ideas and motory vibratiuncules pre viously associated with it; and thus puts the mind upon thinking and the body upon action. Hartley indeed, in the 6th paragraph of the section, we are examining, treats of muscular motion, as the only effect of a passion strongly excited, or volition. But as volition, every one's experience teaches, has power over the exertions of the mind, as well as over the muscnlar motions, I have ventured to add a clause with respect to the mind in order to complete the theory. A passion then, becoming the will, excites other ideas and motory vibratiuncules associated with it at the time of its excitement. But there is no reason, why these ideas and motory vibratiunoules thus previously associated with it should constitute or produce any thing like that particular course of conduct necessary to obtain the object now desired or supposing the number of ideas and motory vibratiuncules thus previously associated with it to be very great, there is no reason, why the passion, whose operation is mechanical, should excite those only, which are proper for its pres

The following is the sixth paragraph: Sixthly. The will appears to be nothing but a desire or aversion sufficiently strong to produce an action, that is, not automatick primarily or secondarily. At least, it appears to me, that the substitution of these words for the word will, may be justified by the common usage of language. The will is therefore that desire or aversion, which is strongest for the then present time. For if any other desire was stronger, the muscular motion connected with it by association, would take place, and not that which proceeds from the will, or the voluntary one, which is contrary to the supposition. Since, therefore, all love and hatred, all

desire and aversion are factitious, and generated by association, i. e. mechanically, it follows that the will is mechanic al, also."

ent purpose; there is no reason, why this aggregate of ideas, this complex vibration in the brain,should be associated with, or if associated with, should select and excite all those numerous other vibrations or ideas and those only, which may produce all the minute varieties of the course of action now required

Such are some of the objections, which may be made to Hartley's ac count of the affections and of the will. If any one of these objections be valid, the doctrine of the mechanism of the will, and consequently the doctrine of necessity (a doctrine, which he confesses himself to have admitted with the greatest reluct ance) finds no support in his theory of association.

Hartley seems to have considered imperfectly and indistinctly the effects upon the mind of "objects and the incidents of life," sometimes exciting and sometimes gratifying the passions; sometimes causing desire and aversion, and sometimes pleasure and pain. He has considered these objects and incidents, as far as relates to the present subject, as hav. ing no other power than to excite pleasurable or painful aggregates of ideas. These aggregates he has of course sometimes considered as passions, and sometimes as intellectual pleasures and pains, since it could not be forgotten, that both these were excited by objects and the incidents of life. But if there be any force in the preceding reason. ing; if the passions be not aggre gates of simple ideas; if they be not factitious; if upon the theory, which maintains these suppositions, there can be no reasonable account given of their phenomena, then neith er are the intellectual pleasures and pains, aggregates of the ideas or tra ces of the sensible pleasures and

pains; or to use the words of Hartley to" be deduced, in fact from the sensible pleasures and pains by means of the general law of associa

Hartley has not used these words, "aggregates of the ideas or traces of the sensible pleasures and pains" in speaking of the intellectual pleasures and pains; though these are analysed by him as be ing such aggregates. It might have started any theorist, to have given in the same words the same account of these pleasures and pains, which he had before given of the passions and affections. The definition just mentioned is however directly implied in the following paragraph from that part of the 94th Propo

sition, which treats " of the Pleasures arising from the Beauty of the Natural

World."

"An attentive person may also in viewing or contemplating the beauties of nature lay hold as it were of the remainders and miniatures of many of the particular pleasures here enumerated; while they recur in a separate state and before they coalesce with the general indeterminate oggregate and thus verify the history now proposed, [i.e. the history of the formation from the pleasures of sense, of the pleasures arising from the beauties of the natural world.]

The following is Hartley's general account of the intellectual pleasures and pains in his introduction to the 4th Chap

ter:

"Now it will be sufficient proof, that all the intellectual pleasures and pains are deducible ultimately from the sensible ones, if we can shew of each intellectual pleasure and pain in particular, that it takes its rise from other pleasures and pains either sensible or intellectual. For thus none of the intellectual pleasures and pains can be original. But the sensible pleasures and pains are evidently originals. They are therefore the only ones, i. e. they are the common so urce, from whence all the intellectual pleasures and pains are ultimately derived."

