2. Principles of Human Knowledge. Lond., 1710, 1734, 1776,

3. The Three Dialogues. Lond., 1713, 1725, 1734, 1776. 8vo. 4. The Theory of Vision, or Visual Language Vindicated and Explained, 1733, 1860 (with annotations by Cowell).

5. Alciphron. Lond., 1732, 1752 (3d edition), 8vo, 2 vols. From the fourth London edition, New Haven, 8vo, 1803.

With a commendatory note by President Dwight, who styles Berkeley one of the first philosophers of any age.' The editor is indebted to Prof. George E. Day, of New Haven, for a copy of this edition.

6. Siris. Lond., 1744 (three editions), 1746, 1747, 1748,

1752. 8vo.

§ 14: TRANSLATIONS INTO FRENCH AND GERMAN.-The Three Dialogues were translated into French by the Abbé du Gua de Malves, 1750, 12mo; Alciphron by de Joncourt, 2 vols. 8vo, La Haye, 1734; and Siris by Boullier, 1748, 12mo.

The Three Dialogues were translated from the French translation of 1750 by J. C. Eschenbach, Professor of Philosophy at Rostock. The French was used because the translator could not get the English original. The German translation is given. in the Sammlung'-a collection of the most important authors who have denied the actuality of their own bodies and of the entire corporeal world. Rostock, 1756, 8vo. Eschenbach has incorporated Collier's Key in his volume, and has added notes and an Appendix in confutation of Idealism.

In 1781, Leipzig, appeared the first volume of Berkeley's 'Philosophische Werke,' with a sketch of his life and of his writings. This volume contains the Three Dialogues.

The philosophical part of Siris has never been translated into German.

§ 15: UEBERWEG'S EDITION.-In the 'Philosophische Bibliothek'-Philosophical Library, or Collection of the Chief Works on Philosophy of Ancient and Modern Times, with the co-operation of distinguished scholars; edited, translated (when the works are not German), with annotations and biographical notices, by J. H. von Kirchmann, the twelfth volume is Berkeley's Principles of Human Knowledge.

'The perusal of Berkeley's writings tends in a high degree to stimulate independent thinking. From the general philosophical notions (Begriffen) which tradition is wont to fix, Berkeley invariably falls back upon the concrete intuitions on which those notions rest, and tests the notion by the intuition. This is the evident secret of his power. Among the writings of modern philosophers I know scarcely any which are so free from the untested adoption of traditional abstractions, so independent and bold in reconstruction, such classic models in style, as the "Meditations" of Descartes and the "Principles" of our Berkeley. These qualities give them a pre-eminent adaptation as an introduction to philosophical research.

'We hardly need say that this recognition of the merits of Berkeley does not involve an acceptance of his doctrine on our part. We have added critical remarks which may stimulate the reader to independent reflection on the problems discussed. We have also given some explanations, especially of the historical references.

'Over against the ordinary presuppositions it is the aim of philosophy, in part to correct and extend, in part simply to clear up and confirm. Philosophy is not merely to strive after new results, but also to account for those grounds of just supposition, scientifically tenable, which escape our consciousness in its primary exercise (zunächst). In our sense-perception, the simple opinion that external things exist, and that they exist there and in the way, where and how, the images in our perception (Wahrnehmungsbilder) are present to our mind, this opinion in a certain respect is to be corrected, in another respect is to be justified. By reference throughout to Berkeley's doctrine, both these can be most easily carried through in such a way that the entire circle of the problems to which we are here to have regard is brought into full light. These problems belong in part to Psychology and Theology, in part to Logic. With respect to Logic, I could desire that my critical observations on Berkeley may be regarded as an essential supplement to my views of external and internal perception, which form the first division of my "System of Logic." Bonn, 1857; 3d ed., do., 1868.

'KÖNIGSBERG, Jan. 22, 1869."

II. The Precursors of Berkeley.

§ 1: BACON (1561-1626) and Berkeley.—‘It is in the writings of Berkeley,' says Archer Butler, 'that we are to look for the first exposition of those acute and important reasonings which may be said in these latter days to have reduced the broad practical monitions of Lord Bacon to their metaphysical principles.'1

'Berkeley's theory of physical causation . . . consummates Bacon, and opens the way to the true conception of physical induction.' 2

Berkeley's judgment, that: 'As the natural connexion of signs with the things signified is regular and constant, it forms a sort of rational discourse, and is therefore the immediate effect of an intelligent cause,' is in developed harmony with 'Bacon's conception of the interpretability of Nature or the sensible world.' 3 The whole spirit of Berkeley is, however, reactive against the speculative superficiality and the one-sided practicalness and materializing tendency of the Baconian System.

