But if the divine will determine the diftinction of right and wrong, what elfe is it but an identical propofition, to fay of God, that he acts right? or how is it poffible even to conceive that he fhould act wrong? yet thefe affertions are intelligible and fignificant. The cafe is this: by virtue of the two principles, that God wills the happiness of his creatures, and that the will of God is the measure of right and wrong, we arrive at certain conclufions; which conclufions become rules; and we foon learn to pronounce actions right or wrong, according as they agree or disagree with our rules, without look ing any farther; and when the habit is once establifhed of ftopping at the rules, we can go back and compare with thefe rules even the divine conduct itself, and yet it may be true (only not observed by us at the time) that the rules themselves are deduced from the divine will.

Right is a quality of perfons or actions.

Of perfons; as when we fay, fuch a one has a "right" to this eftate; parents have a "right" to reverence from their children; the king to allegiance from his fubjects; mafters have a "right" to their fervants' labour; a man hath not a "right" over his own life.

Of actions; as in fuch expreffions as the following: it is "right" to punish murder with death; his behaviour on that occafion was "right;" it is not "right" to fend an unfortunate debtor to jail; he did or acted "right," who gave up his place rather than vote againft his judgment.

In this latter fet of expreffions, you may fubftitute the definition of right above given for the term itself, v. g. it "is confiftent with the will of God" to punifh murder with death-his behaviour on that occafion was "confiftent with the will of God"—it is not confiftent with the, will of God" to fend an unfortunate debtor to jail—he did, or acted “consistently

with the will of God," who gave up his place rather than vote against his judgment.

In the former fet, you muft vary the phrase a little, when you introduce the definition inftead of the term. Such a one has a "right" to this eftate, that is, it is "confiftent with the will of God," that such a one should have it-parents have a "right" to reverence from their children, that is, it is "confiftent with the will of God," that children fhould reverence their parents; and the fame of the reft.

Chapter X.

THE DIVISION OF RIGHTS.

RIGHTS, when applied to persons, are,

Natural or adventitious,

Alienable or unalienable,

Perfect or imperfect.

FIRST, Rights are natural or adventitious.

Natural rights are fuch as would belong to a man, although there fubfifted in the world no civil gov. ernment whatever.

Adventitious rights are fuch as would not.

Natural rights are, a man's right to his life, limbs, and liberty; his right to the produce of his perfon, al labour; to the ufe in common with others, of air, light, water. If a thousand different perfons, from a thousand different corners of the world, were caft together upon a defert ifland, they would from the first be every one entitled to thefe rights.

Adventitious rights are, the right of a king over his fubjects; of a general over his foldiers; of a judge over the life and liberty of a prifoner; a right to elect or appoint magiftrates, to impose taxes, de

cidé difputės, direct the defcent or difpofition of property; a right, in a word, in any one man or particular body of men, to make laws and regulations for the reft. For none of these rights would exist in the newly inhabited island.

And here it will be afked, how adventitious rights are created; or, which is the fame thing, how any new rights can accrue from the eftablifhment of civil fociety; as rights of all kinds, we remember, depend upon the will of God, and civil fociety is but the ordinance and inftitution of man? For the folution of this difficulty, we must return to our first principles. God wills the happiness of mankind, and the existence of civil fociety, as conducive to that happiness. Confequently, many things, which are useful for the support of civil fociety in general, or for the conduct and converfation of particular focieties already established, are, for that reason, "confiftent with the will of God," or "right," which without that reafon, i. e. without the eftablishment of civil fociety, would not have been fo.

From whence alfo it appears, that adventitious rights, though immediately derived from human appointment, are not for that reafon lefs facred than natural rights, nor the obligation to refpect them lefs cogent. They both ultimately rely upon the fame authority, the will of God. Such a man claims a right to a particular eftate. He can fhew, it is true, nothing for his right, but a rule of the civil community to which he belongs; and this rule may be arbitrary, capricious and abfurd. Notwithstanding all this, there would be the fame fin in difpoffeffing the man of his eftate by craft or violence, as if it had been affigned to him, like the partition of the country amongst the twelve tribes, by the im mediate defignation and appointment of Heaven.

SECONDLY, Rights are alicnable or unalienable. Which terms explain themfelves.

.

The right we have to most of those things, which we call property, as houfes, lands, money, &c. is alienable.

The right of a prince over his people, of a huf band over his wife, of a mafter over his fervant, is generally and naturally unalienable.

The diftinction depends upon the mode of acquir ing the right. If the right originate from a contract, and be limited to the perfon by the express terms of the contract, or by the common interpretation of fuch contracts, (which is equivalent to an exprefs ftipulation) or by a perfonal condition annexed to the right, then it is unalienable. In all other cafes it is alienable.

The right to civil liberty is alienable; though in the vehemence of men's zeal for it, and in the language of fome political remonftrances, it has often been pronounced to be an unalienable right. The true reafon why mankind hold in deteftation the memory of those who have fold their liberty to a tyrant, is, that together with their own, they fold commonly, or endangered the liberty of others; which certainly they had no right to difpofe of.

THIRDLY, Rights are perfect or imperfect.

Perfect rights may be afferted by force, or, what in civil fociety comes into the place of private force, by course of law.

Imperfect rights may not.

Examples of perfect rights. A man's right to his life, person, house; for if these be attacked, he may repel the attack by inftant violence, or punith the aggreffor by law: a man's right to his eftate, furniture, clothes, money, and to all ordinary articles of property; for if they be injurioufly taken from him, he may compel the author of the injury to make reftitution or fatisfaction.

Examples of imperfect rights. In elections or appointments to offices, where the qualifications are

prescribed, the beft qualified candidate has a right to fuccefs; yet if he be rejected, he has no remedy. He can neither feize the office by force, nor obtain any redress at law; his right therefore is imperfect. A poor neighbour has a right to relief; yet if it be refused him, he must not extort it. A benefactor has a right to returns of gratitude from the perfon he has obliged; yet if he meet with none, he must acquiefce. Children have a right to affection and education from their parents; and parents, on their part, to duty and reverence from their children; yet if these rights be on either fide withholden, there is no compulfion to enforce them.

It may be at firft view difficult to apprehend how à perfon fhould have a right to a thing, and yet have no right to use the means neceffary to obtain it. This difficulty, like moft others in morality, is refolvable into the neceffity of general rules. The reader recollects, that a perfon is faid to have a "right" to a thing, when it is "confiftent with the will of God" that he fhould poffefs it. So that the queftion is reduced to this; how it comes to pafs, that it fhould be confiftent with the will of God, that a person should poffefs a thing, and yet not be confiftent with the fame will that he should use force to obtain it? The answer is, that by reason of the indeterminateness, either of the object, or of the circumftances of the right, the permiffion of force in this cafe would, in its confequence, lead to the permiffion of force in other cafes, where there exifted no right at all. The candidate above described has, no doubt, a right to fuccefs; but his right depends upon his qualifications, for inftance, upon his comparative virtue, learning, &c. there must be fomebody therefore to compare them. The exiftence, degree, and refpective importance of these qualifications are all indeterminate; there must be fomebody therefore to determine them. To allow the candidate to demand fuccefs by force, is to make