mony of Displeasure against Sin; that it SERM. VI. is the Reverse. And it would be fo, to punish him merely as fuch, in that fingle abstract View, without any Relation to the Character which he fuftained: But to punish him as one who gave up his Right to be treated as innocent; who voluntarily offered himself, as a Subftitute for an of fending World, is certainly an Indication of the divine Displeasure against Sin: Becaufe, unless God had been fo far displeased at Sin, as not to readmit even penitent Sinners, merely as fuch, to Favour; he had required no Subftitute, no vicarious Punishment at all. God's Averfion to Sin, upon the Account of it's Malignity and prejudicial Nature, is fhewn, in Proportion to the Difficulty of pardoning it; and the Difficulty of pardoning it, in Proportion to the Dignity of the Perfon, who fuffered.

It is objected, that fuch a Satisfaction must be inconfiftent with God's free Grace: Becaufe, if it was a juft and reasonable Satisfaction; God could not have refused. it: But if not just and reasonable; then he' ought not to have accepted it.

To which I anfwer, that this is a grofs and palpable Fallacy: It fuppofes the very Thing,

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SERM. VI. Thing, which ought to have been proved, or rather admits of no Proof.

It supposes, that a Satisfaction may be just and reasonable, antecedently to the Will of the Legislator: Whereas, in all vicarious Punishments, the Legiflator's Consent must be prefuppofed, as abfolutely neceffary to make them just and reasonable: Which Confent he may withhold; and infist, that, the Crime being ours, the Punishment should be fo too.

Befides, when it is faid, that the Satiffaction was reafonable, it may be asked, Reasonable, as to what? It was reasonable in this Refpect, that it was an Expedient to fecure the Honour of God's Laws, and to prevent the ill Confequences of the Indemnity of Sin, though repented of: But it might have been as reasonable, at least, and would have anfwered the fame End, if Sinners had suffered in Perfon. Therefore this Objection proceeds, a dicto fecundum quid, ad dictum fimpliciter, from what is reasonable in one View, to what is fo intirely, and in all Views, without any poffible Alternative, which might be as reasonable.

If it be objected; that the fecond Perfon in the Trinity could not fatisfy the

first ;

firft: because they are of one undivided SERM. VI. Effence...

I reply, That the whole. Force of this Objection, refts upon our Notions of the Divine Unity, which are too inadequate to reafon folidly upon. Thofe, who advance this Objection, fhould prove, either that the Union must be too close to admit of diftinct Actions and Offices; or too wide to make the three Perfons one God. The Manner of the divine Unity is as unfearchable, as his Effence; and our Ideas of it too indeterminate and indiftinct, to beget any full and determinate Knowledge, which must always keep Pace with our Ideas. The three Perfons are one Being, because undivided: But it does not follow, that because they are undivided; that therefore, they are indiftinct: To be undivided, and to be indiftinct, being not the fame Idea. Whither shall I go, fays the Pfalmist, from thy Prefence? If I go up into Heaven, thou art there: If I go down to Hell, thou art there also: If I take the Wings of the Morning, and remain in the uttermoft Parts of the Sea; even there also fhall thy Hand lead me, and thy right Hand shall hold me. Now Being in Heaven, Being in Hell, Being

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SERM. VI.

Being in the Sea, may be one Being, because undivided; but not, because indiftinct For certainly Being in Heaven is diftinct from being in Hell. The Unity then of the three Perfons, as to their Nature, refults from their Indivifibility. Indivifibility is no Bar to Diftinction.What is no Bar to Diftinction, can be none to diftinct Actions or Offices. Confequently, Son and Father, though indivifible, and therefore one Being, might act diftinctly, in giving and receiving Satisfaction.

Still it may be urged; that this does not intirely remove the Difficulty: That, however diftinct, they are one and the fame Lawgiver: And confequently, the fame Lawgiver fatisfied the fame Lawgiver: Which is an Abfurdity.

To take off the Force of this Objection, it is fufficient to obferve That to be fovereign Lawgiyer is no effential Perfection of the Deity. If it were, he could never have been without it: He must have been Lawgiver ab æterno; i. e. He must have been Lawgiver, before there were any Beings to give Laws to. It is plain then, to be Lawgiver is only a relative Property. Our Saviour confequently might be truly

God,

God, i. e. ennobled with all the effential SERM. VI. Perfections of God; at the fame Time that he divefted himself of the relative Capacity of fovereign Lawgiver, during the Time, that he was tranfacting the gracious Scheme of our Redemption. It is true, it is neceffary, that God should be Lawgiver to us, ftante rerum Hypothefi But then, upon the Suppofition of more Perfons in the divine Nature, it is no more neceffary, that the Son fhould be always fupreme Lawgiver; than that the Father should be Judge at the last Day. The fame Attributes are inherently vefted in both: But the Exertion of those Attributes, in this or that Province, in this or that particular Scheme of Action, is free and voluntary.

There is a Point in Knowledge, where Usefulness ends, and unconcerning Speculatation begins. As far as any Thing is useful and important to our Happiness, fo far, by the Help of Revelation, all is generally clear and plain; beyond that, all is dark and inacceffible to us in a great Measure. The Reafon is, God has drawn a Veil over this Part of Knowledge, left by attending to Things remote from Ufe, and Matters of meres Curiofity, the Mind fhould be divert

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