may be made use of in Divinity: The Anfwer is as to the neceffary Truths, that they can never be discarded out of Divinity, because God himself can never alter their Nature, and make that to be falfe which is neceffarily true.

BUT cannot Revelation teach us fome Propofitions contrary to them, that are neceffary? not at all, because if that was the cafe, there would be no Rule left by which to diftinguish a true Revelation from a falfe one.

BUT with regard to mutable or contingent Truths, the Cafe is not the fame; for thefe depending upon the Good-will and Pleasure of God, who has established them for a good and fufficient Reason, the Reafon being alter'd, the Truth must be alter'd of courfe: for inftance, it is true that the Sun cr Earth are in motion; this is established by God for fome good Reafon; but for fome Reason of a higher nature the Sun or Earth may fometimes be stop'd in their motion.

THIS, fays our Author, is what Philofophers and Divines pretty well agree in; but when they must apply these general Rules to particular Cafes, it is hardly to be expreffed how much they differ: the fame Propofitions being by fome reckoned among the neceffary, and by others among the mutable Truths; and it is not an easy thing to fay how they may be diftinguished: This must be done by studying Philofophy more accurately, than is ufually done. But our Author has not thought fit to enter here into Particulars, and to fhew diftinctly which are the necessary, and which the mutable or contingent Truths. The remaining part of this Chapter is taken up with confuting the oppofite Schemes of the famous Mr. Locke and

Mr.

Mr. Poiret, about the comparative Certainty of Reafon and Revelation; but as our Author only enlarges upon what has already been faid by Leibniz and others, we think it needless to repeat it here a

IN the third Chapter of this preliminary Difcourfe, the Author treats of the Difference there is between Nature and Grace. By Nature be underft nds all the Faculties, Inclinations, &c. which a Man' is born with, and by which he is a moral Agent; and by Grace, whatever God works extraordinarily in Man, to make him able to pay an acceptable Worship to the Deity, and to practife Piety. And in order to fhew more exactly the Difference there is between Nature and Grace, the Author fays, that we must diftinguish in every Action, first, the Principle or Motive, which induces Man to act. 2dly, The outward Act itself: afterwards he goes on to fhew what belongs to Nature, and what to Grace, in the feveral Duties we owe to God, to our Neighbours, and to ourfelves. He calls Worship of God in general, every Action, which we perform out of a Senfe of the Perfections of God. Or more especially, The natural Worship confifts in fuch Action, as we perform out of a Senfe of thofe Perfections of God which are naturally known; and the Chriftian Worship is of fuch Action, as either the Authority or Influence of Revelation excites us to do. He obferves next, that Nature is either corrupted or found: Now, if a Man goes to Church, only for the fake of his Reputation, and that he may not pass in the World for a Profane and an Atheift; this is the Effect only of corrupt Nature. 2dly, If a See Leibniz, Theodic. Difc. Prelim. §. 29.

No. XX. 1732.
VOL. IV.

he does it out of custom, this too must be affcribed to Nature depraved. 3dly, Ifa Man goes to Church, that he may not disturb civil Society, he acts indeed agreeably to Reason, but not Chriftian-like; for this an Atheift may do out of Cautioufriefs. 4thly, Some do worfhip God out of a good Heart, and a Senfe of his Perfections, because Reafon tells them he requires it of them: but as they may do it without being Chriftians, this cannot be afcribed to Grace. But, 5thly, Whoever frequents the publick Places of Worfhip, because Chrift has commanded it by his Apostle St. Paul, he acts in a manner by a preventing Grace: 6thly, He that worships God, because he takes a delight in it, has a higher Degree of Grace. 7thly, He that goes to Church with an Intention to improve his Piety and Virtue, has still a greater Share of Grace. These are the feveral Degrees by which our Author thinks we may distinguish what belongs to Nature and what to Grace. He goes on in the fame manner with regard to our Duties towards our Neighbours, and towards ourfelves; but we need not enlarge upon those Subjects, fince by what we have already faid, the Reader may easily guess what is here offered.

WE come now to the Treatife itfelf, which is a fort of Syftem of Divinity philofophically explained. We will confine ourselves at prefent to the firft Volume, intending to give an Account of the second in our next Journal.

THIS firft Volume contains fourteen Chapters: The first divided into five Sections, treats of the Definition, Being, and Attributes of God. The Author gives us, after Mr. Wolfius, two Definitions of the fupreme Being. 1. God, fays be, is a Subftance, which conceives or apprehends diftinctly by one fingle Alt

all

all things poffible. Deus eft fubftantia, quæ univerfa poffibilia. unico Actu diftinitè, aut fi mavis adæquatè repræfentat. The fecond Definition is this, God is a Subftance diftinct from the World, and which comprehends in itself the Caufe or ReaJon of the World. Deus eft fubftantia a Mundo diftincta, que Rationem hujus in fe continet.

THE Author afferts thefe Definitions against fome Divines, who had found fault with them. He next fhews the Ufe of thefe Definitions, and how from them may be inferred divers Attributes of God, as his infinite Power of knowing all things, his being the Author of the Universe, his Will, his divine Providence, &c. He proceeds in the fecond Section to prove there is actually fuch a Being as has been defined. In the third he endeavours to convince his Readers that the Nature of God is infinite or boundlefs:: his meaning is, that God enjoys all poffible Perfections, and that none of them are limited. Immenfe, fays he, are God's Knowledge, Power, Prefence, Duration, &c. The force of his Argument to prove it is, that nothing exists without a fufficient Reason; but no Reason can be given, why there fhould be any bounds to the Attributes or Nature of God, therefore there are none. Whether this way of arguing upon our Ignorance will fatisfy every Reader, we will not determine: we'll only obferve by the way, as to the infinite Prefence of God, that our Author has not thought fit to explain, what he means by thofe words, Whether an actual Prefence of the divine Subftance to every part of the Univerfe, or only his Power of acting, and of knowing what paffes, in every Corner of the World. This laft Opinion is beterodox, and the former feems to make God extended, except

N 2

we

we fay in the fcholaftical Jargon, Deus eft ubique inftar puniti, God is every where after the manner of a Point ".

...IN the fourth Section the Author proves, that there can be but one God; for if there were more, fays he, they would differ from one another in some refpect, or they would not: if they did, one would have what the other would want, and this laft could not be perfect; if i they did not differ in the leaft, they must be all the felf-fame Being; for it is an Axiom of Mr. Leibniz, that things, which are undifcernable, that is, between which there is not the leaft Difference, are not feveral things, but one and the fame individual Being c.

In the fifth and laft Section of the firft Chapter, the Author treats of God's Holiness, by calling God holy, we mean, fays he, that God enjoys nothing but Perfections, without any thing different from, or contrary to them. Sanctum Deum vocamus, quod perfectiones folas, nec diverfum aut contrarium quiddam continet: this the Author proves by what he has faid about God's Immenfity; if there is nothing in Nature, that can fet any bounds to the Perfections of God, he muft enjoy them all, and in an infinite degree: But is it not poffible, that he should have a Mixture of fome Imperfections? No, fays our Author, for an Imperfection is nothing else but the Abfence or Limitation of fome Perfection: therefore an infinite Being must have all Perfections, without any thing different from or

h Touching God's Immenfity, fee Mr. Le Clerc. Pneumatol. Seat. III. Cap. III.

See Recueil de Diverfes Pieces par Mrs. Leibniz, Neuton, Clarke, Tom. I. p. 5o. and Dr. Clarke's Anfwer, p. 64. and Leibniz's Reply. 92.