merous and clamorous families. We have both of us a great deal of dirty work to do, and if you will lend me your horfes to draw me through the mire, I will lend you mine, fo let us e'en join our teams together.'-' Why, neighbour Whighoufe, I like your propofal very well,' fays farmer Toryman, but I fear our horfes won't draw well together. I am apt to fear they will find the chains rather galling, and that they will kick, and wince, and ftart, and run reftive.'

Never fear that, Mr. Toryman,' fays Mr. Whighouse, we must pat 'em and coax 'em, and feed 'em with good hay and corn, and give fome of them fine trappings, and then never fear but we make them fo tractable, that we may ride 'em ourselves with eafe, though to be fure we are neither of us very light weights.'

"Now all former animofities were to be forgotten, and upon every occafion they called one another my good friend Mr. Whighoufe, and my worthy neighbour Mr. Toryman. This to be fure made the neighbours laugh. But matters foon took a ferious turn; for these two overgrown farmers began to encroach upon their neighbours, to break down their fences, and were proceeding to feize their very deeds and leafes, when a worthy gentleman in the neighbourhood, finding how matters were going on, went and informed their worthy landlord of their proceedings, who difmiffed them from their farms, in order to make room for better tenants."

Sir Richard Hill concluded by faying, that without doing violence to the moral of the ftory, he would fay to Old England,

De te fabula narratur.

The motion for adjourning the Committee on the state of the nation to Monday next was put and carried.

A few words after this paffed between Lord Surry and the Chancellor of the Exchequer, relative to the difpofal of the place of Chancellor of the Dutchy of Lancaster; the refult of which was, that Mr. Pitt faid, he would not difpofe of it contrary to the wishes of Parliament.

No bufinefs.

January 22.

VOL. XI.

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Mr. Chancellor Patt.

Mr. Fox.

January 23.

An uninterefting converfation occurred on the charge brought by Mr. Yorke refpecting the ftory of Mr. Hamilton, of Bargany, and Mr. Dalrymple. Mr. Charteris explained the whole into a laugh.

Mr. Chancellor Pitt moved, that his India bill be read a fecond time and committed. The motion being feconded, Mr. Fox rofe with an intention to enter into the intrinfic merits of a bill, on the fate of which depended fo many and fuch various circumftances of magnitude and importance. He wished to confider them difpaffionately, and with the deference and candour which they deserved. He hoped no perfon would fufpect him of prejudice on a point of fo much intereft, and which fo materially affected the political concerns of the nation, and the profperity and happiness of fo vaft a number of the human race, This was no object of trivial concern; no question of light difcuffion; no fubject in the investigation of which the fpirit of party fhould mingle itself.

The evils exifting in the adminiftration and government of India might be digefted under diftinct heads. From the reports of the Secret and Select Committees it appeared, that the Company's fervants abroad, by a secret influence, corrupted and abused to their purposes the Proprietors and Directors at home. It was no lefs evident that there was no energy, or at leaft no fufficient vigour in the administration of the Company's affairs in this country. And it was equally obvious, that there were no remedies for thofe evils of various defcriptions, which were committed by the fervants of the Company abroad. Thefe, faid he, are the grand and leading points of confideration in the digeftion of a fcheme of India reform, and which it was my object to correct in the bill which I formed on the fubject, and which obtained the approbation and sanction of the Houfe. Let us now compare the bill under confideration in its various tendencies to correct these evils, and in its different relations to thefe objects.

The bill under confideration then, by continuing the influence and power of the Proprietors and Court of Directors, by rendering the latter dependent on the former, even for its existence, by avowedly leaving as much as poffible the commerce of the Company to its own fuperintendance, has furely in it no tendency to eradicate thefe evils, or to emancipate

emancipate the Company from that flavish dependence on its fervants abroad, which has deprived it of energy and decifion, and rendered it the prostituted object of foreign cabal. It was the intention of my bill to remedy these encroachments, of fo threatening and deftructive a nature, by excluding the Proprietors, as far as was confiftent with neceffity, from a participation in a government, in the conduct of which they had exhibited fuch a prostitution of fentiment, and fo ftrange an accommodation of meafures, to the corrupt influence and fecret intrigues of their fervants abroad. This, however, is by no means the intention of the bill under difcuffion. According to it, matters are still allowed to move on in their former track. Directors must still look to their conftituents, and proprietors may ftill be decided, not by motives of public utility, not by the fentiments of cool deliberation, but by b Cret influence of perfons who perhaps gave them came.103.

