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in favor of the opinion that the Constitution carries and tects slavery, wherever its authority goes in territories or States. Let us analyze and examine them in detail. 1st. The right of property in a slave is distinctly and expressly affirmed, &c. This proposition he grounds, solely and exclusively, upon the first clause of the ninth section of the first article of the Constitution, which is in these words: "The migration or importation of such persons, as any of the States now existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by Congress prior to the year eighteen hundred and eight." By that clause Congress is restricted till 1808, from prohibiting the migration or importation of persons into the existing States. Neither slaves nor the right of property are mentioned in it, and nothing is affirmed or denied respecting them, either distinctly and expressly or otherwise. Because Congress was thus restricted, some of the States, who always held and exercised the legal right, and refused to give it up, took occasion to continue the slave-trade-and that is the whole of it. 2d. The right to traffic in it (slave property) was guaranteed for twenty yearsor, as he expresses it in another place, (Ib. p. 411), "The right to purchase and hold this property is directly sanctioned and authorized for twenty years." All this, too, he positively asserts on the sole authority of the same restrictive clause. Property in man-the right to traffic in it-to purchase it-hold it-first authorized, then sanctioned, and finally guaranteed-for twenty years-merely by a clause negativing the right of Congress to prevent it till 1808. There can be no answer to such reasoning as this. 3d. Government is pledged, in express terms, to protect it (the right of property in slaves) in all time. This pledge he finds in the third clause of the second section of the fourth article, which says that fugitives from labor shall be delivered up on claim, &c. Here it is a pledge of the Government. In another place (Ib. p. 411) it is a pledge of the States to each other. And in both it is to protect and maintain the master's right of property in man-a subject most studiously avoided in every part of the Constitution. So easy does he find it, to manufacture sanctions, pledges, and guarantees, by one party or by another, directly, expressly, dis

tinctly, in express terms, and in plain words, for any purpose, and out of the least possible materials. A man, whose mind is so constituted or perverted, as to render him capable of handling law and logic after this manner, cannot be safely trusted with the statement of a fact, or the annunciation of a principle; and a fortiori not with the much more dangerous and responsible duty of drawing a conclusion.

His whole doctrine for making the Constitution a slavery instrument, recognizing and sanctioning the right of property in man, and planting and protecting negro slavery in all the States and territories in the Union, and wherever the authority of its government extends, unchecked by the power of Congress or anybody else; whereby he declares null and void a statute of the United States, which has been approved and sustained by every department of the Government, and practised upon for thirty years; he distinctly sees and reads in plain words in these two clauses of the Constitution, neither of which says one word upon the subject, or alludes to any part of it, otherwise than as all generals must necessarily include some particulars. They speak of persons, as such, generally and exclusively, their migration and importation and their obligations under local law, restricting State legislation, and suggesting a single duty (of somebody without saying who) by way of remedy under certain circumstances, for their voluntary evasion of those obligations. They do not purport to grant, assert, or even admit any right, or prescribe any other duty; they guarantee nothing, and pledge nothing. They do not contain one word about negroes, in distinction from other persons-nor about slaves, in distinction from apprentices, minors, hired laborers, or others owing service;—not one word about property of any sort, in man, or anything else.

But the Chief Justice asserts that they expressly affirm the right of property in man-in a slave,-that they guarantee in express terms, the right to traffic in it for twenty years, and that they pledge the Government to protect the master's right of property forever. This atrocious doctrine was invented and intended to enable slaveholders to in

undate with slavery, not only all the territories of the United States, but to authorize them to carry it, under the protection of the Constitution, into all the States of the Union, in defiance of all State Constitutions and laws. Accordingly the late President Buchanan, in one of his last official documents, says, that slavery is as thoroughly established in Kansas as in South Carolina, and, he might have added with the same kind of truth, as thoroughly in every other State as in either. The flagitious enormity of the conception exceeds all precedent. It may well be doubted if even John C. Calhoun ever came fully up to it.