"If we admit the power of association and can also shew that associations sufficient in kind and degree concur in fact in the several instances of our intellectual pleasures and pains, this will of itself exclude all other causes of these pleasures and pains," &c.

Source

are primary pleasures and pains altogether independent of the pleasures and pains of sense.

But what then, it may be asked, is the chapter of Hartley upon the intellectual pleasures and pains? Į answer, that, if the preceding view of this subject be correct, it is not in truth, what it claims to be, an an alysis of the intellectual pleasures and pains into their constituent parts, by the association, of which they are formed; but it is a most ingenious ac count of the manner, in which these pleasures and pains are very frequent ly associated together and associated with reminiscences of sensible plea sures and pains.

But whatever may be the separate value of parts of the work of Hartley, his theory of association appears to me continually defective and insufficient for its purpose, to account for the phenomena of the mind. There are causes however, why its defects and its insufficiency are not so apparent as one might suppose they would be. would be. Hartley readily abandons the proper language of his theory, where this might appear incongruous or absurd, for the language of common opinion. Where, upon his principles, it might be difficule speciously to account for the phenomena of the mind, he sometimes states these phenomena without attempting to do this, he gives the fact itself without endeav

ouring to connect it with his system, or to translate the incorrect and loose language of former metaphysicians into the proper and precise dialect of his theory. Hence it is, that his theory, as far as it is explained, may sometimes appear plausible, and when we quit this, we find ourselves among facts, which all acknowledge, and slide easily into language, to which we have been accustomed. We scarcely recollect, that Hartley has no claim to this language, which is the common property of other writers, and that it is his duty not merely to state these facts, which is nothing to his pur pose, but to accommodate them to his theory. In reading Hartley, one ought constantly to have in mind similar sentiments to those, which Cicero in his philosophical writings so frequently expresses with regard to Epicurus; Quasi ego id curem quid ille aiat aut neget illud quæro quid ei

consentaneum

sit dicere [De Finibus. Lib. II. Bec. 22] Hæc bene dicuntur, nec ego repugno,sed inter sese ipsa pugnant. [sec. 28.]

While employed upon his theory, Hartley seems scarcely to have recollected, that there were any opinjons contradictory to his own. In pursuing his synthetical method, he anticipates no objections, he perplexes himself with no difficulties. Though his theory of the mind is so peculiar and throughout differ. ent from all others, yet in this part of his work, except in the last chapter with reference to the doctrine of necessity, he no where appears as a controvertist. He does not with draw the attention of his reader from his own system, or weaken his as sent to it by introducing any different views of his subject. Hence from this uninterrupted, and from the long and close attention required by his

work, it may be difficult to prevent one's ideas from becoming assimila ted to those of Hartley. The mind, fatigued by the labour of compre hending his theory, may have but little alacrity to seek for objection and different views of the subject, which are not offered to its examin. ation.

The mind of Hartley (if I may venture to make any further criticism upon a man so respectable for intellectual and moral excellence) seems not to have been best adapt. ed to take a comprehensive and general view of a complex subject and its various relations. The distinguishing character of his mind wat perhaps an habit of patient investigation. Whatever was the theme of his inquiry, he seems to have surveyed it slowly and in detail. Hence he frequently brings together a great variety of observations, many of them very excellent. But there is, even in separate observa tions and detached parts of his work, sometimes a want of precision of thought, or at least of expression, which may leave one in doubt whether he had considered very ac curately, that of which he is treating,

In the conclusion of the first part of the work of Hartley, there are some general remarks upon the doc. trine of the mechanism, or necessity of human actions. But it is not in the timid, the doubtful, the almost contradictory language of Hartley,

Of language almost contradictory,! will give the following passages as a spe cimen: "We may shew," says Hartley, "by a like method of reasoning, that the affections of gratitude and resentment, which are intimately connected with the moral sense, remain notwithstanding the doctrine of mechanism.”

.......

・・ “It seems to follow, that as soon as we discover created intelligent beings not to be real causes, we should ccase to make them objects either of

that one ought to examine the consequences of this doctrine, which opposes itself to the uniform testimony of the language, the feelings, and the conduct of mankind; which makes our language upon moral subjects unmeaning or inconsistent with truth; which makes our feel

gratitude or resentment. But this is in a great measure speculation, for it will appear to every attentive person, that benevolence, compassion, &c. are amiable; envy ánd malice the contrary, from whatever causes they proceed; i. e. he will find his mind so formed already by association, that he cannot withhold his gratitude or resentment."

