only an exercise of virtue in these persons, but an exercise of it in ways and degrees peculiarly apt to improve it; apt to improve it, in some respects, even beyond what would be by the exercise of it required in a perfectly virtuous society, or in a society of equally imperfect virtue with themselves. But that the present world does not actually become a state of moral discipline to many, even to the generality, i. e., that they do not improve or grow better in it, cannot be urged as a proof that it was not intended for moral discipline, by any who at all observe the analogy of nature. For, of the numerous seeds of vegetables and bodies of animals, which are adapted and put in the way to improve to such a point or state of natural maturity and perfection, we do not see perhaps that one in a million actually does. Far the greatest part of them decay before they are improved to it, and appear to be absolutely destroyed. Yet no one who does not deny all final causes will deny that those seeds and bodies which do attain to that point of maturity and perfection answer the end for which they were really designed by nature, and therefore that nature designed them for such perfection. And I cannot forbear adding, though it is not to the present purpose, that the appearance of such an amazing waste in nature, with respect to these seeds and bodies by foreign causes, is to us as unaccountable as, what is much more terrible, the present and future ruin of so many moral agents by themselves, i. e., by vice.

Against this whole notion of moral discipline, it may be objected in another way, that so far as a course of behaviour materially virtuous proceeds from hope and fear, so far it is only a discipline and strengthening of self-love1. But doing what God commands, because he commands it, is obedience, though it proceeds from hope or fear. And a course of such obedience will form habits of it. And a constant regard to veracity, justice, and charity, may form distinct habits of these particular virtues, and will certainly form habits of self-government, and of denying our inclinations whenever veracity, justice, or charity requires it.

Religion is so far from disowning the principle of self-love, that it often addresses itself to that very principle, and always to the mind in that state where reason presides; and there can be had no access to the understanding, but by convincing men that the course of life we would persuade them to is not contrary to their interest.-Butler's Sermon xiii.

Nor is there any foundation for this great nicety, with which some affect to distinguish in this case, in order to depreciate all Religion proceeding from hope or fear. For veracity, justice, and charity, regard to God's authority and to our own chief interest, are not only all three coincident, but each of them is, in itself, a just and natural motive or principle of action. And he who begins a good life from any one of them, and perseveres in it, as he is already in some degree, so he cannot fail of becoming more and more, of that character which is correspondent to the constitution of nature as moral, and to the relation which God stands in to us as moral governor of it; nor, consequently, can he fail of obtaining that happiness which this constitution and relation necessarily suppose connected with that character1.

These several observations, concerning the active principle of virtue and obedience to God's commands, are applicable to passive submission or resignation to his will; which is another essential part of a right character connected with the former, and very much in our power to form ourselves to. It may be imagined, that nothing but afflictions can give occasion for or require this virtue; that it can have no respect to, nor be any way necessary to qualify for, a state of perfect happiness; but it is not experience which can make us think thus. Prosperity itself. whilst anything supposed desirable is not ours, begets ex travagant and unbounded thoughts. Imagination is alto gether as much a source of discontent as anything in our external condition. It is indeed true, that there can be no scope for patience, when sorrow shall be no more; but there may be need of a temper of mind which shall have been

1 Butler's meaning is as follows:-Self-love, as an active principle, aiming at our chief interest must uniformly coincide with the will of God; for obedience to his will must ever be our chief interest. But self-love, as a passive feeling of desire for the gratification of our wishes and affections, may not be more absolutely coincident with God's will than our particular affections are; and as being, like them, subject to excitement, independent of the approbation of the moral principle, they may require habits of resignation, as those require habits of obedience. At all events, both of them, as passive feelings, disturb the mind, and so need discipline in order to restrain them.-(D.)

2

Resignation to the will of God is the whole of piety; it includes in it all that is good, and is a source of the most settled quiet and composure of mind. It may be said to be perfect when our will is lost and resolved into his.-Serm. xiv. (Ed.)

