casion of beginning, and referred other cases to the diligence of time. Neither was this their unreadiness a small help towards examining the disposition of the Greeks and others, who must afterwards dearly pay for any backwardness found in their good-will. There was not indeed any cause to fear that all of the Greeks, or other eastern people, should conspire together and take part with the Macedonian; such was the dissension between their several estates, howsoever the generality of them were inclined the same way. Nevertheless, embassadors were sent to deal with them all, and to crave their help against Perscus, or rather to demand it, in no less ample manner than heretofore they had yielded it against Philip and Antiochus, in wars pretending the liberty of Greece. The embassadors used as gentle words, for fashion's sake, as if they had stood in doubt that their request might happen to be denied. But the Greeks were now grown well acquainted with such Roman courtesy, and understood that not only such as made refusal, but even they who might seem to have granted half unwillingly, were like to hear other manner of words when once this business was ended. Wherefore none of them were scrupulous in promising the best of their help to the Romans; the Achæ, ans and Rhodians, which were chief among them, being rather doubtful', even when they had done their best, lest it should be ill taken, as if they had halted in some part of their duty. It is strange that men could be so earnest to set up the side whereof they gladly would have seen the ruin. The vulgar sort was every where addicted to Perseus; of the nobles and rulers, if some were vehemently Roman, they wanted not opposers that were wholly Macedonian; yea, the wisest and most honest, who regarded only the benefit of their country, wished better to Perseus than to the Romans. And of this

1 Polyb, Legat. Ixxiii. lxxviii. and lxxx.

number Polybius, the chief of historians, was one; who, though he judged the victory of Perseus like to prove hurtful to Grecce, yet wished he the Romans ill to thrive, that so the Greeks might recover perfect liberty; for his endeavours in which course he was at length tyrannically handled, as shall be shewed hereafter. This considered, it appears, that an extraordinary fear, and not only reverence of the imperial city, made the Achæans and other estates of Greece thus conformable to the Romans. The occasion of this their fear may be justly imputed unto the timorous demeanor of Perseus himself. He had undertaken a war whereof the benefit should redound not only to his own kingdom, but unto all that were oppressed by the Romans. Yet no sooner were some few companies brought over-sea to make a countenance of meaning somewhat against him, than he began to speak the enemy fair, and sue for peace at Rome. Since, therefore, it was known that every small thing would serve to terrify him, and, cousequently, that it should at all times be in the Romans power, by giving him any tolerable conditions of peace, to take revenge at leisure upon those which had assisted him, little occasion was there why any should adventure to partake with him. He made indeed a great noise, leading about his army, taking by force or composition some few towns, and soliciting all to join with him; but wise men could not be so beguiled; for at the same time he sought all means of pacification, and to that end made humble suit unto the Roman embassadors. Q. Martius, the chief of those embassadors, and a man of more fineness in cunning than was usual among the Romans, made shew of inclination to the king's desire, and gave out such comfortable words, that the king intreated and obtained a meeting at the river Peneus. There did Martius very gently rebuke the king, and charge him

2 Polyb. Legat. lib. lxxvii.

was agreed upon, but only was inferred by conse quence. Now, if the Romans would urge this point further, and say, that the Macedonion might not bear defensive arms without their permission, then had Perseus very just reason to find himself aggrieved. For since they had allowed his father, without controul, to make war in Thrace (whilst they themselves were unacquainted with the Thracians) and elsewhere abroad, though he asked not their licence, why should they now interpret the bargain after another fashion? Was it now become unlawful for him to chastise his own rebels, or to repay an Illyrian that invaded Macedon? By such allegations he maintained the right of his cause in very mild sort, when it was too late. At the present, by disclaiming the league as unjust, he ministered occasion unto the embassadors to give him defiance. Having heard the worst of their message, he commanded them to be gone out of the kingdom in three days. But either he should have been less vehement, or more constant in his resolution. For if his heart could serve him to undertake the war, he should courageously have managed it, and have fallen to work immediately, whilst the enemy was unprepared, not have lost opportunity, as now and often he did, in hope of obtaining a worse peace than the former.

SECT. VI.

The Romans solicit the Greeks to join with them in the war against Perseus. How the Greeks stood affected in that war. The timorousness of Perseus. Martius, a Roman embassador, deludes him with hopes of peace. His forces. He takes the field, and wins part of Thessaly. The forces of Licinius the Roman consul, and what assistance the Romans had in this war. Of Tempe in Thessaly, and what advantages the Macedonian had, or might have had, but lost by his fear. Perseus braves the Romans, fights with them, knows not how to use his victory, sues for peace, and is denied it by the vanquished. Perseus, having the worse in a skirmish, forsakes all the country by ing without Tempe. The Baotians rebel against the Romans, and are rigorously punished. The Roman commanders unfortunate in the war against Perseus. They vex the Greeks, their friends, for whose ease the Senate makes provision, having heard their complaints. The flattering Alabanders.

So long had the Romans been seeking occasion to take in hand this Macedonian war, that well might they have been ready for it when it came, and not (as they were) behind-hand in provisions. But it was on a sudden that they met with a confluence of good pretences to make the war, whereof if no one alone had weight enough, yet all of them together seemed more than sufficient. This opportunity of making their cause honest in common opinion was not to be neglected, though otherwise they were unprepared for the action; wherefore knowing, or having reason to believe, that their own strength was such as would prevail in the end, they hastily embraced the fair oc

respite allowed them to depart out of Italy; whereas they who came last on the same errand, did their message without the walls, in the temple of Bellona, (the usual place of giving audience to open enemies, or to such commanders as might not, by reason of some custom, enter the city) and had only the short warning of eleven days to be gone out of Italy. Neither did this poor courtesy serve alone to hide the craft of Martius, as if he had meant none other than good earnest; but it was a likely mean, both to keep a long while from Perseus the knowledge of his business, and to stagger his resolution when he should need it most firm.

And accordingly it fell out; for Licinius the Roman consul was at Apollonia in a manner as soon as the Macedonian embassadors were with their king at Pella; which, though it were enough to have roused Perseus, and have made him lay aside all cowardly hope of getting pardon, yet was he content to deliberate a while, Whether it were not better to offer himself tributary to the Romans, and to redeem their good-will with some part of his kingdom that so he might enjoy the rest, than to put all at once to hazard. But, finally, the stoutest counsel prevailed, which also was the wisest; and so would have proved, had it been stoutly and wisely followed. He now began, as if the war had not begun until now, to do what should have been done long afore: he caused all his forces to be drawn together, and appointed their rendezvous at Citium, a town in Macedon. All being in readiness, he did royal sacrifice with an hundred beasts to, I know not what Minerva, that was peculiarly honoured in his country; and then, with all his courtiers and those of his guard, set forward to Citium. His army he found consisting of nine and thirty thousand foot and four thousand horse, whereof about twelve thousand foot and a thousand horse were strangers of sundry nations, most part