queft, mutual defence, common diftrefs, or more ac, cidental coalitions, might produce this effect.

II. A fecond fource of perfonal authority, and which might eafily extend, or fometimes perhaps fuperfede, the patriarchal, is that, which refults from military arrangement. In wars, either of aggreffion or defence, manifeft neceffity would prompt those who fought on the fame fide to array themselves under one leader. And although their leader was advanced to this eminence for the purpofe only, and during the operations of a fingle expedition, yet his authority would not always terminate with the reafons for which it was conferred. A warrior who had led forth his tribe against their enemies with repeated fuccefs, would procure to himself, even in the deliberations of peace, a powerful and permanent influence. If this advantage were added to the authority of the patriarchal chief, or favoured by any previous distinction of ancestry, it would be no difficult undertaking for the person who poffeffed it to obtain the almoft abfolute direction of the affairs of the community, especially if he was careful to affociate to himself proper auxiliaries, and content to practise the obvious art of gratifying or removing those who opposed his pretenfions.

But, although we may be able to comprehend how by his personal abilities or fortune one man may obtain the rule over many, yet it seems more difficult to explain how empire became hereditary, or in what manner fovereign power, which is never acquired without great merit or management, learns to defcend in a fucceffion, which has no dependence upon any qualities, either of understanding, or activity. The caufes which have introduced hereditary dominion into fo general a reception in the world, are principally the following--the influence of affociation, which communicates to the fon a portion of the fame respect which was wont to be paid to the virtues or ftation of the father--the mutual jealousy of other competitors--the greater envy, with which all behold the exaltation of an equal, than the continuance of an ac

knowledged fuperiority-a reigning prince, leaving behind him many adherents, who can preferve their own importance, only by fupporting the fucceffion of his children-Add to thefe reafons, that elections to the fupreme power having, upon trial, produced deftructive contentions, many states would take refuge from a return of the fame calamities, in a rule of fucceflion; and no rule prefents itfelf fo obvious, certain, and intelligible, as confanguinity of birth.

The ancient state of fociety in moft countries, and the modern condition of fome uncivilized parts of the world, exhibit that appearance, which this account of the origin of civil government would lead us to expect. The earliest hiftorics of Palestine, Greece, Italy, Gaul, Britain, inform us, that these countries were occupied by many fmall independent nations, not much perhaps unlike thofe which are found at prefent amongst the favage inhabitants of North America, and upon the coaft of Africa. These nations I confider as the amplifications of fo many fingle families, or as derived from the junction of two or three families, whom fociety in war, or the approach of fome common danger, had united. Suppofe a country to have been firft peopled by shipwreck on its coafts, or by emigrants or exiles from a neighbouring country, the new fettlers having no enemy to provide againft, and occupied with the care of their perfonal fubfiftence, would think little of digefting a fyftem of laws, of contriving a form of government, or indeed of any political union whatever; but each fettler would remain at the head of his own family, and each family would include all of every age and generation who were defcended from him. So many of thefe families as were holden together after the death of the original ancestor, by the reafons, and in the method above recited, would wax, as the individuals were multiplied, into tribes, clans, hordes, or nations, fimilar to thofe into which the ancient inhabitants of many countries are known to have been divided, and

which are ftill found, wherever the ftate of fociety and manners is immature and uncultivated.

Nor need we be furprifed at the early exiftence in the world of fome vaft empires, or at the rapidity with which they advanced to their greatness, from comparatively fmall and obfcure originals. Whilft the inhabitants of fo many countries were broken into numerous communities, unconnected, and oftentimes contending with each other; before experience had taught thefe little ftates to fee their own danger in their neighbour's ruin; or had inftructed them in the neceffity of refifting the aggran dizement of an afpiring power, by alliances and timely preparations; in this condition of civil policy, a particular tribe, which by any means had got the ftart of the reft in ftrength, or difcipline, and happened to fall under the conduct of an ambitious chief, by directing their firft attempts to the part where fuccefs was moft fecure, and by affuming, as they went along, those whom they conquered, into a share of their future enterprizes, might foon gather a force which would infallibly overbear any oppofition, that the scattered power and unprovided ftate of fuch enemies could make to the progress of their victories.

