and, under this point of view, the native state of Johore, situated on the south-east point of the Malay peninsula, is free to form engagements with other European powers, while no claim can exist on the states of Rhio and Lingin, because the supremacy of the Dutch has never been established in those islands.

The island of Bintang, in which is situated the port and harbor of Rhio, is about thirty miles in length, and ten miles in breadth, and contains about 7000 inhabitants; and Rhio, as has been already noticed in a former part of these observations, having long been the resort of the Malay and Chinese traders, is peculiarly well situated for a commercial station: the harbor will contain from twenty to thirty large ships, in safe and excellent anchorage, but is liable to objection, in consequence of the approach to it through the straits of Rhio being somewhat intricate, and impeded by a shoal, which renders the channel narrow for ships of burden; I am, however, informed, that the sea is almost constantly calm and quiet, and that the difficulty of entrance is not so great as to be attended with danger. Bintang furnishes fresh provisions, and good water in abundance, and the neighbouring island of Lingin is rich in the ordinary produce of the Indian islands, particularly in gambier, which is an article in constant use among the Javanese and Malays. Rhio, therefore, would become a valuable mart or emporium, where the merchandise exported from Great Britain, or British India, might be collected and exchanged for the products of the Indian islands calculated for the China market; it would also be a central station, whence a further connexion with the independent native states might be formed, and an adequate squadron be placed, when necessary, in the ordinary track of the British trade to China.

I have before remarked that the Dutch had not any possession or control in the islands of Bintang and Lingin in the year 1803, and no trace is to be discovered among the collection of treaties and contracts with native states, which were found among the records at Batavia, of their ever having exercised, in these islands, the supremacy which they had elsewhere established in the Indian Archipelago. The circumstance also of a mission having some months ago been sent to Rhio by the governor general in council at Fort William, for the purpose of forming an establishment there, provided the Netherlands government had not already preceded us, confirms this opinion, because it may be presumed that the act of having sent this mission proves that no known obstacle existed on the ground of any right possessed by another nation The native chiefs of Bintang and Rhio may consequently be considered independent of the control of any European power,

and free to select that connexion which is most agreeable to themselves; and they have more than once expressed a desire to receive a British establishment, and their willingness to conclude a treaty for that purpose.

If this mission has been successful, the possession of Rhio will of course become the nucleus whence the farther connexion with the native states will proceed; and if not successful, it becomes the more necessary to interpose and to fix the commercial relations in the Eastern seas on a secure and decided footing, before the local clashing of interests has led to injury and dispute.

If then it be asked what position of circumstances would be most likely to remove the local causes of difference between Great Britain and the Netherlands, the question may be readily answered by suggesting that the eastern side of the Straits of Sunda and the western side of the China sea should become the boundary of the respective establishments of the two nations; thus leaving Sumatra and Banca, together with the Straits of Malacca and the adjacent islands, to be occupied by the British, while the Dutch retained Borneo, Java, and the different islands to the eastward of the Straits of Sunda.

But if such an arrangement were found to involve too many of the positions which have unfortunately been conceded and overlooked when the convention of 1814 was concluded, the British trade ought at any rate to have free access to all the ports where the local administration and government of the country is not exercised by the European power who controls its trade, and appropriates its produce. The custom of the Dutch government has been to establish a single public agent as director of the local trade of a port, and obtain a treaty or contract with the native chief to the exclusion of other nations; but it can hardly be sufficient in the present state of the Indian commerce, that the residence of a harbor-master and a few individual merchants should constitute an exclusive right of possession: nor can it be admitted that a treaty concluded with a native prince or chief, in which the sovereignty of his country is ceded to the Netherlands government, should convey to that government a dominion over territories not actually held or administered by the prince who thus cedes them. Yet it is in history that the power of the Dutch government in the Indian Aachipelago was raised by their treaties with the native states having been made to comprehend the cession of all islands which have at any former period acknowledged the supremacy of that state, but were not actually in subjection or tributary to it at the time of the treaty being concluded; and it is only in this way that the Netherlands go

vernment can now pretend to a sovereignty over the island of Borneo de efi và th Lachclugeg

Those positions, therefore, which are not already occupied should be obtained without further delay; the recent proceedings/1 of the government-general in India should be supported and maintained; and it then remains to conclude such further aren rangements as may be thought requisite for the more clear and better understanding of the commerce of the Eastern seas, and for that amelioration and freedom of intercourse which the numerous population in these countries have a just right to expect.d biased H

