fhould be conveyed to a lazaretto by an order of quarantine, with whatever impatience he might defire his enlargement, and though he faw a guard placed at the door to oppofe his escape, or even ready to destroy his life if he attempted it, would hardly accufe government of encroaching upon his civil freedom; nay, might, perhaps, be all the while congratulating himfelf that he had at length fet his foot again in a land of liberty. The manifeft expediency of the meafure not only juftifies it, but reconciles the moft odious confinement with the perfect poffeffion, and the lotticft notions of civil liberty. And if this be true of the coercion of a prifon, that it is compatible with a ftate of civil freedom, it cannot with reafon be difputed of thofe more moderate conftraints which the ordinary operation of government impofes upon the will of the individual. It is not the rigour, but the inexpediency of laws and acts of authority, which makes them tyrannical.

There is another idea of civil liberty, which, though neither fo fimple, nor fo accurate as the former, agrees better with the fignification, which the ufage of common difcourfe, as well as the example of many refpectable writers upon the fubject, has affixed to. the term. This idea places liberty in fecurity; making it to confift not merely in an actual exemption from the constraint of ufelefs and noxious laws and acts of dominion, but in being free from the danger of having any fuch hereafter impofed or exercited. Thus, fpeaking of the political ftate of modern Europe, we are accuftomed to fay of Sweden, that the hath loft her liberty by the revolution which lately took place in that country; and yet we are affured that the people continue to be governed by the fame laws as before, or by others which are wifer, milder, and more equitable. What then have they loft? They have loft the power and functions of their di et; the conftitution of their states and orders, whofe deliberations and concurrence were required in the formation and establishment of every public law; and thereby have parted with the fecurity which

they poffeffed against any attempts of the crown to harrafs its fubjects, by oppreffive and useless exertions of prerogative. The lofs of this fecurity we denominate the lofs of liberty. They have changed not their laws, but their legiflature; not their enjoyment, but their fafety; not their present burthens, but their profpects of future grievances: and this we pronounce a change from the condition of freemen to that of flaves. In like manner, in our own country, the act of parliament, in the reign of Henry the Eighth, which gave to the king's proclamation the force of law, has properly been called a complete and formal furrender of the liberty of the nation; and would have been fo, although no proclamation were iffued in pursuance of thefe new powers, or none but what was recommended by the highest wisdom and utility. The fecurity was gone. Were it probable, that the welfare and accommodation of the people would be as ftudiously, and as providently, confulted in the edicts of a defpotic prince, as by the refolutions of a popular affembly, then would an abfolute form of government be no lefs free than the pureft democracy. The different degree of care and knowl, edge of the public intereft which may reasonably be expected from the different form and compofition of the legiflature, conftitutes the diftinction, in refpect of liberty, as well between thefe two extremes, as between all the intermediate modifications of civil gov. ernment.

The definitions which have been framed of civil liberty, and which have become the fubject of much unneceffary altercation, are moft of them adapted to this idea. Thus one political writer makes the very effence of the fubject's liberty to confift in his being governed by no laws but thofe to which he hath actually confented; another is fatisfied with an indirect and virtual confent; another again places civil liberty in the feparation of the legislative and executive offices of government; another in the being governed by law, that is, by known, preconftituted, inflexible rules of action and adjudication; a fifth in

the exclufive right of the people to tax themfelves by their own reprefentatives; a fixth in the freedom and purity of elections of reprefentatives; a feventh in the tontrol which the democratic part of the con, ftitution poffeffes over the military establishment. Concerning which, and fome other fimilar accounts of civil liberty, it may be obferved, that they all la. bour under one inaccuracy, viz. that they defcribe not fo much liberty itfelf, as the fafe-guards and prefervatives of liberty: for example, a man's being governed by no laws, but thofe to which he has given his confent, were it practicable, is no otherwife neceffary to the enjoyment of civil liberty, than as it affords a probable fecurity againft the dictation of laws, impofing fuperfluous reftrictions upon his private will. This remark is applicable to the reft. The diverfity of thefe definitions will not furprife us, when we confider that there is no contrariety or oppofition amongst them whatever; for, by how many different provifions and precautions civil liberty is fenced and protected, fo many different accounts of liberty itself, all fufliciently confiftent with truth and with each other, may, according to this mode of explaining the term, be framed and adopted.

