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no part of the cargo is paid for in specie, the Japanese laws prohibiting the exportation of the precious metals under any form; the whole trade therefore consists in barter, and the profit depends on the subsequent sale of the homeward-bound cargo. At the close of one year's consignment the quantity and assortment of the following year's cargo is determined, and a list is sent to Batavia for the guidance of the authorities accordingly.

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It has been the opinion of many of the best informed persons, however, that these restrictions on the quantity of cargo are very much owing to the mismanagement or intrigues of the officers of the factory, whose interest it is that the trade should not be so extensive as to interfere with their own privilege, or require more than one chief officer to conduct it; and the commissioner who went to Nangazacky in the year 1814 expressly declares, that, in his opinion, the present state of the trade is no criterion for judging of the extent to which it might be carried; he says, "The climate, the habits of the people, and their freedom from any prejudices that would obstruct the operation of these natural causes, would open a vent for numerous articles of European comfort and luxury. The consumption of woollens and hardware might be rendered almost unlimited;-they are fond of the finer specimens of the glass manufacture, and the returns from Japan, which have hitherto been limited to their copper and camphor, some lacquered ware, a small quantity of silks, and a few other things of trifling importance, may be extended to a long list. Specimens of teas, pitch, borax, iron, cinnabar, linseed oil, whale oil, and other articles which may be obtained, have been brought to Java by this opportunity." -, unwelle

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The same gentleman has also observed, that so far as his local knowledge enabled him to form a judgment, the real difficulties of introducing the British flag in Japan, inasmuch as they depend on the character and political institutions of the Japanese, are much less than they have been represented to be. He was of opinion, that the ill success of the attempts hitherto made has been chiefly owing to the misrepresentations which it has been the policy of the Dutch government to keep up, in order to secure their own commercial monopoly; and that the failure of the Russian embassy in 1804, as well as the offence taken at the entrance of the British frigate into the harbor of in the year tangazacky 1808, may be in a great measure attributed to the effects of this policy. In short, from the various opinions expressed by persons who were at Nangazacky with the commercial adventure in 1813 and 1814, it seems reasonable to conclude that, although

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the recent re-establishment of the Dutch, factory under its ancient forms will have re-opened the usual supply of European goods,

and will consequently have taken away the particular advantages: that were to be contemplated while the British authority ruled in Java, there is still sufficient prospect of success to justify an attempt being made, if other objects to be acquired be considered worth the expense of a trials And this conclusion is confirmed by the following circumstance: When at the close of the commercial consignment of the years 1814 and 1815, the chief of the factory, calculating on the change which had taken place in Europe, renewed his declaration that he would not receive another consignment except on his own terms, he requested the Japanese interpreters to transmit a declaration, on their part, that they could not answer for the consequences of any departure from the plan which he proposed. The interpreters did so ; but they concluded by saying It is, however, of no importance who is sent as chief of the factory, provided a lasting peace has been established at Batavia." This expression could only imply, that if the govern ment had become settled, whether English or Dutch, the trade might be continued; because it is very evident that the Japanese knew the real character of the expeditions sent from Batavia by the British authorities, and were aware of the conquest of Jaya; and as no doubt was ever entertained of the Dutch being received at Nangazacky, the remark was useless if applied to the Netherlands government only.

Upon the whole, then, I think it may be assumed, that, in a commercial point of view, there is a considerable opening among * the Indian islands, which it would be desirable to occupy, before the further advances of other nations shall have excluded us altogeAther. It remains to show, that the longer this question is postponed, the greater will be the difficulty as well as necessity of actwing with effect; and that it is politically expedient to obtain a naval station in the Eastern seas, while it can be done without injury to the just rights of others.

The only power with whom there would at present be any actual contact is the government of the Netherlands; it is necessary, btherefore, to consider, what are the rights which that government has acquired by the convention concluded in the year 1814. This convention has restored the factories and establishments which the & Dutch possessed in the Eastern seas in the commencement of 1803, viz. Java and its dependencies, Celebes, and the smaller islands situat97ed in the straits of Macassar, the Moluccas, Malacca on the Malay peninsula, and sundry establishments on the island of Sumatra : it has also ceded to them the island of Banca; but as it contains no explanatory article whatever, there is still this question, as before observed, whether a formal abandonment by the Dutch govern ment, subsequently to January, 1803, of establishments which

had been held by them previously to that date, constitutes an exclusion of such establishments from the provisions of the convention 1814? And on the decision upon this point would depend the present right of the Netherlands government to consider their former factories on the island of Borneo as a part of the recent restitution.

It is evident, from what has already been stated, that the commercial relations between Great Britain and Holland, in the Eastern seas, are not the same now as they were when the Dutch were in the plenitude of their commercial monopoly in that quarter of the world. Of late years, the British have acquired a direct and frequent intercourse with the native states in the Indian Archipelago, and, from that intercourse, have established new relations which have assisted in augmenting the amount of capital employed in the British trade to China. The Dutch, therefore, can no longer exercise the same restrictive policy and nominal control among the Eastern states, without committing a positive injury on the trade which has been legitimately acquired by Great Britain; nor can they extend their control over Borneo and the Straits of Malacca, without encroaching beyond the bounds which the convention of 1814 has restored to them; consequently, much depends on the system of policy pursued by the present government of Java.