Did not daily obfervation and bence illuftrate the connection between reprefentative and constituent bodies? No where is this dependence more eminently mplified than in this Houfe. Here all of us look to our chlors. Here all of us wish to accommodate ourselves to their inclinations, fo far as is agreeable to our principles; and in the event of diffolution, each of us is anxious to conciliate the approbation, friendship, and good offices of our constituents, that we may not be difmiffed. This dependence exhibits, in the ftrongest light, the extreme danger of continuing the commercial concerns of the Company in the hands of perfons raised to office, and placed under the abfolute control of men who have uniformly been under the influence and direction of their fervants abroad. Do not recent facts illuftrate this truth, and evidently demonftrate that Directors are chofen not in virtue of their merits, but agreeable to the prepoffeffions and prejudices of the proprietors? I do not mean to expatiate on the circumftances of a late election, or to develope the various caufes which have raifed an honourable gentleman (Commodore Johnstone) behind me, and others, to the office they now hold in the Court of Directors. is fuflicient for me to cbferve, that in determining the judgment of the populace in fuch cafes, merit is not al ways the criterion of decifion; but that in proportion as a fervant has acted wrong, in proportion as he has forfeited the favour of the Company, he has, in the fame propor

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tion,

tion, recommended himself to their patronage and regard. Here then is a defect of fyftem, a corruption in government, a protection of delinquency, which loudly calls for correction and remedy. On the prefent fcheme, however, are not these evils rather heightened than destroyed?

Another objection to the bill, in my opinion, is, that it enfures no effective mode of obedience. It enacts an appointment of officers by one body, and vefts their recall in another. How could fuch a fyftem be rendered either executive or effectual? According to every idea of jurisprudence I have formed, the executive authority in every wellregulated government ought to be placed in a fmall body. This was the conftant theme of thofe who declaimed on the advantages of monarchical government, and their reafonings ought certainly to be admitted in as far as they were agreeable to the maxims of freedom. Here were, however, two diftinct bodies; a Court of Directors and Superintendants, conftituted on different principles, who might be actuated by various motives, who might occafionally be influenced by oppofite interefts; and yet, into the hands of thefe two bodies is to be committed the executive power of adminiftering the affairs of the India Company. The one is to have the authority to appoint; it is the privilege of the other to recall. In fo divided a government, where can there exift either energy or execution? Founded in principles fo heterogeneous, must it not be the conftant victim of internal distraction?

But fuppofing there fhould be a cordial agreement eftablifhed between thefe two executive bodies, though there should even exist a danger of such an union amongst them, how dreadful muft their combination be to this country? By whom is the Board of Superintendance to be appointed? Is it not by his Majefty? Is it not to be under his control? In how dreadful a point of view, then, muit the very fuppofition of an agreement between this Board and the Court of Directors ftrike every one who attends to it? Muft not the exiftence of fuch an union extend the influence of the prerogative, by adding to it the patronage of the Company? Is it not giving power to the Sovereign for the ends of influence, and for the extenfion of that fyftem of corruption which had been fo justly reprobated? How can thofe, then, who affect to be the enemies of undue influence, the candidates for popular diftinction, and the affected friends of freedom, pretend to fupport a bill fo dangerous

dangerous in its tendencies, and fo hoftile to the liberties of the country? In whatever point of view then I confider the nature of this regulation, I muft pronounce it to be unwife and unfafe; for no truths are more obvious than thefe, that when the Courts of Superintendants and Directors are at variance, anarchy will be the effect; when on the other hand they are agreed, meafures will be adopted tending to increafe the influence of the Crown, and deftructive of the liberties of the fubject.

To prevent thefe evils, and to guard against fuch fluctuation of fyftem, it was propofed in the bill which received the fanction of this Houfe, that a confiftent and permanent government of India affairs fhould be eftablished in London. On this plan, officers were not to be appointed one day, and recalled another. The adminif tration of India was not to be fubjected to change, and become a fhuttlecock of government, fimilar to that which exifts in this country; for what has been the fate of this distracted kingdom for fome years paft? Look at the revolutions which have taken place within this period. Confider how Miniftry has fluctuated through various fucceffions, occafioned by different caufes, whether of national difafter, or of fecret influence. Look how many changes there have been brought about in the administration of Irelan, and in the men appointed in the conduct of it. Would not a fyftem, then, conftituted on fimilar principles, be productive of fimilar effects? Would not the appointments of men vary in India according to the revolutions of politics in this country, and every circumftance, on this principle of the bill, be rendered unftable and ineffectual? No perfon fetting out to India for the most benevolent purpofcs, could either accomplish his wifhes, or fecure his permanency under fo precaricus a regulation.

But this bill is by no means calculated to restrain any of thofe abufes which have exifted fo long, and have been fo loudly complained of. This is another of its cardinal defects. In fo divided a fcheme of government, where the management of affairs is vefted in the fame hands as thofe to whom it was formerly committed, how can fuch an object be accomplished? In whom did the refponsibility of nomination reft? No where. His Majefty had the power of appointing toties quoties, without refponfibility. In fo trange a fyitem, how could thofe abufes be rectified,

which