Such are the facts, the principles, and the logic invoked by the Chief Justice, endorsed and approved, without any qualification, by one other Judge only, and by no other living man, so far as the public are informed. At least no evidence has yet been laid before them, and it is to be hoped there never may be, which would sustain such a charge against any other mortal. If he had simply said that his doctrine was to be found somewhere in the Constitution, deducible from its language, or pervading its unseen spirit in general terms, the bold and reckless assertion might have found some believers, among those who never read the Constitution, or could not trust their own understanding; but when he puts his finger on the passage, and says it is there, directly, expressly, distinctly, in express terms, and in plain words, all the world can understand and judge of his hallucination.

ARTICLE III.-CONSCIENCE AS CONTRASTED WITH THE DISCURSIVE REASON.

He who would indicate more clearly the office and authority of conscience, and give such prominence as is due to this fundamental law of our being, assumes a worthy task, though he be unable to perform it. For, as no faculty occupies a higher position than this, so none should be more free to exercise its prerogatives without interference. And therefore it is well to guard against all encroachments upon the sphere and rights of that faculty, which, to be the most efficient instrument of good, must act with spontaneous and native freedom.

Feeling as we do that a correct and enlightened conscience is man's noblest heritage, and desiring to see it rescued from all subservience and thraldom, we have been led to contrast it with other faculties of the mind, and especially with what is called the discursive reason, or reasoning faculty; and, if we mistake not, it will appear that the latter is the grand usurper which takes upon itself to review and reverse the moral judgments, and to control the moral tribunal; whereas the conscience, within its own sphere, ought to be free and supreme in all its operations and decisions.

From all that appears, the mind is one in its ultimate root of being and activity. It is like a machine, where, though the parts perform different operations, they are connected and controlled by a central principle. The faculties, as it were, converge, and at length lose themselves in unity. Consequently analysis can only proceed up to a certain point. Beyond that, obscurity baffles the closest inspection.

By this we would not say that the mental faculties do not differ in their ultimate principle, but that this difference rather appears from what is external, than from what is internal; that is, it rather appears in the separate functions which they have to perform, than from any inward evidence. Indeed, we should suppose, that those faculties which constitute a human

being, would be conjoined in such a manner as to be incapable of separation in their essential nature. And this being true, the most we can do is, to mark the distinction between these faculties, as seen in difference of office, and modes of operation-a difference which we propose to indicate with respect to conscience and the discursive reason, with the desirę to accord to the former that sacred and independent authority which rightly belongs to it.

We say the discursive reason, to distinguish it from what is called the pure, or intuitive reason. For, when it comes to the latter, we arrive at that principle without which it were impossible to form any right perceptions, whether intellectual or moral; whether by intuition or demonstration; and, as we shall see, it differs nothing in its mode of perception from the moral faculty. Whereas, as we hope to show, the moral and reasoning faculties not only differ in this respect, but in respect to the truths they perceive, and are wholly unlike and independent in office and operation.

I. The office of the moral faculty is to determine the moral quality of actions; that is, to determine simply what is right or wrong. This is its distinctive work, and it has no other. The reasoning faculty, on the other hand, has only to do with truths outside the sphere of morals-as, for instance, truths of a scientific or speculative nature. It would determine simply what is true or false, wise or unwise. The former would regulate our conduct as moral and responsible beings. The latter would rather add to our knowledge, and facilitate our projects as the creatures of time.

II. In respect to operation, the perceptions of the moral faculty are intuitive, and its judgments immediate. Those of the reasoning faculty, on the other hand, are only arrived at through processes of demonstration.

This contrast will not hold when applied to the pure or intuitive reason, and we shall see a further propriety in the distinction made between it and the reasoning faculty. In the former, the judgments are as immediate as those of the conscience. It has to do with simple ideas, which are the basis from whence arise its perceptions, and on which rest its conclu