By

This is the language of Hartley, in disavowing, as it would seem, certain consequences, as they appear to be, of the doctrine of necessity. turning over a few pages we may find what follows: "I come now," says Hartley," to hint some consequences of the doctrine of mechanism, which seem to me to be strong presumptions in its favour."

The third of these consequences mentioned by Hartley, is the following: Thirdly. It has a tendency to abate all resentment against men. Since.all that they do against us is by the appointment of God, it is rebellion against him to be offended with them."

I do not say, how far these passages may be reconciled. But from a comparison of them together, it will be obvious, that Hartley affirms by implication, what he certainly would not have affirmed directly, that, on the mind of a necessarian, the conviction that he is acting in rebellion against God, has very little effect; and that to suppose it will have any, is, "in a great measure mere speculation."

Of what is meant in the text, by doubtful language,the following is an example: "Eighthly. It may be said, that the doctrine of mechanism makes God the author of sin. I answer, that, till we arrive at self annihilation, sin always will, and ought to appear, to arise from ourselves; and that when we are arrived thither, sin and evil of every kind van

ish."

It is not easy to affix any definite meaning to this answer; nor to see how Vol. V. No. X. 3 R

Nor

it is applicable to the objection. may it be easy to shew, why, in any case, sin, of which we are convinced that we are not the real cause, will, and ought to appear, to arise from ourselves.

I subjoin the only passages in Hartley, that I recollect as having any tendency to explain the manner, in which he intends to use the phrase, "self annihilation." The first is the fourth corollary of the twenty-second proposition:

"Cor. 4. Since God is the source of all good, and consequently must at last appear to be so, i. e. be associated with all our pleasures, it seems to follow even from this proposition, that the idea of God, and the ways, by which his goodness and happiness are made manifest must at last take place of and absorb all other ideas, and He himself become, according to the language of the scrip tures, all in all."

The two following passages are from the concluding remarks on the mechanism of the human mind, which we have been considering.

"It does indeed appear, that this" [our being affected towards men, as if they were the real causes of their actions] "is owing to our present imperfect state, in which we begin with the idolatry of the creature, with the worship of every associated circunstance; and that, as we advance in perfection, the associations relating to the one only ultimate infi nite cause must at last overpower all the rest; that we shall pay no regards but to God alone; and that all resentment, demerit, sin and misery will be utterly annihilated and absorbed by his infinite happiness and perfections"

The doctrine of mechanism," says

Hartley, "has a tendency to beget the most profound humility and self-annihilation; since, according to this, we are entirely destitute of all power and perfection in ourselves; and are what we are, entirely by the grace and goudness

of God."

the real causes of their actions; which sets aside remorse; which, as it respects the pleasures of the moral sense, those pleasures, in comparison with which, the better sects of ancient philosophy, thought all others annihilated, and in their enjoy ment all pain and sorrow absorbed and unfelt; which, instead of these, offers us the miserable belief, that certain proper associations have, in some way, been formed within us, and that we have been the mechan

ical instruments in the production of certain beneficial effects.*

Views of human nature, very different from those connected with the doctripes of mechanism, may be found in

I have no intention, however, to lengthen this letter, by observing on the consequences of the doctrine of necessity. What precedes has not beei written under the most favourable circumstances. I have had no other work of any value to consult on its subject, except that of Hartley himself, and the weakness of my eyes has been such as to prevent my either reading or writing with continued

ättention.

the three first Sermons of Bishop Butlet, a man, whose only honest aim in the vigourous exertion of a most powerful mind seems to have been the establishment of truth and the promotion of vit. tue. He has written nothing unworthy of the author of "the Analogy."

while every reading makes me more admire his genius, every one makes me more doubt his heart. One thing I am extremely offended at in his poems, and of which I never took so much notice before, his frequent quotations of scripture phrases in much too ludicrous a way. The notes are worth any body's running over; some very wild, some very ingenious, some full of amusing anecdotes, some bitterly but not wittily satirical, but merely rough, unjust, and angry, and the greatest number, true commentator like, explaining what needs no explanation, and wire-drawing for meanings that the author never thought of.”

Tom Jones and Clarissa.
[From a letter to Miss Talbot.]

"I am sorry to find you so outrageous about poor Tom Jones: he