no further than as the former are positive, or arise out of mere external command, the reasons of which we are not acquainted with; and as the latter are moral, or arise out of the apparent reason of the case, without such external command. Unless this caution be observed, we shall run

into endless confusion.

Now this being premised, suppose two standing precepts enjoined by the same authority, that, in certain conjunctures, it is impossible to obey both; that the former is moral, i. e., a precept of which we see the reasons, and that they hold in the particular case before us; but that the latter is positive, i. e., a precept of which we do not see the reasons: it is indisputable that our obligations are to obey the former1, because there is an apparent reason for this preference, and none against it. Further, positive institutions-I suppose all those which Christianity enjoins are means to a moral end, and the end must be acknowledged more excellent than the means. Nor is observance of these institutions any religious obedience at all, or of any value, otherwise than as it proceeds from a moral principle. This seems to be the strict logical way of stating and determining this matter; but will, perhaps, be found less applicable to practice than may be thought at first sight.

And therefore, in a more practical though more lax way of consideration, and taking the words moral law and positive institutions in the popular sense, I add, that the whole moral law is as much matter of revealed command as positive institutions are, for the Scripture enjoins every moral virtue. In this respect, then, they are both upon a level. But the moral law is, moreover, written upon our hearts; interwoven into our very nature. And this is a plain intimation of the Author of it, which is to be preferred when they interfere.

But there is not altogether so much necessity for the determination of this question as some persons seem to think. Nor are we left to reason alone to determine it. For, First, though mankind have, in all ages, been greatly

1 But we are not to suppose, because we cannot see the reasons for them, that God has not the wisest and best reasons for imposing them. This would not be worth remarking, if deistical writers, who deny the possibility of such precepts, did not confound positive with arbitrary precepts.—(H.)

prone to place their religion in peculiar positive rites, by way of equivalent for obedience to moral precepts, yet, without making any comparison at all between them, and consequently without determining which is to have the preference, the nature of the thing abundantly shows all notions of that kind to be utterly subversive of true religion, as they are, moreover, contrary to the whole general tenor of Scripture; and likewise to the most express particular declarations of it, that nothing can render us accepted of God without moral virtue. Secondly, upon the occasion of mentioning together positive and moral duties, the Scripture always puts the stress of Religion upon the latter, and never upon the former, which, though no sort of allowance to neglect the former, when they do not interfere with the latter, yet is a plain intimation that when they do, the latter are to be preferred. And further, as mankind are for placing the stress of their religion anywhere rather than upon virtue, lest both the reason of the thing, and the general spirit of Christianity, appearing in the intimation now mentioned, should be ineffectual against this prevalent folly, our Lord himself, from whose command alone the obligation of positive institutions arises, has taken occasion to make the comparison between them and moral precepts; when the Pharisees censured him for eating with publicans and sinners, and also when they censured his disciples for plucking the ears of corn on the Sabbath day. Upon this comparison he has determined expressly, and in form, which shall have the preference when they interfere. And by delivering his authoritative determination in a proverbial manner of expression, he has made it general: I will have mercy, and not sacrifice'. The propriety of the word proverbial is not the thing insisted upon, though I think the manner of speaking is to be called so. But that the manner of speaking very remarkably renders the determination general, is surely indisput able. For had it, in the latter case, been said only that God preferred mercy to the rigid observance of the Sabbath, even then, by parity of reason, most justly might we have argued, that he preferred mercy likewise to the observance of other ritual institutions, and, in general, moral duties to positive ones. And thus the determina1 Matt. ix. 13, and xii. 7.

tion would have been general, though its being so were inferred and not expressed. But as the passage really stands in the Gospel, it is much stronger. For the sense and the very literal words of our Lord's answer are as applicable to any other instance of a comparison between positive and moral duties as to this upon which they were spoken. And if, in case of competition, mercy is to be preferred to positive institutions, it will scarce be thought that justice is to give place to them. It is remarkable, too, that as the words are a quotation from the Old Testament, they are introduced, on both the forementioned occasions, with a declaration that the Pharisees did not understand the meaning of them. This, I say, is very remarkable. For, since it is scarce possible for the most ignorant person not to understand the literal sense of the passage in the Prophet', and since understanding the literal sense would not have prevented their condemning the guiltless, it can hardly be doubted that the thing which our Lord really intended in that declaration was, that the Pharisees had not learned from it, as they might, wherein the general spirit of Religion consists: that it consists in moral piety and virtue, as distinguished from forms and ritual observances. However, it is certain we may learn this from his divine application of the passage in the Gospel.