Laftly, our theory affords a prefumption, that the earliest governments were monarchies, becaufe the government of families, and of armies, from which, according to our account, civil government derived its inftitution, and probably its form, is univerfally monarchical.

Chapter II.

HOW SUBJECTION TO CIVIL GOVERNMENT IS MAINTAINED.

COULD we view our own fpecies from a diftance, or regard ma kind with the fame fort of obfervation, with which we read the natural hiftory,

or remark the manners, of any other animal, there is nothing in the human character which would more furprife us, than the almost universal fubjugation of ftrength to weakness-than to fee many millions of robuft men, in the complete ufe and exercise of their perfonal faculties, and without any defect of courage, waiting upon the will of a child, a woman, a driveller, or a lunatic. And although, when we suppose a vast empire in abfolute fubjection to one perfon, and that one depreffed beneath the level of his fpecies by infirmities, or vice, we fuppofe perhaps an extreme cafe, yet in all cafes, even in the most popular forms of civil government, the phyfical ftrength refides in the governed. In what manner opinion thus prevails over ftrength, or how power, which naturally belongs to fuperior force, is maintained in oppofition to it; in other words, by what motives the many are induced to submit to the few, becomes an inquiry which lies at the root of almost every political fpeculation. It removes, indeed, but does not refolve the difficulty, to fay, that civil governments are now-a-days almost universally upheld by ftanding armies; for the question ftill returns, how are these armies themfelves kept in fubjection, or made to obey the commands, and carry on the defigns, of the prince or ftate which employs them.

Now although we should look in vain for any fingle reafon which will account for the general submiffion of mankind to civil government, yet it may not be difficult to affign for every clafs and character in the community, confiderations powerful enough to diffuade each from any attempts to refift eftablished authority. Every man has his motive, though not the fame. In this, as in other inftances, the conduct is fimilar, but the principles which produce it extremely various.

There are three diftinctions of character into which the fubjects of a state may be divided; into those who obey from prejudice; thofe who obey from reafon; and those who obey from self-interest.

I. They who obey from prejudice, are determined by an opinion of right in their governors; which opinion is founded upon prefcription. In monarchies and ariftocracies which are hereditary, the prefcrip- ' tion operates in favour of particular families; in republics and elective offices, in favour of particular forms of government, or conftitutions Nor is it to be wondered at, that mankind should reverence authority founded in prescription, when they obferve that it is prescription which confers the title to almoft every thing elfe. The whole courfe and all the habits of civil life, favour this prejudice. Upon what other foundation ftands any man's right to his eftate? The right of primogeniture, the fucceffion of kindred, the descent of property, the inheritance of honours, the demand of tithes, tolls, rents, or fervices from the eftates of others, the right of way, the powers of office and magiftracy, the privileges of nobility, the immunities of the clergy, upon what are they all founded, in the apprehenfion at leaft of the multitude, but upon prescription? To what else, when the claims are contefted, is the appeal made? It is natural to transfer the fame principle to the affairs of government, and to regard thofe exertions of power, which have been long exercised and acquiefced in, as fo many rights in the fovereign; and to confider obedience to his commands, within certain accustomed limits, as enjoined by that rule of confcience, which requires us to render to every man his due.

In hereditary monarchies, the prefcriptive title is corroborated, and its influence confiderably augmented, by an acceffion of religious fentiments, and by that facredness which men are wont to ascribe to the perfons of princes. Princes themselves have not failed to take advantage of this difpofition, by claiming a fuperior dignity, as it were, of nature, or a peculiar delegation from the Supreme Being. For this purpofe were introduced the titles of facred majefty, of God's anointed, reprefentative, vicegerent, together with the ceremonies of inveftitures and coronations,

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