them required in the Chriftian character. "Add to your faith virtue, and to virtue knowledge, and to knowledge temperance, and to temperance patience, and to patience godlinefs, and to godlinefs brotherly kindness, and to brotherly kinginefs charity."* On the other hand, when vices are enumerated, they are put disjunctively, that is, as feparately and feverally excluding the finner from heaven. "Neither fornicators, nor idolaters, nor adulterers, nor effeminate, nor abusers of themfelves with mankind, nor thieves, nor covetous, nor drunkards, nor revilers, nor extortioners, fhall inherit the kingdom of heaven."t

Those texts of scripture, which seem to lean a contrary way, as that "charity fhall cover a multitude of fins;" that "he which converteth a finner from the error of his way fhall hide a multitude of fins ;" cannot I think, for the reasons above mentioned, be extended to fins deliberately, habitually, and obftinately perfifted in.

3. That a state of mere unprofitableness will not go unpunished.

This is exprefsly laid down by Christ in the parable of the talents, which fuperfedes all farther reafoning upon the fubject. "Then he which had received one talent, came and said, Lord, I know thee that thou art an auftere man, reaping where thou haft not fown, and gathering where thou haft not ftrawed; and I was afraid, and hid my talent in the earth; lo, there thou haft that is thine. His Lord anfwered and faid unto him, thou wicked and flothful fervant, thou kneweft (or kneweft thou ?) that I reap where I fowed not, and gather where I have not ftrawed; thou oughteft therefore to have put my money to the exchangers, and then at my coming I fhould have received mine own with ufury. Take therefore the talent from him, and give it unto him

* 2 Pet. i. 5, 6, 7.

+ 1 Cor. vi. 9, 10. || James v. 20.

+ 1 Pet. iv. 8.

which hath ten talents; for unto every one that hath fhall be given, and he shall have abundance; but from him that hath not fhall be taken away even that which he hath; and caft ye the unprofitable fervant into outer darkness, there fhall be weeping and gnafbing of teeth.”►

III. In every queftion of conduct where one fide is doubtful and the other fide fafe, we are bound to take the fafe fide.

This is beft explained by an inftance, and I know of none more to our purpose than that of fuicide. Suppose, for example's fake, that it appear doubtful to a reafoner upon the fubject whether he may lawfully destroy himself. He can have no doubt, but that it is lawful for him to let it alone.

Here therefore is a cafe, in which one fide is doubtful, and the other fide fafe. By virtue therefore of our rule, he is bound to pursue the safe fide, that is, to forbear from offering violence to himself whilft a doubt remains upon his mind concerning the lawfulnefs of fuicide.

It is prudent, you allow, to take the fafe fide. But our obfervation means fomething more. We affert that the action, concerning which we doubt, whatever it may be in itself, or to another, would in us, whilft this doubt remains upon our minds, be certainly finful. The cafe is exprefsly fo adjudged by St. Paul, with whofe authority we will for the prefent reft contented. "I know and am perfuaded by the Lord Jefus, that there is nothing unclean of itfelf, but to him that efteemeth any thing to be unclean, to bim it is unclean. Happy is he that condemneth not himself in that thing which he alloweth; and he that doubteth is damned (condemned) if he eat, for whatsoever is not of faith (i. e. not done with a full perfuafion of the lawfulness of it) is fin."t

*Matt. xxv. 24, &c.

+ Romans xiv. 14, 22, 23.

H.

BOOK II.

Moral Obligation.

Chapter I

THE QUESTION, WHY AM I OBLIGED TO KEEP MY WORD? CONSIDERED.

WHY am I obliged to keep my word?

Because it is agree

Because it is right, fays one. able to the fitnefs of things, fays another. Because it is conformable to reafon and nature, fays a third. Because it is conformable to truth, fays a fourth. Because it promotes the public good, fays a fifth. Because it is required by the will of God, concludes a fixth.

Upon which different accounts, two things are obfervable:

First, That they all ultimately coincide.

The fitnefs of things, means their fitness to produce happiness: the nature of things, means that actual conftitution of the world, by which fome things, as fuch and fuch actions, for example, produce happiness, and others mifery: reafon is the principle, by which we discover or judge of this conftitution: truth is this judgment expreffed or drawn out into propofitions. So that it neceffarily comes to pass, that what promotes the public happinets, or hap piness upon the whole, is agreeable to the fitnefs of things, to nature, to reafon, and to truth: and fuch

(as will appear by and by) is the divine character, that what promotes the general happiness, is required by the will of God; and what has all the above properties, muft needs be right; for right means no more than conformity to the rule we go by, whatever that rule be.

And this is the reason that moralifts, from whatever different principles they fet out, commonly meet in their conclufions; that is, they enjoin the fame conduct, prefcribe the fame rules of duty, and, with a few exceptions, deliver upon dubious cafes the fame determinations.

Secondly, It is to be obferved, that these answers all leave the matter fhort; for the inquirer may turn round upon his teacher with a fecond queftion, in which he will expect to be fatisfied, namely, why am I obliged to do what is right; to act agreeably to the fitnefs of things; to conform to reafon, nature, or truth; to promote the public good, or to obey the will of God?

The proper method of conducting the inquiry is, firft, to examine what we mean, when we fay a man is obliged to do any thing, and then, to fhew why he is obliged to do the thing which we have proposed as an example, namely, "to keep his word."

Chapter II.

WHAT WE MEAN WHEN WE SAY A MAN IS OBLIGED TO DO A THING.

A MAN is to be faid to be obliged, "when he is urged by a violent motive, refulting from the command of another."

FIRST, "The motive must be violent." If a perfon, who has done me fome little fervice, or has a small place in his disposal, ask me upon fome occa

fion for my vote, I may poffibly give it him, from a motive of gratitude or expectation; but I should hardly fay, that I was obliged to give it him, because the inducement does not rife high enough. Whereas, if a father or a mafter, or any great benefactor, or one on whom my fortune depends, require my vote, I give it him of course; and my answer to all who afk me why I voted fo and fo, is, that my father or my master obliged me; and that I had received fo many favours from, or had fo great a de-pendence upon fuch a one, that I was obliged to vote as he directed me.

SECONDLY, "It must refult from the command of another." Offer a man a gratuity for doing any thing, for feizing, for example, an offender, he is not obliged by your offer to do it; nor could he say he is, though he may be induced, perfuaded, prevailed upon, tempted. If a magiftrate, or the man's immediate fuperior command it, he confiders himself as obliged to comply, though poffibly he would lofe lefs by a refufal in this cafe, than in the former.

I will not undertake to fay that the words obliga tion and obliged are ufed uniformly in this fenfe, or always with this distinction; nor is it poffible to tie down popular phrafes to any conftant fignification : but, wherever the motive is violent enough, and coupled with the idea of command, authority, law, or the will of a fuperior, there, I take it, we always reckon ourselves to be obliged.

And from this account of obligation it follows, that we can be obliged to nothing, but what we ourfelves are to gain or lofe fomething by; for nothing else can be a "violent motive" to us. As we

hould not be obliged to obey the laws, or the magiftrate, unlefs rewards or punishments, pleasure or pain, fome how or other depended upon our obedience; fo neither fhould we, without the fame reafon, be obliged to do what is right, to practise virtue, or to obey the commands of God.