depart from the moral rule of action interwoven in their nature, or suggested and enforced by this moral faculty1; in rewarding and punishing them upon account of their so doing.

I am not sensible that I have, in this fifth observation, contradicted what any author designed to assert. But some of great and distinguished merit, have, I think, expressed themselves in a manner which may occasion some danger to careless readers, of imagining the whole of virtue to consist in singly aiming, according to the best of their judgment, at promoting the happiness of mankind in the present state; and the whole of vice in doing what they foresee, or might foresee, is likely to produce an overbalance of unhappiness in it: than which mistakes, none can be conceived more terrible. For it is certain, that some of the most shocking instances of injustice, adultery, murder, perjury, and even of persecution, may, in many supposable cases, not have the appearance of being likely to produce an overbalance of misery in the present state; perhaps sometimes may have the contrary appearance. For this reflection might easily be carried on, but I forbear. The happiness of the world is the concern of him who is the Lord and the Proprietor of it: nor do we know what we are about, when we endeavour to promote the good of mankind in any ways, but those which he has directed; that is, indeed, in all ways not contrary to veracity and justice. I speak thus upon supposition of persons really endeavouring, in some sort, to do good without regard to these. But the truth seems to be, that such supposed endeavours proceed, almost always, from ambition, the spirit of party, or some indirect principle, concealed perhaps in great measure from persons themselves. And though it is our business and our duty to endeavour, within the bounds of veracity and justice, to contribute to the ease, convenience, and even cheerfulness and diversion of our fellow-creatures: yet, from our short views, it is greatly uncertain, whether this endeavour will, in particular instances, produce an overbalance of happiness upon the whole; since so many and distant things must come into the account. And that which makes it our duty is, that there is some appearance that it will, and no positive

1 P. 169.

appearance sufficient to balance this, on the contrary side; and also, that such benevolent endeavour is a cultivation of that most excellent of all virtuous principles, the active principle of benevolence.

However, though veracity, as well as justice, is to be our rule of life; it must be added, otherwise a snare will be laid in the way of some plain men, that the use of common forms of speech, generally understood, cannot be falsehood; and, in general, that there can be no designed falsehood without designing to deceive. It must likewise be observed, that in numberless cases, a man may be under the strictest obligations to what he foresees will deceive, without his intending it. For it is impossible not to foresee, that the words and actions of men, in different ranks and employments, and of different educations, will perpetually be mistaken by each other: and it cannot but be so, whilst they will judge with the utmost carelessness, as they daily do, of what they are not, perhaps, enough informed to be competent judges of, even though they considered it with great attention.

END OF ANALOGY.

BISHOP BUTLER'S SERMONS.

PREFACE.

As the religious system of Bishop Butler is to be gathered from his "Analogy of Natural and Revealed Religion," so his moral system is to be found in his "Fifteen Sermons upon Human Nature, or Man considered as a Moral Agent."

In order to appreciate the full meaning of these sermons, it is almost necessary to master the Preface, which stands prefixed to them. The following outline of it will be found useful.

Though all men judge to some extent, few care to judge whether the arguments set before them be really conclusive or not. For proof, as such, they do not care; and this tendency is increased by light and frivolous reading. Others, on the contrary, think no subject difficult, and so are not at the pains of weighing arguments. But all works require attention in proportion to the difficulty of their subject-matter. And moral treatises require special attention, because ideas fluctuate, and terms change their meaning. Light works may be accommodated to the reader, but the moral writer must state things as he finds them. And those only have a right to pronounce the following discourses difficult or obscure, who know whether such difficulty or obscurity could have been avoided or not. They should remember that, while perplexity may be laid to the charge of the writer, obscurity lies in the subject-matter of a book.

There are two ways of treating the subject of morals. The one starts with an inquiry into the abstract relations of things; the other from a matter of fact, such as what is the particular nature of man, and what its several parts, &c., and then from these facts goes on to determine what course of life it is which corresponds to his whole nature. The former is the best formal proof; the latter is more readily understood by most men, and peculiarly suited to satisfy a fair mind.

Butler adopts, chiefly, this latter course. In the first three sermons, he proceeds upon it entirely. The intention of these sermons is to show what is the nature of man, and how the ancient moralists were right in asserting that virtue lay in following this nature, and vice in departing from it. In order to understand the truth of this position, we must state exactly what is meant by a "System." It is not merely a whole made up of several parts; but such a whole made up of parts which have a mutual relation to each other, and are conducive to some end. Thus man is made up of appetites, passions, affections, and a conscience; but this is not a

complete account of man's inward frame and nature, because we have not taken into account the relation of conscience to the rest, and the end to which his nature is adapted. If we view man in this light, it will be as clear that man is made for virtue as a watch for keeping time.

It follows on this, that if virtue be the end of man, vice is most opposed to his moral nature. And the heathen moralists meant this when they wrote: for even if they meant that vice was opposed to the higher part of his nature, the very idea of a higher and a lower part implies that they believed it to be a system, although possibly they may not have been able to explain themselves fully.

The Preface next gives a brief outline of the argument of some of the sermons in consecutive order. The first three sermons are to the following effect: Men and brutes both have certain appetites, but man has a ruling principle within him, called a conscience, which brutes have not. And therefore, although brutes, in pursuing their instincts, follow their entire nature, it does not follow that man is following nature when he pursues his appetites; for he is following only a part, and that too the lower part, of his nature, and he is neglecting to follow conscience, which he ought to obey as absolute and supreme in his moral system. Thus, in spite of the immoral tenets of certain philosophers, man is a law to himself; the very voice of conscience laying him under an obligation to act virtuously.

The eleventh and twelfth sermons are the only other two which need to be specially mentioned here. Their outline is as follows: Benevolence and self-love are not opposed, but compatible. Our actions have for their objects either ourselves or others; so far as they regard ourselves, they are the result of self-love; so far as they regard others, they spring from benevolence; and these two affections may coexist; nay, they are so often united in the same action, that it becomes absurd to assert, as some do, that men are wholly actuated by the one or the other affection. The facts of human nature go equally to show the existence within us of both principles. And self-love, rightly understood, and in its due degree, is as good an affection as benevolence. It is as much to be regretted that men do not show more self-love in the world, as it is that they have so little benevolence. For if they were to cultivate self-love-in other words, if they were uniformly to pursue their own true and highest good-much vice and misery would be avoided.

↑ SERMON I.-Upon Human Nature.

The first three sermons bear the above title. We learn from them, first, that man's nature is a Constitution or System, and that conscience is the leading principle in it; secondly, that con