took to build (each at his own charges) one quinquireme; which example wrought so well, that they, whose ability would not serve to do the like, joined with some others, and laying their money together, concurred two or three of them, in building of another, with condition to be repaid when the war was finished. By this voluntary contribution, they made and furnished two hundred new quinqueremes, taking for their pattern that excellent swift-rowing galley which they had gotten from the Rhodian in the port of Lilybæum, as was shewed before. The charge of this fleet was committed to C. Luctatius Catulus, who passed with the same into Sicily the spring following, and entered the port of Drepanum, endeavouring by all means to have forced the city. But being advertised that the Carthaginian fleet was at hand, and being mindful of the late losses which his predecessors had received, he was careful to put himself in order against their arrival.

Hanno was admiral of the Carthaginian fleet; a man (as his actions declare him) wise in picture, exceedingly formal, and skilful in the art of seeming reverend. How his reputation was first bred, I do not find; but it was upheld by a factious contradiction of things undertaken by men more worthy than himself. This quality procured unto him (as it hath done to many others) both good-liking among the ancient sort, whose cold temper is averse from new enterprizes, and therewithal an opinion of great foresight, confirmed by every loss received. More particularly, he was gracious among the people, for that he was one of the most grievous oppressors of their subject provinces; whereby he procured unto the Carthaginians much wealth, but therewithal such hatred as turned it all to their great loss. He had ere this been employed against the Numidians, and wild Africans, that were more like to rovers than to soldiers in making war. Of these fugitive nations, he learned to neglect more manly enemies, to his own

great dishonour, and to the great hurt of Carthage; which lost not more by his bad conduct, than by his malicious counsel, when, having shewed himself an unworthy captain, he betook himself to the long robe. Yet is he much commended in Roman histories, as a temperate man, and one that studied how to preserve the league between Carthage and Rome. In which regard, how well he deserved of his own country, it will appear hereafter; how beneficial he was to the Romans, it will appear, both hereafter and in his present voyage, wherein he reduced the Carthaginians to a miserable necessity of accepting, upon hard conditions, that peace which he thenceforth commended.

Hanno had very well furnished his navy with all needful provisions for the soldiers at Eryx, (for dexterity in making preparation was the best of his qualities;) but he had neither been careful in training his mariners to the practice of sea-fight, nor in manning his galleys with stout fellows. He thought, that the fame of a Carthaginian fleet was enough to make the unexpert Romans give way; forgetting, that rather the resistless force of tempest, than any other strength of opposition, had made them to forsake the seas. Yet in one thing he had either conceived aright, or else was sent forth well instructed. It was his purpose, first of all to sail to Eryx, and there to discharge his ships of their lading; and having thus lightened himself, he meant to take aboard some part of the land army, together with Hamilcar himself, by whose help he doubted not, but that he should be able to make his enemy repent of his new adventure to sea. This was a good course, if it could have been performed. But Catulus used all possible diligence to prevent the execution of this design; not because he was informed of the enemy's purpose, but for that he knew it to be the best for them, and for that he feared no danger so greatly as to encounter with Hamilcar. Wherefore, although

the weather was very rough, and the seas went high, when the Carthaginian fleet was descried, yet he rather chose to fight with the enemy, that had the wind of him, than to suffer this convoy to pass along to Eryx, upon likely hope of better opportunity in the future. All that Hanno should have done, Catulus had performed. He had carefully exercised his men in rowing; he had lightened his gallies of all unnecessary burdens; and he had taken aboard the choice men of the Roman land-soldiers. The Carthaginians, therefore, at the first encounter, were utterly broken and defeated, having fifty of their gallies stemmed and sunk, and seventy taken, wherein were few less than ten thousand men, that were all made prisoners; the rest, by a sudden change of wind, escaping to the isle of Hieronesus.

The state of Carthage, utterly discouraged by this change of fortune, knew not whereon to resolve. Means to repair their fleet in any time there were none left; their best men of war by sea were consumed; and Hamilcar, upon whose valour and judgment the honour and safety of the commonwealth rested, was now surrounded by his enemies in Sicily, where he could not be relieved. In this extremity, they make dispatch unto Hamilcar himself, and authorise him to take what course should seem best unto his excellent wisdom, leaving all conclusions to his election and sole counsel.

Hamilcar, whom no adversity, accompanied with the least hope or possibility of recovery, had ever vanquished, looking over every promise, true or false, that the present time could make him (for to attend any thing from the future he was not able) resolved to make trial whether his necessity might be compounded upon any reasonable terms. He therefore sent to Luctatius the consul an overture of peace; who, considering it well, gathered so many arguments from the present poverty of the Roman state, wasted beyond expectation in the former war, that

he willingly hearkened unto it. So, in conclusion, an accord was made, but with provision, that it should hold none otherwise than if the senate and people of Rome would ratify it with their allowance.

The conditions were: first, that the Carthaginians should clearly abandon the isle of Sicily; secondly, that they should never undertake upon Hiero, king of Syracuse, nor invade any part of his territories, nor the territories of any of his friends and allies; thirdly, that they should set at liberty, and send back into Italy, all the Romans whom they held prisoners, without ransom; lastly, that they should pay unto the Romans two thousand and two hundred talents; which make, after six hundred French crowns to the talent, thirteen hundred and twenty thousand crowns, the same to be delivered within twenty years next following.

These articles were sent to Rome, where they were not thoroughly approved; but ten commissioners were sent into Sicily, to make perfect the agreement. These commissioners added a thousand talents to the former sum, and required a shorter time of payment. Further also, they took order that the Carthaginians should not only depart out of Sicily itself, but should also withdraw their companies out of all the other islands between it and Italy, renouncing their whole interest therein.

Such was the end of the first Punic war, that had lasted about twenty-four years without intermission; in which time the Romans had lost, by fight or ship, wreck, about seven hundred quinquiremes, and the Carthaginians about five hundred, the greatness of which losses doth serve to prove the greatness both of these two cities, and of the war itself; wherein I hold good the judgment of Polybius, that the Ro. mans, in general, did shew themselves the braver nation, and Hamilcar the most worthy captain,

CHAP. II.

OF DIVERS ACTIONS PASSING BETWEEN THE FIRST AND SECOND PUNIC WARS.

SECT. I.

Of the cruel war begun between the Carthaginians and their own mercenaries.

TH

6

HE Romans having, partly by force, and partly by composition, thrust the Carthaginians out of Sicily, and all the little islands thereunto adjacent, gave them rather means and leisure to help themselves in a following war, than cause to hold themselves contented with the present peace. It is an ancient and true rule, Quod leges a victoribus dicuntur, accipiuntur à victis';' that laws are given by the conquerors, and received of the conquered. But the Romans had either forgotten the answer that was made unto them by one of the Privernates, or else had forgotten to follow it, in this weighty business. For one of Privernum, after a rebellion, defending in the senate the cause of his city, was demanded by a senator, What peace the Romans might hope for, or assure themselves of, if they quitted 'their present advantage over them?' he answered

1 Q. Curt. 1. iv.