forms and figures of extended beings, of all of which I hold the direct contrary. So that upon the whole there are no principles more fundamentally opposite than his and mine.'

§ 5: SPINOZA (1632-1677) AND BERKELEY.-An approach to Spinoza may seem to be made by Berkeley's removal of some elements of the Cartesian Dualism. Relatively to this, Berkeley may be called a generic monist. Descartes maintained two genera or kinds of substance, spiritual and corporeal. Berkeley allowed but one kind or genus of substance, to wit: spirit :—Divine spirit and Created spirit. To him all the phenomenal is so far subjective that it is either the operation of mind, or operation on mind, which is also of course in its result again the operation of mind, for the passivity of mind can in no case be more than relative. Its passivity is but a conditioned activity. But while Berkeley maintained one genus of substance, he held to objective, real species within it, and to real individuality and personality within the species. The Infinite spirit is a true, individual person, and the finite spirits are true, individual persons. No philosophical writer more thoroughly than Berkeley insists on the personality and freedom of God, the personality and freedom of man. He had, as we have seen, no sympathy with the latent Pantheism of Malebranche's vision in God, which, however it may be explained, still leaves the operations of the human mind as proper phenomena of the Divine mind, and effaces the true individuality and personality of man. There is no writer among our English classics whose whole moral tendency is purer than Berkeley's, more completely sundered from the ethical destructivism of Spinoza. His works are a bulwark of the highest faiths, hopes, and aspirations of the heart of man, and they are such, in part, because of their distinct assertion of the personality and freedom of God, the personality, freedom, and accountability of man.

§6: LOCKE (1632-1704) AND BERKELEY.—The system of Locke, which in one line of development easily runs out into materialism, is in another line carried out with equal ease into idealism. To this extreme tended Locke's depreciation of the accepted idea of substance; a depreciation the danger of which he himself subsequently saw; he ridiculed the distinction expressed in the terms substance' and 'accident.' He says (Hum. Und.,

II. xiii. 19), 'They who first ran into the notion of accidents, as a sort of real beings that needed something to inhere in, were forced to find out the word "substance" to support them.' Berkeley's theory enlarged and gave scientific shape to Locke's inconsiderate ridicule.

Another point of attachment to idealism is found in Locke's view of knowledge-his answer to the question, 'What do we know ?' To this he returns the reply (IV. i. 1), ‘The mind hath no other immediate object but its own ideas, which it alone does or can contemplate;' and he infers that our knowledge is only conversant about them. He says (Iv. ii. 1), 'All our knowledge consists in the view the mind has of its own ideas, which is the utmost light and greatest certainty we with our faculties and in our way of knowledge are capable of.' This is a distinct admission that we have no immediate proper knowledge of the external world. The mind knows not things immediately, but only by the intervention of the ideas it has of them.' (Iv. iv. 3.) This strictly taken means that we know only our ideas and infer the existence of things. He goes on to say, 'Our knowledge is therefore real only so far as there is a conformity between our ideas and the reality of things.' He ought to have said, to be consistent with himself, our inferences therefore as to things are correct only so far as there is a conformity between our ideas and the reality of things.

Locke was too acute to fail to perceive the embarrassment of his position, but he was not acute enough to relieve it, for in fact it cannot be relieved. That he was acute enough to perceive it is shown by his asking, 'But what shall be the criterion, how shall the mind, when it perceives nothing but its own ideas, know that they agree with things themselves?' 'This,' he says, 'though it seems not to want in difficulty, yet I think there be two sorts of ideas, that we may be assured agree with things.' (IV. iv. 3.)

In these very words he abandons his position and goes into the discussion of a wholly different question. He raises his question in what Kant would call the sphere of the critical reason, and returns his answer in the sphere of the practical reason. His question is, 'How shall I know?' His answer is, 'I have good reason to believe.' But, philosophically speaking, we can

When

not know what we believe, nor believe what we know. I speak philosophically and say, 'I believe,' I grant that I do not know, in the strict sense in which we here use the term.