§ 2: HOBBES (1588-1679).-Hobbes and Berkeley stand together as defenders of Nominalism. It is almost their sole point of contact. Hobbes assumed, in his explanation of intelligent man, that the body accounted for the mind, and that Matter is the deepest thing in the Universe. Berkeley believed that Hobbes' wild imaginations-in a word, the whole system of Atheism-is. . . entirely overthrown by the repugnancy included in supposing the whole, or any part, even the most rude. and shapeless, of the visible world, to exist without a mind.' saw atheistical principles taking deeper root in consequence of the prevalence of false philosophy: 'Pantheism, Materialism, Fatalism, are nothing but Atheism a little disguised.' He regarded with horror the fact that the notions of Hobbes,' and others of the same school, ' are relished and applauded.' 5

He

Berkeley seemed determined to a surgery of extirpation in his treatment of the malady of the age. He felt that it was beyond poulticing, and he proposed to remove the cancer with the knife.

⚫ Dublin University Magazine, vol. vii. 538; quoted in Fraser's B.'s Life, 407.

2 Fraser: Life, 43.

4 Second Dialogue (Works, i. 305).

3 Siris, 254, and Fraser's note. See [104].

5 Theory of Vision Vindicated (Works, i. 374).

As prevalent falsehood abused matter to the overthrow of spirit, Berkeley proposed to settle the warfare by taking away the very material of war. He characterizes unthinking matter as that only fortress without which your Epicureans, Hobbe-ists, and the like, have not even the shadow of a pretence.' '

§ 3: DESCARTES (1596-1650) AND BERKELEY.-Berkeley 'inaugurated a new and second era in the intellectual revolution which Descartes set agoing.' Descartes rests upon the fundamental position of Berkeley, that we cognize the idea alone. He inferred from the existence of the idea, in perception, a substantial material world of which it is the idea. Berkeley denies the inference.

There were elements in the developed Cartesianism which could not but provoke opposition on the part of sound thinkers. Descartes did not actually draw some of the extremest inferences of the later Cartesianism, yet his views easily, if not necessarily, ran out into those of his school.

In Cartesianism matter is but the unknown occasion at the presence of which Ideas are excited in us by the will of God. Matter, in the Cartesian system, is passive and inert. Descartes assumed, as Berkeley did, that external substance is not in any proper sense the cause of our ideas. Berkeley improved on Descartes, therefore, by rejecting what on Descartes' hypothesis was useless and encumbering. Descartes had exploded the idea, once recognized, that colors, sounds, and the rest of the sensible secondary qualities or accidents, have a real existence without the mind. Berkeley,3 accepting this, went on to show that the primary ones--figure, motion, and such like,-cannot exist otherwise than in a spirit or mind which perceives them, and that it follows that we have no longer any reason to suppose the being of matter, taking that word to denote an 'unthinking substratum of qualities or accidents wherein they exist without the mind.' Berkeley clearly saw and exposes the philosophical absurdity of the Cartesian conception of the relation of the external world to the mind of man.4 'The modern philosophers, who, though they allow matter to exist, yet will have God alone to be the immediate, efficient cause of all things.' 'Created beings are there2 Prin. H. K., 8 69. 3 Prin., 273. 4 Prin. H. K., 8 53.

• Prin., ? 23.

I

fore made to no manner of purpose, since God might have done everything as well without them.' He refers to Descartes when he speaks of those who, after all their laboring and struggle of thought, are forced to own that we cannot attain to any selfevident or demonstrative knowledge of the existence of sensible things.' In the Hylas and Philonous he alludes to Descartes: 'What a jest it is for a philosopher to question the existence of sensible things till he hath it proved to him from the veracity of God, or to pretend our knowledge on this point falls short of intuition or demonstration.'

§ 4: MALEBRANCHE (1638-1715) AND BERKELEY.-'The Platonism,' says Fraser, which pervades Malebranche perhaps tended to encourage the Platonic thought and varied learning that appeared in Berkeley's later writings.3 But Berkeley is not so much at home in the divine vision of the French metaphysician as among the ideas of the English philosopher (Locke). The mysticism of the "Search for Truth" was repelled by the transparent clearness of Berkeley's thought. The slender hold retained by Malebranche of external substance, as well as the theory of merely occasional causation of matter, common to him and Descartes, naturally attracted Berkeley.'

The position of Malebranche, as Berkeley himself states it, is, that matter is not perceived by us, but is perceived by God, to whom it is the occasion of exciting ideas in our mind. In treating of the views of Malebranche, Berkeley says, 'If it pass for a good argument against other hypotheses in the sciences, that they suppose nature or the divine wisdom to make something in vain, or to do that by tedious, round-about methods which might have been performed in a much more easy and compendious way, what shall we think of that hypothesis which supposes the world made in vain'? Ibid. Few men think, yet all have opinions. I shall not, therefore, be surprised if some men imagine that I run into the enthusiasm of Malebranche, though in truth I am very remote from it. He builds on the most abstract, general ideas, which I entirely disclaim. He asserts an absolute external world, which I deny. He maintains that we are deceived by our senses and know not the real natures or the true 3 Pref., p. 113.

I Prin., 288.

2 p. 324.