TRIAL.

The next point to be established is, that our present life is one of probation, that is, a state of trial for a future one. And this point must be treated separately, because the word "Probation" is distinctly expressive of dangers and trials, which do not necessarily enter into the idea of a Moral Government.

Now it is a fact that in our natural or temporal capacity we can go wrong, if we choose to do so; and that, therefore, we are so far in a state of trial, of difficulty, and of danger, to which our moral and religious trial bears some analogy. And what constitutes our natural trial here is something either in our external circumstances or in our own nature. For example, people may be betrayed into behaviour incompatible with their true interests by surprise, or by some other external occasion, or they will be led to act contrary to Prudence and Virtue by their own evil passions and habits. Still, temptations from without, and temptations from within, mutually imply each other. For when we talk of external temptations, we imply that we have within us some inward susceptibility of temptation; and when we talk of being misled by passions, we imply external temptations and objects of gratification.

Bp. Butler proceeds to prove his point by appealing to the judgments which men commonly form upon the subject. For

example, he argues that people blame themselves and others for their misconduct in temporal matters; that every one speaks of the hazards to which young people expose themselves when they first set out in life. Such descriptions of our state of natural trial are just as proper descriptions of our religious probation, if for the word "temporal" we substitute "future," and for "Prudence," "Virtue ;" so analogous are the two states.

And if we go on from a consideration of our like state of trial in both capacities, to observe how men behave under it, we shall find that men are misled, blinded, and deceived, by their own passions in either case. Thus our trials in our temporal and religious capacities, as they proceed from the same causes, and produce like effects, are evidently analogous and of the same kind.

Further, the difficulties and dangers with which we meet in our temporal capacity are often, either wholly or in part, created by the agency of others, by foolish education, &c., and other external circumstances. The same we find to be the case in our religious capacity. It is true that we are in a state of degradation, in a state inferior to what might have been, and one which does not seem to us the best calculated to advance our temporal and eternal interests. However, our happiness in it is evidently put into our own power; and so we have no more reason to complain against the Author of Nature on account of our position, than on account of his having withheld from us other advantages belonging to a higher order of created beings.

Our state, then, here is probably a state of trial, because it is of a piece with the rest of God's dealings towards us that it should be so. On the whole, if mankind, considered in their natural capacity, found themselves in a settled state of security and happiness, there would be a presumption against the acknowledged doctrine of Religion, that it represents our future interests as dependent on our exertions here. But the contrary is the case; our happiness here is not absolute, but contingent on our own exertions; in both cases it depends on ourselves, and consequently our present and future state are analogous.

CHAPTER V.

OF A STATE OF MORAL DISCIPLINE.

Having established the fact that we are in a state of Probation, the question next arises, "Why have we been placed in it?" Revelation tells us that it is for our moral discipline and improvement in virtue and piety, as the qualification for a future state of security and happiness. The probability of this being the case may be inferred from the analogy of this present world.

Youth, considered as a discipline for the scenes of mature life