Locke says (IV. iv. 8), 'To make our knowledge real, it is requisite that our ideas answer their archetypes.' (Iv. vi. 16), 'General certainty is never to be found but in our ideas; it is the contemplation of our own abstract ideas that alone is able to afford us general knowledge.' (Iv. vi. 11), The knowledge we have of our own being we have by intuition, the existence of God reason clearly makes known to us; the knowledge of the existence of any other thing we can have only by sensation, for there being no necessary connection of real existence with any idea a man has in his memory, nor of any other existence but that of God, with the existence of any particular man, no particular man can know the existence of any other being but only when by actually operating upon him it makes itself perceived by him; for having the idea of anything in our minds no more proves the existence of that thing than the picture of a man evidences his being in the world, or the vision of a dream makes thereby a true history.' Locke admits in so many words the notice we have by our senses of the existence of things without us is not altogether so certain as our intuitive knowledge or the deductions of reason employed about the clear abstract ideas of our own minds, yet it is an assurance that deserves the name of knowledge.' Here Locke marks three gradations of intellectual certainty: the first and highest gradation is our intuitive knowledge, the second and lower is deductions of reason, the third and lowest is the notice our senses take of things without us, the result of which Locke calls assurance; in a word, I. Intuition, II. Reason, III. Faith. Now, as the first of these is not more than knowledge, the second and third must be less than knowledge, because they are less than the first. Locke feels this, and hence the rhetorical vagueness 'it is an assurance that deserves the name of knowledge'-it is really faith, not knowledge. He says (IV. xi. 9) of this last, 'This knowledge extends so far as the present testimony of our senses employed about particular objects that do then affect them, and no further; for if I saw such a collection of simple ideas, as is wont

to be called man, existing together one minute since, and am now alone, I cannot be certain that the same man exists now, since there is no necessary connection of his existence a minute since with his existence now; by a thousand ways he may cease to be since I had the testimony of my senses for his existence.' He closes the paragraph by saying, 'Though it be highly probable that millions of men do now exist, yet whilst I am alone writing this I have not the certainty of it which we strictly call knowledge, though the great likelihood of it puts me past doubt; but this is but probability, NOT knowledge.' In these words of Locke there is a distinct assertion of the principle that cognition and belief are distinct, that no amount of belief is strictly equivalent to knowledge, and that knowledge proper is limited by the present testimony of our senses, so far as anything external to us is involved. This is not, indeed, Berkeley's doctrine that the unperceived is non-existent; but it is the doctrine, almost as remote from popular impression, that the unperceived is unknown, -it is that the cognitive esse is percipi, and in a new shape it involves that, on Locke's principles, the external world is not an object of knowledge, but an assumption of faith. In some sense Berkeley developed certain parts of the philosophy of Locke; in others, he took grounds against it.

§7: BURTHOGGE (1694).— Richard Burthogge's Essay upon Reason and the Nature of Spirits, 1694, is quoted by Prof. Fraser1 as presenting 'dim anticipations both of Berkeley and of Kant.' Burthogge says, 'Few, if any, of the ideas which we have of things are properly pictures, our conceptions of things no more resembling them in strict propriety than our words do our conceptions... Things ... are in all respects the very same to the mind or understanding that colours are to the eye... Things are nothing to us but as they are known by us; ... they are not in our faculties, either in their own reality or by way of a true resemblance or representation... Every cogitative faculty, though it is not the sole cause of its own immediate (apparent) object, yet has a share in making it. . . In sum, the immediate objects of cogitation... are entia cogitationis, all phenomena; appearances that do no more exist without our faculties in the things them

Life and Letters, 44.

selves than the images that are seen in water, or behind a glass, do really exist in those places where they seem to be... In truth, neither accident nor substance hath any being but only in the mind, and by the virtue of cogitation or thought.''

III. Summaries of Berkeley's System.

§ 1: In common with every great thinker of every age, Berkeley has been misunderstood and misrepresented in various ways. Men of various schools have been unconsciously biased in their judgment of Berkeley's views by their own.

Where there has been no misrepresentation, there has been a difference in the proportion and prominence assigned by different writers to different parts.

It will therefore be both interesting and useful to present a number of summaries from distinguished writers of different schools. They will have value as testimony also, where differences of opinion may still exist as to Berkeley's meaning.

§ 2: REID (1710-1796).- Berkeley maintains, and thinks he has demonstrated, by a variety of arguments, grounded on principles of philosophy universally received, that there is no such thing as matter in the universe; that sun and moon, earth and sea, our own bodies and those of our friends, are nothing but ideas in the minds of those who think of them, and that they have no existence when they are not the objects of thought; that all that is in the universe may be reduced to two categories, to wit, minds, and ideas in the mind.'"

§3: KANT (1724-1804).- Material idealism is the theory which maintains that the existence of objects in space exterior to us is either dubious and incapable of proof, or false and impossible. The former is the problematic idealism of Descartes, who holds that there is but one empirical assertion which is beyond doubt, to wit, Lam; the second is the dogmatic idealism. of Berkeley, who maintains that space, with all the things to which it adheres, as an inseparable condition, is in itself impossible, and that by consequence the things in space are mere

1 Chaps. iii. and v., quoted in Life and Letters, 44. Burthogge's Work is in the Philadelphia Library.

2 Works (Hamilton), 281.