first, which supposes an informed and enlightened conscience: "I delight in the law of God." "I had not known sin but by the law." "I consent unto the law that it is good." These sentiments could only be uttered by a man who was, in a considerable degree at least, acquainted with his duty, and who also approved of the rule of duty which he found laid down.

Secondly, the case before us also supposes an inclination of mind and judgment to perform our duty. "When I would do good, evil is present with me: to will is present with me, but how to perform that which is good I find not.'

"I see

Thirdly, it supposes this inclination of mind and judgment to be continually overpowered. another law in my members, warring against the law of my mind, and bringing me into captivity to the law of sin, which is in my members:" that is, the evil principle not only opposes the judgment of the mind, and the conduct which that judgment dictates (which may be the case with all), but in the present case subdues and gets the better of it. "Not only wars against the law of my mind, but brings me into captivity."

Fourthly, the case supposes a sense and thorough consciousness of all this; of the rule of duty; of the nature of sin; of the struggle; of the defeat. It is a prisoner sensible of his chains. It is a soul tied and bound by the fetters of its sins, and knowing itself to be so. It is by no means the case of the ignorant sinner: it is not the case of a seared and hardened conscience. None of these could make the reflection or "The com

the complaint which is here described.

mandment which was ordained unto life, I found to

be unto death. I am carnal, sold under sin. In me dwelleth no good thing. The law is holy; and the commandment holy, just, and good: but sin that it might appear sin (that it might be more conspicuous, aggravated, and inexcusable), works death in me by that which is good." This language by no means belongs to the stupified, insensible sinner.

Nor, Fifthly, as it cannot belong to an original insensibility of conscience, that is, an insensibility of which the person himself does not remember the beginning; so neither can it belong to the sinner who has got over the rebukes, distrusts, and uneasiness which sin once occasioned. True it is, that this uneasiness may be got over almost entirely; so that, whilst the danger remains the same, whilst the final event will be the same, whilst the coming destruction is not less sure or dreadful, the uneasiness and the apprehension are gone. This is a case, too common, too deplorable, too desperate; but it is not the case of which we are now treating, or of which St. Paul treated. Here we are presented throughout with complaint and uneasiness; with a soul exceedingly dissatisfied, exceedingly indeed disquieted, and disturbed and alarmed with the view of its condition.

Upon the whole, St. Paul's account is the account of a man in some sort struggling with his vices; at least, deeply conscious of what they are, whither they are leading him, where they will end; acknowledging the law of God, not only in words and speeches, but in his mind; acknowledging its excellency, its authority; wishing also, and willing, to act up to it, but in fact doing no such thing; feeling, in practice, a lamentable inability of doing his duty, yet perceiving that it must be done. All he has hitherto attain

ed is a state of successive resolutions and relapses. Much is willed, nothing is effected. No furtherance, no advance, no progress is made in the way of salvation. He feels, indeed, his double nature; but he finds, that the law in his members, the law of the flesh, brings the whole man into captivity. He may have some better strivings, but they are unsuccessful. The result is, that he obeys the law of sin.

This is the picture which our apostle contemplated, and he saw in it nothing but misery: "O wretched man that I am!" Another might have seen it in a more comfortable light. He might have hoped that the will would be taken for the deed; that since he felt in his mind a strong approbation of the law of God; nay, since he felt a delight in contemplating it, and openly professed to do so; since he was neither ignorant of it, nor forgetful of it, nor insensible of its obligation, nor ever set himself to dispute its authority; nay, since he had occasionally likewise endeavoured to bring himself to an obedience to this law, however unsuccessful his endeavours had been above all, since he has sincerely deplored and bewailed his fallings off from it; he might hope, I say, that his was a case for favourable acceptance.

St. Paul saw it not in this light. He saw in it no ground of confidence or satisfaction. It was a state to which he gives no better name than "the body of death." It was a state, not in which he hoped to be saved, but from which he sought to be delivered. It was a state, in a word, of bitterness and terror; drawing from him expressions of the deepest anguish and distress: "O wretched man that I am! who shall deliver me from the body of this death?"

XXVII.

EVIL PROPENSITIES ENCOUNTERED BY THE AID OF THE SPIRIT.

(PART II.)

ROMANS, vii. 24.

O wretched man that I am! who shall deliver me from the body of this death?

HE who has not felt the weakness of his nature, it is probable, has reflected little upon the subject of religion: I should conjecture this to be the case.

But then, when men do feel the weakness of their nature, it is not always that this consciousness carries them into a right course, but sometimes into a course the very contrary of what is right. They may see in it, as hath been observed, and many do see in it, nothing but an excuse and apology for their sins: since it is acknowledged, that we carry about with us a frail, not to call it a depraved, corrupted nature, surely, they say, we shall not be amenable to any severities or extremities of judgments, for delinquencies, to which such a nature must ever be liable: or, which is indeed all the difference there is between one man and another, for greater degrees or less, for more or fewer, of these delinquencies. The natural man takes courage from this consideration. He finds ease in it. It is an opiate to his fears. It lulls him into a forgetfulness of danger, and of the dreadful end, if the danger be real. Then the practical consequence is, that he begins to relax even of those endeavours to obey

God which he has hitherto exerted. Imperfect and inconstant as these endeavours were at best, they become gradually more languid and more unfrequent and more insincere than they were before: his sins increase upon him in the same proportion: he proceeds rapidly to the condition of a confirmed sinner, either secret or open, it makes no difference as to his salvation. And this descent into the depths of moral vileness and depravity began, in some measure, with perceiving and confessing the weakness of his nature; and giving to this perception that most erroneous, that most fatal turn, the regarding it as an excuse for every thing; and as dispensing even with the self-denials, and with the exertions of self-government, which a man had formerly thought it necessary to exercise, and in some sort, though in no sufficient sort, had exercised.

Now I ask, was this St. Paul's way of considering the subject? Was this the turn which he gave to it? Altogether the contrary. It was impossible for any Christian, of any age, to be more deeply impressed with a sense of the weakness of human nature than he was; or to express it more strongly than he has done in the chapter before us. But observe; feeling most sensibly and painting most forcibly the sad condition of his nature, he never alleges it as an excuse for sin he does not console himself with any such excuse. He does not make it a reason for setting himself at rest upon the subject. He finds no relief to his fears in any such consideration. It is not with him a ground for expecting salvation; on the contrary, he sees it to be a state not leading to salvation; other