formed by patience. For though self-love, considered merely as an active principle leading us to pursue our chief interest, cannot but be uniformly coincident with the principle of obedience to God's commands, our interest being rightly understood; because this obedience, and the pursuit of our own chief interest, must be in every case one and the same thing: yet it may be questioned whether self-love, considered merely as the desire of our own interest or happiness, can, from its nature, be thus absolutely and uniformly coincident with the will of God, any more than particular affections can1; coincident in such sort as not to be liable to be excited upon occasions and in degrees impossible to be gratified consistently with the constitution of things or the divine appointments. So that habits of resignation may, upon this account, be requisite for all creatures; habits, I say, which signify what is formed by use. However, in general it is obvious that both self-love and particular affection in human creatures, considered only as passive feelings, distort and rend the mind, and therefore stand in need of discipline. Now denial of those particular affections, in a course of active virtue and obedience to God's will, has a tendency to moderate them, and seems also to have a tendency to habituate the mind to be easy and satisfied with that degree of happiness which is allotted us, i. e., to moderate self-love. But the proper discipline for resignation is affliction. For a right behaviour under that trial; recollecting ourselves so as to consider it in the view in which Religion teaches us to consider it as from the hand of God; receiving it as what he appoints or thinks proper to permit in his world and under his government; this will habituate the mind to a dutiful submission. And such submission, together with the active principle of obedience", make up the temper and character in us which answers to his sovereignty, and which absolutely belongs to the condi tion of our being, as dependent creatures. Nor can it be said that this is only breaking the mind to a submission to mere power; for mere power may be accidental and precarious and usurped: but it is forming within ourselves the

1 Page 149.

2 The whole temper or character in us which answers to the sovereignty of God and belongs to our dependent condition, is formed by the union of the two principles of active obedience and passive submission.—(D.)

temper of resignation to his rightful authority, who is by nature supreme over all.

Upon the whole: such a character and such qualifications are necessary for a mature state of life in the present world, as nature alone does in no wise bestow, but has put it upon us, in great part, to acquire in our progress from one stage of life to another, from childhood to mature age; put it upon us to acquire them, by giving us capacities of doing it, and by placing us in the beginning of life in a condition fit for it. And this is a general analogy to our condition in the present world as in a state of moral discipline for another. It is in vain, then, to object against the credibility of the present life's being intended for this purpose, that all the trouble and the danger unavoidably accompanying such discipline might have been saved us by our being made at once the creatures and the characters which we were to be. For we experience, that what we were to be was to be the effect of what we would do; and that the general conduct of nature is, not to save us trouble or danger, but to make us capable of going through them, and to put it upon us to do so. Acquirements of our own experience and habits are the natural supply to our deficiencies and security against our dangers, since it is as plainly natural to set ourselves to acquire the qualifications, as the external things, which we stand in need of. In particular, it is as plainly a general law of nature, that we should, with regard to our temporal interest, form and cultivate practical principles within us, by attention, use, and discipline, as anything whatever is a natural law, chiefly in the beginning of life, but also throughout the whole course of it. And the alternative is left to our choice; either to improve ourselves, and better our condition, or, in default of such improvement, to remain deficient and wretched. It is therefore perfectly credible, from the analogy of nature, that the same may be our case, with respect to the happiness of a future state, and the qualifications necessary for it.

There is a third thing' which may scem implied in the

A probation-state has been already regarded in a twofold light-first, as implying trial, difficulties, and danger; secondly, as implying moral discipline and improvement. It remains to speak of it as a stage for the exhibition of character.-Ed.

present world's being a state of probation; that it is a theatre of action for the manifestation of persons' characters with respect to a future one; not, to be sure, to an allknowing Being, but to his creation, or part of it. This may, perhaps, be only a consequence of our being in a state of probation in the other senses. However, it is not impossible, that men's showing and making manifest what is in their heart, what their real character is, may have respect to a future life, in ways and manners which we are not acquainted with; particularly it may be a means, for the Author of Nature does not appear to do anything without means, of their being disposed of suitably to their characters, and of its being known to the creation, by way of example, that they are thus disposed of. But not to enter upon any conjectural account of this, one may just mention, that the manifestation of persons' characters contributes very much, in various ways, to the carrying on a great part of that general course of nature, respecting mankind, which comes under our observation at present. I shall only add, that probation, in both these senses, as well as in that treated of in the foregoing chapter, is implied in moral government; since by persons' behaviour under it, their characters cannot but be manifested, and, if they behave well, improved.

CHAPTER VI.1

OF THE OPINION OF NECESSITY, CONSIDERED AS
INFLUENCING PRACTICE.

THROUGHOUT the foregoing Treatise it appears, that the condition of mankind, considered as inhabitants of this

The analogy pursued in this treatise between the experienced constitution of nature and the expected dispensation taught by religion, suggests the following question :-If the opinion of necessity be reconcilable with the former, is it not also reconcilable with the latter? To answer this hypothetical question is the. object of this chapter. But first an objection which, if valid, would subvert the very foundation of the whole treatise, must be answered. Butler's argument is throughout built on the assumption that there is an intelligent Author and Governor of nature; but the Fatalist destroys the proof of this assumption, by asserting that necessity will itself account for the origin and preservation of all things. This question, then, must first be answered; upon the supposition that the opinion of necessity is reconcilable

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