It may be so. It is so. And the question, now, therefore is, whether this difference can be accounted for.

Now this is certain, that to any thing asserted by Scripture there cannot be two contrary meanings attached. All these differences, therefore, must be occasioned by some defect, not in the object contemplated, but in the persons contemplating it. Though the thing seen may be the same, it may be seen through a discolouring or distorting medium, or the eye seeing it may be diseased; when, therefore, there is some known wrong principle in the interpreter of Scripture, we are not to wonder, if, in some instances, the truth is hidden from his mental vision. Now that the mental eye, both of the Papist and of the ultra-Protestant, is jaundiced on those points where they differ from ourselves, appears from this, that both parties come to the interpretation of Scripture influenced by principles which they would not acknowledge as correct for the interpretation of any other ancient book.

The Papist first of all exalts tradition to an equality with Scripture, and then receives as tradition, not what is really such, that is, what has been received as such by the Catholic church, but what has at any time been decreed by that

branch of the church which is in slavery to the court of Rome. Thus the canons of the council of Trent are received as traditions. The Papist, therefore, interprets Scripture, not as we do, by the light of tradition, properly so called, by reference to the opinions and practices of the primitive ages, and by deference to the authority of the church Catholic, but according to certain dogmas of a comparatively modern date of the Roman church 9.

The ultra-Protestant meets the Papist, though they start from the very opposite extremes. He avowedly puts aside the tradition which the Papist only virtually rejects. Instead of seeking to ascertain how the Scriptures were understood by those to whom they were in the first instance addressed, how they were interpreted by the church universal before those divisions existed which we have now to deplore, and when, therefore, (by means of corresponding churches and general

9 See Waterland on Ecclesiastical Antiquity, chap. vii. Patrick on Tradition, p. 41. Stillingfleet's Rational Account, part I. chap. v. Marsh's Comparative View, p. 45. Beveridge on the Nineteenth Article, works ix. 393, and especially Jeremy Taylor's Dissuasive from Popery, x. 485. Bellarmine, Tract. de Potest. Sum. Pontif., plainly declares "that the modern church of Rome has power not only to declare and explain, but even to constitute and command what shall belong to the faith."

councils,) the opinion of the universal church could be known, he relies entirely on his private judgment; and thus, while rejecting with indig nation and scorn the claim to infallibility made by the Pope of Rome, he, in effect, converts every individual teacher, either into an infallible pope, or into a mere sceptic. I do not deny the right of private judgment as a political privilege, but to contend for it, as some persons do, as a sure guide to truth, is not only absurd, but cannot fail to involve those who do so in inconsistency as well as error.

We see, then, why these parties are not able to discover the truth, although the Bible may be open before them; there is always something intervening to prevent them from seeing the truth clearly; and we all know how very small a substance held close to the eye will eclipse the sun at its zenith. I wish not to throw blame upon them. Whether the dimness or obliquity of their vision be a misfortune or a fault, or rather, when it is the one or the other, it is not for us to determine who are forbidden to judge, it can be known by Him only to whom all hearts are open, and from whom no secrets are hid. The object, in alluding to the subject now, is simply to shew that their having missed the truth is no proof that the truth is not discover+

able by those who (to adopt the words of one to whom this church is much indebted, Archbishop Cranmer) "follow the judgment of the most sacred word of God, and of the holy Catholic church."

Nor is the discovery of the truth, though requiring much attention and study, so difficult as those who would deter us from seeking it are fond to represent. The chief difficulty relates to the formation of our principles. And here the church stands towards us in the same relation as the Apostles did towards the primitive Christians. She dogmatizes on certain articles of faith, and then requires us to act as the Beroans did after the preaching of the Apostle, to search the Scriptures, and to ascertain for ourselves whether what she says can be read therein, or proved thereby. Thus, with respect to our principles, we are to prove all things. But, having proved them, and found them to be good, we are to hold them fast, and to use them as a balance in which to weigh every theory which may afterwards be suggested; a measure by which to ascertain the height and length and breadth of every other doctrine that may be advanced. Although we may not be able to detect the fallacy of every paralogism that may be brought under our notice, yet, since it is no

proof that an argument is correct, because I, as an individual, cannot refute it, we are justified in rejecting it at once, if it be adduced in opposition to some conclusion, of the truth of which we have been previously convinced. Being convinced of the fact that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles, we are ready to admit that it would be mere waste of time to attend to any argument which should have for its object to prove the contrary. And in like manner, having ascertained that the doctrine of the Holy Trinity, as stated and guarded in the Athanasian creed, that bulwark to the Apostles' creed, is the doctrine of Scripture, we are not called upon (except as scholars endeavouring to convince gainsayers) to examine the statements of every heretic who may think fit to deny or explain away this article of faith. To many persons this would, indeed, be worse than a waste of time, for, intellectually as well as morally, we are in a state of probation. And if it would be infatuation in any one to say, "being fully persuaded of the exceeding sinfulness of sin, and of the power of divine grace for my protection, I will frequent the society of the profligate and profane, in order to prove the virtue, which, without trial, can hardly be said to exist," if this would be infatuation, folly, and