Itmay be urged perhaps that the natives in the Indian Archiees pelago are in a state of anarchy and uncivilisation, which unfits 1 them for engaging in peaceable intercourse, and renders it impro-s bable that the trade with them would become of sufficient value i to repay the expense, much less justify any sacrifice to obtain itre But although I am free to admit that the introduction of regularan commercial habits, and the abolition of their present custom of or having their vessels equally prepared for plunder or for trade, w cannot be the work of a moment, I believe that the barbarism of these tribes has been very greatly exaggerated, and I am satisfied v that their piratical habits are very much owing to the statex of dis degradation in which they have been held. Remove the cause, and the effect ceases; permit them to enjoy quietly and without £/? restraint the fruits of industry, and there is no peculiar difficulty that should prevent the usual progress of freedom and of civilisation among them. The same report was given of the inhabitants of Java, and was credited until the experience of the British adminis tration in that island had shown that there exists not a people more e mild in character and more accessible to kindness than the Javanese are grand although the present habits of the Malay tribes are less if} refined and civilised; there is no reason to suppose that they arests less accessible than their neighbours. I will not pretend to sayed that the first British vessels trading to their ports would in every instance meet with the reception or find the profit that could be. wished, more especially in the first opening of the communication ; but what I am anxious to establish is, that the means may be found, within the circle above described, of ameliorating the condition of some millions of our fellow-creatures, and of obtaining, with that amelioration, a permanent and material advancement of our own national prosperity, aristaq qoisM to Pribolɔ 001303 29blesd The conquest of these countries, or even a resident control over 2 the government of them, would not be either necessary or politic it is sufficient to form such connexions with them as would pre-br vent any other nation assuming that control to our exclusion, and

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establishing a monopoly destructive to the local industry of the population. This might, I conceive, be effected by the possession of an establishment in their neighbourhood, which, at the same time that it offered to them a market for the purchase of their commodities and the supply of their wants, should contain a sufficient naval force to command respect and ensure protection; and, as our commercial relations extended, a second such establishment might be added, and communications be occasionally held with the neighbouring states, or in particular instances, an officer of inferior rank be sent to reside as an agent. A more extended plan than this would not, I presume, be required; for it would be an essential part of the system to leave the native trader perfectly free from restraint; and if the commercial objects in contemplation are to be effectually sought for, the British merchant should be at liberty to trade freely to the different ports, and to make his engagements as best suited his own convenience; with no greater restrictions than what may be found absolutely necessary to secure to the East India Company the exclusive commercial privileges which they already possess in China.

An establishment at the port of Rhio, and either the northwest part of Borneo, or near the Suluh islands, would embrace the extremes of a first undertaking, and would not trespass on the known rights or possessions of any other power. There is a harbour on the coast of Borneo Proper; and in the Suluh islands, although Suluh itself is not a convenient port, an excellent harbor is formed with the main island by Pulo Talain, which contains a safe and extensive anchorage, and is in the vicinity of a well cultivated country, abounding with good water and supplies.

Or, if the establishments which have been recently formed on the Western coast of Borneo can be matter of negociation, and . the trade to that coast can be recovered, Pontiana will naturally become a principle place of resort. The trade of this port is considerable; there is a population of between 40 and 50,000 Chi

• The annual demand for the Pontian market is estimated to require * 8 to 10,000 bales of piece goods,

1000 peculs of Swedish iron,

300 peculs of steel, and

400 coyangs of salt;

besides cotton cloths of Malay patterns, a few bales of broad-cloths, some chintzes, hardware, &c. And this independently of the Malay and China trade to the port.

is to J-SAVOY In return, Pontiana furnishes about 20 peculs of gold; some diamonds, birds' nests, camphor, betle-nut, and other articles which have already been enumerated, as being common to the islands in this Archipelago,so pas

nese residing near the gold-mines, who have a domestic government among themselves, but pay tribute to the Malay sultan of Pontiana; and the revenues of this chief are estimated to average 180,000 dollars per annum, including a capitation tax on the Chinese, at the rate of one Spanish dollar per head; and the value of 50 bankals of gold, which is the amount of the revenue paid on the produce of the mines.' The trade to this port had, previously to the restitution of Java to his Netherlands majesty's government, been for several years in the hands of the free merchants resident in the East India Company's possessions; and it is a tribute justly due to the judgment and foresight of Sir Stamford Raffles to add, that if his views and wishes had been carried into execution, a chain of establishments, wholly unconnected with the conquest of Java, and independent of the provisional possession of that island, would have been formed along the track of the China sea, and would have obtained without difficulty every one of those national objects of which it may with truth be said, that the longer they are delayed, the greater will be found the necessity of securing them.

At the same time I think it may be asserted, that the plan which it is the object of these remarks to recommend to public notice would not only require no considerable expense in the first instance, but may even be considered economical, if it be admitted that the security of the commercial interests of this country renders it advisable to have a naval station nearer to the China sea than those which we possess at present.

After the first cost of placing the new establishment in a posture of security against foreign aggression, and of constructing those works of defence which every distant position must require,.no large expense would be necessary to conduct the details of an administration which is intended principally for commercial purposes without monopoly, and does not contemplate any acquisition of territory, nor any direction of the internal government of other countries. In time of peace, therefore, it would require no larger defensive means than those which are thought necessary in the neighbouring British settlements, and whenever war takes place it immediately acquires an increase of value and importance, which would, even with the most scrupulous attention to economy, justify a larger expenditure on account of it.

Should a new war occur in Europe, which though sincerely to be deprecated cannot be considered to be an impossibility, our China trade would have, to pass along a line of foreign ports; should war

It is calculated, but the information is not so complete as to make the calculation at all certain, that about 50 parets of gold are annually obtained from the mines in Succadana.