Now the whole course of proceedings adopted by that government tends to revive the former system of monopoly and exclusion. They commenced, at the time of the restitution of Java, by refusing to admit the slightest interference, or any community of interests, on the part of the British government in the possessions ceded or restored to them: it was their earnest endeavor to induce the natives to conclude that Great Britain had no longer any regard or influence in their behalf. They have since annulled the very treaty by which the power of ceding the island of Banca to them 'was obtained, and have sent the sultan of Palembang a prisoner to Batavia, as a punishment for his having solicited that protection which he was justly entitled to expect from the British nation ; and it appears, by recent accounts, that they have assumed a paramount authority at Banjarmassin, at Sambas, and at Pontiana, and declare the Netherlands government to be the sovereign of Borneo. But one step more is wanting; if, with the same system and views, they establish themselves also on the western side of the China sea; if they obtain the islands of Bintang and Lingin, and of the south-east coast of the Malay peninsula, (positions which they are known to have in view) the British merchant will become wholly excluded from direct trade to the Indian islands, and will not have one port between Penang and China to which he can resort, except under the control and direction of a foreign power. The Nether

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lands government have Batavia on one side, and seek to obtain Rhio' on the other; by the former they already command the Straits of Sunda, by the latter they would acquire a naval station at the entrance from the Straits of Malacca to the China sea; while the possession of Malacca and Johore, on the southern Malay coast, would complete their command of these straits; and thus the direct Toute of the British trade to China would have to pass along a line of foreign settlements, while Great Britain would possess no naval station nearer than Ceylon and Penang. The vexatious difficulties to which this state of things would lead, and the eventual insecuority of the British trade, under such circumstances, must be too obvious to require comment.

The local enactments of the Java government lead also to the same system of exclusion. By regulations passed last year, foreign @vessels are not permitted to touch at the minor ports in Java all the cargo must be taken in at the port from which the vessel is cleared out, an import and export duty of twelve per cent. is imposed, while six per cent. is paid on the cargoes of Netherlands ships; and it is also understood that the old system has been revived of requiring all native traders at the ports under the control of the Netherlands government, to take passes from the resident European authority; a practice which necessarily tends to force the native trade to such ports as the Java government may prefer, and Krestricts other nations from a direct participation therein. v

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In whatever point of view, therefore, the question is considered, it seems essential to interpose for the purpose of preventing the revival of this injurious and pernicious system; injurious as it bregards the legitimate pretensions of other nations, and pernicious as it presents a barrier against that improvement of the native popu*lation, which, in the present enlightened state of Europe, ought to be a subject of general anxiety. It might not, indeed, be so immediately destructive to the commercial interests of Great Britain, if the government of the Netherlands were satisfied with what the convention of 1814 has restored, and would not seek to ëstablish their control over countries which were not in contemplation when that convention was concluded; but every act of that government is of a different tendency; and the very great exertions which have been made, and are still making, show the importance attached to the object. The latest advices mention, that the Netherlands government have a squadron of ships of war at Batavia considerably larger than that which Great Britain retains in the Indian seas, and shave about 10,000 European troops in their Eastern settlements, *mos 919w dɔidw (etinq to love yɔansique & aust, or ¿IS“ 25 and the chief port and harbor in the island of Bintang.

independently of their colonial corps. With what view can this sexpense be incurred, unless to establish a supreme authority in that quarter of the world do 192.

31 Surely, then, it would be injudicious to delay until these plans have become matured, and have acquired that plea which a continued possession and a lapse of time would give to them. The acts of the local government of Java, whether in taking possession of factories and establishments which were not held by the Dutch governsment in the year 1803, such as Sambas and Pontiana, or sin -restricting the independent native trade, as in assuming a supremaboy over the island of Borneo, cannot of themselves be considered sufficient to constitute a right of possession; and it will still remain open to other nations, particularly to Great Britain, under the relations in which she stands with the government of the Netherlands, sto interpose and remove the seeds of future dispute, by a eliberal and friendly adjustment of the fair pretensions of both parties. Moreover, the results of the late restitution of Java and its dependencies afford a means of mutual concession and sacrifice, if such be required. There is a balance of about 500,000l. sterling, which is admitted to be due to the British government, in the transfer of Java to the government of the Netherlands; and there sis: a further sum of about 250,000l., disputed indeed, but which lis claimed for the British government on just and equitable grounds. Why may not the settlement of these demands be united with an adjustment of the future commerce of the Indian Archipelago, on sthat system of liberal and generous policy which is consistent with the acknowledged views of the ruling powers in Europe, and with the amicable relations now subsisting between Great Britain and -the Netherlands? navy

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An adjustment of this nature may be considered in two points oof view; separately, as including only those countries where the -Netherlands government had not, at the date of the latest advices from that quarter, actually formed any establishment; or, more collectively, as including those positions which have been occupied since the restitution of Java, but which were not actually trans-ferred with Java at the time of that restitution, harnos jeds notw don The Netherlands government have no possessions to the westbward of the island of Banca, excepting Malacca, which factory, if hot comprehended in one general system of possessing every thing yto the eastward of Penang, would be of no great value to them. It may also, I presume, be granted, that the government of the Netherlands has no right, under the terms of the convention of 1814, to claim a supremacy over minor ports, which were some forty years ago subject to the control of the Dutch, but had been formerly abandoned by them previously to the year 1803;