Truth cannot be offended by a definition, but propriety may. In which view thofe definitions of liberty ought to be rejected, which, by making that effential to civil freedom which is unattainable in experience, inflame expectations that can never be gratified, and difturb the public content with complaints, which no wifdom or benevolence of govern

ment can remove.

- It will not be thought extraordinary, that an idea, which occurs fo much oftener as the fubject of panegyric and careless declamation, than of juft reafon. ing or correct knowledge, fhould be attended with uncertainty and confufion; or that it fhould be found impoffible to contrive a definition, which may include the numerous, unfettled, and ever varying fignifications, which the term is made to ftand for, and at the fame time accord with the condition and experience of focial life.

Of the two ideas that have been stated of civil liberty, whichever we affume, and whatever reafoning we found upon them, concerning its extent, nature, value and prefervation, this is the conclufion-that that people, government, and conftitution, is the freeft, which makes the best provision for the enacting of expedient and falutary laws.

Chapter VI.

OF DIFFERENT FORMS OF GOVERNMENT.

As a series of appeals must be finite, there neceffarily exifts in every government a power from which the conftitution has provided no appeal; and which power, for that reafon, may be terined abfolute, omnipotent, uncontrollable, arbitrary, defpotic; and is alike fo in all countries.

The perfon, or affembly, in whom this power refides, is called the fovereign, or the fupreme power of the state.

Since to the fame power univerfally appertains the office of establishing public laws, it is called alfo the legiflature of the ftate.

A government receives its denomination from the form of the legiflature; which form is likewife what we commonly mean by the conftitution of a country.

Political writers enumerate three principal forms of government, which, however, are to be regarded rather as the fimple forms, by fome combination and intermixture of which all actual governments are compofed, than as any where exifting in a pure and elementary state. Thefe forms are:

I. Defpotifm, or abfolute MONARCHY, where the legiflature is in a single perfon.

II. An ARISTOCRACY, where the legislature is in a felect affembly, the members of which either fill up by election the vacancies in their own body, or fucceed to their places in it by inheritance, property, tenure of certain lands, or in refpect of fome perfonal right or qualification.

III. A REPUBLIC, or democracy, where the people at large, either collectively or by reprefentation, conftitute the legislature.

The feparate advantages of MONARCHY are, unity of council, activity, decifion, fecrecy, dispatch; the military strength and energy which refult from thefe qualities of government; the exclufion of popular and ariftocratical contentions; the preventing, by a known rule of fucceffion, of all competition for the fupreme power; and thereby repreffing the hopes, intrigues, and dangerous ambition of afpiring citizens.

The mischiefs, or rather the dangers of MONARCHY are, tyranny, expenfe, exaction, military domination; unneceffary wars waged to gratify the paffions of an individual; rifk of the character of the reigning prince; ignorance in the governors of the interefts and accommodation of the people, and a consequent deficiency of falutary regulations; want of conftancy and uniformity in the rules of government, and, proceeding from thence, infecurity of perfon and property.

The feparate advantage of an ARISTOCRACY CONfifts in the wifdom which may be expected from experience and education-a permanent council naturally poffeffes experience; and the members, wher fucceed to their places in it by inheritance, will, prob. ably, be trained and educated with a view to the ftations, which they are defined by their birth to occupy.

The mifchiefs of an ARISTOCRACY are, diffenfions in the ruling orders of the ftate, which, from the want of a common fuperior, are liable to proceed to the most defperate extremities; oppreffion of the lower orders by the privileges of the higher, and by laws partial to the feparate interefts of the law makers.

The advantages of a REPUBLIC are, liberty, or exemption from needlefs reftrictions; equal laws; reg ulations adapted to the wants and circumftances of the people; public fpirit, frugality, averfenefs to war; the opportunities which democratic affemblies afford to men of every description, of producing their abilities and counfels to public obfervation, and the