ever F. Malebranche afferted, was so far from establishing a certain Knowledge, that it rather tended to introduce a most dangerous Pyrrhonim, and fhew'd that this Principle of F. Malebranche, GOD CANNOT DECEIVE US, is of no fe at all in that Father's Syftem, according to which there can be no Sciences either human or divine. This is what Mr. Bayle faid of thofe two famous Men; fo that, fays Mr. De Croufaz, this great Remedy against Scepticifm, viz. FAITH, on which Mr. Bayle infifts fo much, is rejected by himfelf; fince he feems to approve of Mr. Arnauld's Objections against F. Malebranche's Syftem. Our Author takes this Opportunity, to fhew, that if a Propofition appears contradictory to our Reason, Faith can never make us be lieve it.

1. To believe, fays he, is to think, to have Ideas of the thing propofed to be believed. I may have fo good an Opinion of a Man,as to be perfuaded, that what he fays is true, tho' I don't understand a Word of what he fays. But then I can't believe the Propofition he delivers to me, as long as I have no Idea or Notion of it.

2. WHEN We understand the Words that form a Propofition, if thefe Words offer a Senfe contradictory, or, if join'd togethe they form no Senfe at all, because they have no Relation to one another, it is impoffible to believe that Propofition.

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OUR Author makes then fome Obfervations upon what is called believing; "That Word, fays he, is very equivocal; ufe has made it fignify feveral different Things, tho' People "don't take notice of it. Sometimes to be"lieve fignifies, not to reject pofitively a Propofition, as tho' it was falfe. Thus the

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"greatest part of Mankind believe the Religion of their Country, tho' they never examin'd it: they don't reject it positively, but "they don't know the Reasons on which it is "grounded,

To believe fometimes fignifies fomething 66 more. We not only don't reject a Propofi"tion, but we are moreover inclined to think "it is true: Thus we believe that our Friends "and Relations are more worthy Men, than "thofe with whom we are unacquainted.

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"To believe fometimes alfo fignifies to yield

to fome Arguments, which borrow their "whole Strength from our Prejudices; we admit thofe Arguments without any Inquiry, "without being fenfible of their Evidence, nay fometimes without understanding the meaning of them. By this means we may "indeed believe contradictory Propofitions; that is, it will never come into our beads to reject them as falfe.

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ADD to this, that all contradictory Propofitions have two Meanings; when we try "to unite thofe two Meanings, to confider them in one View, and to admit them both as true at the fame time, we can never do "it; because it is not poffible to do what is impoffible. But if we confider at once but one "of the Meanings of thofe Propofitions, we

form an Idea of it, and admit it as true and "a few Moments after we confider the other Meaning of it, without taking notice then of that we confider'd first; thus we admit the fecond alfo as true.

PETER, James, and John are three human Perfons, but we muft not fay therefore that there are three human Natures; there is

but

"but one. In the fame manner the Father, "the Son and the Holy Ghoft are three di"vine Perfons; but neverthelefs there is but ❝ one God.

"THERE was a time when the Divines ex"preffed themselves in thefe Words; and it "cannot be doubted but feveral Perfons mif"understood them, and believed at the fame "time that there was but one God, and that. "there were feveral. When they confidered "the Father, Son, and Holy Ghoft diftinguifhed as Peter, James, and John are, they "fell into Polytheifm. But when they were "afked, whether there is more than one God,

they forgot their former Opinion, and an"fwer'd very fincerely, that there is but one:

but if a Perfon had infifted ftill, and defir'd "them to reconcile their two Affertions, they "would have refus'd to enter into that Laby"rinth. They confidered indeed both Quef"tions feparately; but they thought it a Duty, "not to confider them in one View.

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"THUS alfo the Stoicks were fenfible of the Beauty of Virtue, and the Horror of Vice, "like Perfons who were perfuaded that Man is "a free Agent. -But these fame Stoicks.

admitted a Fatum, and spoke of Necef"fity and the Concatenation of all Events in the ftrongeft Terms. Thefe two Opinions "are inconfiftent: But the Stoicks avoided the

Trouble of perceiving that Inconfiftency, by "never comparing thefe two oppofite Terrets." Thus it appears that Men may believe Contradictions, because they never compare the oppofite Propofitions which they admit.

OUR Author afterwards fays, that Faith can never be contrary to Reafon, to which purpose Dd 4

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he quotes a Paffage from Mr. Le Clerc's Book intituled, Sentimens de quelques Theologiens de Hollande fur l'Hiftoire Critique du Pere Simon, P. 337. but that Paffage is too long to be here inferted. He then fays, that when it happens, that what is called Faith and Reafon are oppofite to one another, it fhews either that we miftook the Senfe of fome Paffage of the Scripture, or that we argued upon falfe Principles, or drew from true Principles falfe Confequences. In that Cafe we must correct our Way of arguing; or endeavour by the Ufe of Reason to find out the true Sense of the Paffage, which is mifunderstood; for a Reafon in Man is a Ray of the divine Reafon: when we find them oppofite, it fhews that we are miftaken in what we think to be dictated by one or by the other, Thus far our Author, but it may be very much queftioned whether our Athanafians will agree with him. If they think, that because Mr. De Croufaz has endeavoured. to answer Bayle's Objections against R ligion, his Book may be very ferviceable to them to answer our present Hereticks or Infidels; they are very much miftaken, as may appear by what we have quoted from him. He is a great Defender of human Reason, and would bring Faith and Religion itfelf to that Test.

OUR Author comes afterwards again to the Objections against Motion, and folves them by fome Mathematical Demonftrations, to which we refer the Reader. He then speaks of Void, and feems inclined to think there is no fuch thing as a Space entirely void of Matter. He comes afterwards to what Mr. Locke has faid, viz. That we don't know the Substances themfelves, but only their Qualities and Attributes:

and

and here Mr. De Croufaz endeavours to prove. that Matter and Space are one and the fame thing; fome of his Arguments are the fame with thofe of the Cartefians; and the others are fo intricate, that we own we don't understand them, therefore we must refer our Readers to the Book itfelf.

MR. De Croufaz next confiders Mr. Bayle's Objections with regard to Time; but thefe being trifling and mere Cavils, we need not enlarge upon them. We will only obferve, that Mr. De Croufaz fhews that we must neceffarily admit, that fomething is eternal and infinite; tho' we are not able to folve all the Questions that may be propofed concerning Eternity and Infinity.

OUR Author comes again to Sextus, defcribes for the fifth or fixth Time the Character of the Scepticks, and then answers Sextus's Objections concerning the Numbers and Unity. He next confiders Sextus's Objections against what is commonly called Good or Evil. His Objections are grounded chiefly on this, viz. that what one Man confiders as a Good, another looks upon as an Evil, and another is indifferent about it; hence Sextus concludes, that what is good, evil, or indifferent, is not determined by Nature, fince Men differ fo much. about it. The Subftance of our Author's Anfwer is, that the Opinion of Men is not the Rule of Truth; and that if they would constantly make use of their Reason, and reflect seriously upon what they defire or fear, they would foon agree about what is good or evil. The remaining Part of this Section is taken up in answering what Sextus objects against the Arts and Sciences; but all this not being very

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