But as it is one of the peculiar weaknesses of human nature, when upon a comparison of two things one is found to be of greater importance than the other, to consider this other as of scarce any importance at all, it is highly necessary that we remind ourselves, how great presumption it is to make light of any institutions of divine appointment; that our obligations to obey all God's commands whatever are absolute and indispensable; and that commands merely positive, admitted to be from him, lay us under a moral obligation to obey them, an obligation moral in the strictest and most proper sense.

3 A neglect of the ordinances of religion of Divine appointment is the sure symptom of a criminal indifference about those higher duties by which men pretend to atone for the omission. It is too often found to be the beginning of a licentious life, and for the most part ends in the highest excesses of profligacy and irreligion.-Horsley's Sermons on the Sabbath. (Ed.)

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To these things I cannot forbear adding, that the account now given of Christianity most strongly shows and enforces upon us the obligation of searching the Scriptures, in order to see what the scheme of revelation really is, instead of determining beforehand, from reason, what the scheme of it must be1. Indeed, if in Revelation there be found any passages the seeming meaning of which is contrary to natural Religion, we may most certainly conclude such seeming meaning not to be the real one. But it is not any degree of a presumption against an interpretation of Scripture, that such interpretation contains a doctrine which the light of nature cannot discover2, or a precept which the law of nature does not oblige to.

CHAPTER II.

OF THE SUPPOSED PRESUMPTION AGAINST A REVELATION,
CONSIDERED AS MIRACULOUS.

HAVING shown the importance of the Christian revelation
and the obligations which we are under seriously to attend
to it, upon supposition of its truth or its credibility, the
next thing in order, is to consider the supposed presump-
tions against revelation in general, which shall be the
subject of this chapter, and the objections against the
Christian in particular, which shall be the subject of some
following ones3. For it seems the most natural method,
to remove these prejudices against Christianity, before we
proceed to the consideration of the positive evidence for it,
and the objections against that evidence".

It is, I think, commonly supposed that there is some peculiar presumption, from the analogy of nature, against

5 Hume has gone further; he asserts that "the credit we give to testimony is derived solely from experience," while, he adds, "a miracle is contrary to experience. No testimony should ever gain credit to an event, unless it is more extraordinary that it should be false than that the event should have happened. It is contrary to experience that a miracle should be true; but not contrary to experience that testimony should be false." In short, he considers miracles as impossible; for, speaking of the Abbé de Paris's miracles, he says, "What have we now to oppose to such a cloud of witnesses, but the absolute impossibility or miraculous nature of the events they relate?" Besides the answers here given, see the introduction to the

the Christian scheme of things, at least against miracles, so as that stronger evidence is necessary to prove the truth and reality of them, than would be sufficient to convince us of other events, or matters of fact. Indeed the consideration of this supposed presumption cannot but be thought very insignificant by many persons. Yet, as it belongs to the subject of this Treatise, so it may tend to open the mind, and remove some prejudices, however needless the consideration of it be upon its own account1.

I. I find no appearance of a presumption, from the analogy of nature, against the general scheme of Christianity, that God created and invisibly governs the world by Jesus Christ; and by him also will hereafter judge it in righteousness, i. e., render to every one according to his works, and that good men are under the secret influence of his Spirit. Whether these things are or are not to be called miraculous, is perhaps only a question about words; or, however, is of no moment in the case. If the analogy of nature raises any presumption against this general scheme of Christianity, it must be either because it is not discoverable by reason or experience, or else because it is unlike that course of nature which is. But analogy raises

"Analogy" above; and that to Paley's "Evidences." The fallacy of Hume's reasoning consists in this, that he argues from the laws of matter and motion established in the world; which laws being confessedly arbitrary constitutions of the Creator, the manner of their operation cannot be drawn from any previous reasoning, but must be drawn solely from experience; but if we admit the existence of a God, we must admit that we can discover, by reasoning à priori, a connection between an almighty Cause and every effect which is the object of power. To establish his position, it is necessary to prove that nothing is possible but what is established in the usual course of nature. And as to his objection from testimony-for he opposes the uncertainty of testimony to the certainty of contrary experience-this is answered below (ch. iii.). Further, that the evidence of testimony is superior to that of experience, and that they are somewhat connected, so that the weakening of the one weakens the other, is shown in Price's "Dissertation," p. 400, and in Dr. Adam's " Essay on Miracles,” p. 5.—Ed.

1 After showing the importance of Christianity, it seems the most natural method to remove an objection against revelation in general, and objections against the Christian revelation in particular, before considering the positive evidence for Christianity and the objections against that evidence. The objection against revelation in general is, that it is miraculous. In obviating the supposed presumption against the particular instance of miraculous power displayed in a revelation, the supposed presumption against miracles in general will be considered.-Ed.