and prudence, without which it could not be an adequate check upon the sometimes hasty and ill-considered measures of the Commons (who are, necessarily, liable to be unduly impelled by their constituents, and by the popular voice), than any body of functionaries appointed for life by ministers at the head of one party or the other in the House of Commons, and who would be mostly creatures of those parties.

It must be admitted, that persons sometimes succeed to a seat in the House of Lords, by inheritance, who are a disgrace to that illustrious assembly; and it would, perhaps, be desirable (if, indeed, such an institution could be contrived so as to be free from abuse and danger) to establish a censorship upon the nobility, such as existed in the aristocratic republics of Genoa and Venice, for the purpose of casting out of the upper house, for life, or a lesser term, those members who are unworthy of sitting there. But, unless the upper classes of society should become utterly degraded and depraved (in which case a revolution must necessarily follow), it is impossible to suppose that the House of Lords can ever contain a sufficient number of incompetent or worthless peers to infect the determinations of that body. Such persons are, indeed, seldom likely to take an active part in public affairs: they are driven from the senate by the dignity and gravity of its deliberations; and they remain confounded among the followers of a leader, who must be a man of some weight in parliament and the country. Thus they seldom do more mischief than disgracing themselves.

The House of Lords acquires an accession of vigour and talent at every generation, by the elevation of persons of great birth, influence, and wealth, as well as of illustrious magistrates, commanders, and statesmen, who (however humble their origin may sometimes be) are rewarded

by a seat in that august assembly, for eminent services rendered to their country in peace and war.

The commons consist of all such men of property in the kingdom as have not seats in the House of Lords, every one of whom has a voice in parliament, either personally or by his representatives. It would be impossible for the whole body of the commons to assemble and deliberate; and they therefore transfer their power to representatives, chosen by a number of separate districts wherein the voters are or may be distinguished. The counties are therefore represented by persons, called knights, elected by the proprietors of lands; and the representatives of the cities and boroughs are called citizens and burgesses, who are chosen by the mercantile part, or supposed trading interest of the nation. Universities of Oxford and Cambridge, also, each return two burgesses, elected by the masters of arts, bachelors of divinity and civil law, and doctors. They were first indulged with this permanent privilege by king James I.

The

The number of members of the House of Commons is 658; of whom 500 represent England and Wales, 53 Scotland, and 105 Ireland. "Every member, though chosen by one particular district, when elected and returned, serves for the whole realm. For the end of his coming thither is not particular, but general; not barely to advantage his constituents, but the commonwealth; to advise the crown, as appears by the writ of summons de communi consilio super negotiis quibusdam arduis et ur

1 Blackst. Com. b. i. c. ii. p. 158. That expression, the commons, is used in three different senses, to mean, 1st, the whole body of the population excepting the peers: 2dly, the persons possessing the parliamentary franchise: and, 3dly, the representatives of the people in parliament, who are also called the commons in parliament assembled.

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gentibus, regem, statum, et defensionem regni Angliæ et Ecclesiæ Anglicanæ concernentibus. And therefore he is not bound, like a deputy in the United Provinces, to consult with, or take advice of, his constituents upon any particular point, unless he himself thinks it proper or prudent so to do."1

Blackst. Com. b. i. c. ii. p. 159.
(Coke) 4 Inst. p. 14.

Sidney on Gov. § 44.

Coke, 4 Inst. 14. Hats. Prec.
Speaker Onslow's n. to Hats.
Burke, at the close of his

vol. ii. p. 76. Prec. loc. cit. speech to the electors of Bristol, in 1774, said on this subject-" My worthy colleague says his will ought to be subservient to yours. If that be all, the thing is innocent. If government were a matter of will upon any side, yours, without question, ought to be the superior. But government and legislation are matters of reason and judgment, and not of inclination: and what sort of reason is that, in which the determination precedes the discussion; in which one set of men deliberate, and another decide; and when those who form the conclusion are, perhaps, three hundred miles distant from those who hear the arguments? To deliver an opinion is the right of all men; that of constituents is a weighty and respectable opinion, which a representative ought always to rejoice to hear, and which he ought always most seriously to consider. But authoritative instructions-mandates issued, which the member is bound blindly and implicitly to obey, to vote, and to argue for, though contrary to the clearest convictions of his judgment and conscience-these are things utterly unknown to the laws of this land, and which arise from a fundamental mistake of the whole order and tenour of our constitution. Parliament is not a congress of ambassadors from different and hostile interests-which interests each must maintain, as an agent and advocate against other agents and advocates— but parliament is a deliberative assembly of one nation, with one interest, that of the whole; where not local purposes, not local prejudices ought to guide, but the general good resulting from the general reason of the whole. You choose a member, indeed; but, when you have chosen him, he is not member of Bristol, but he is a member of parliament. If the local constituent should have an interest, or should form a hasty opinion, evidently opposite to the real good of the rest of the community, the member for that place ought to be as far as any other from any endeavour to give it effect...... We are now members for a rich commercial city; this city, however, is but a part of a

In the election of knights, citizens, and burgesses, consists the exercise of the democratic part of our constitution; and it is of the greatest importance to regulate by whom, and in what manner, the suffrages are to be given.

We must now proceed to take a cursory view of, first, the qualifications of electors; and, secondly, the qualifications of the elected.

1. As to the qualifications of the electors. "The true reason of requiring any qualification with regard to property in voters, is to exclude such persons as are in so mean a situation that they are esteemed to have no will of their own. If these persons had votes, they would be tempted to dispose of them under some undue influence or other. This would give a great, an artful, or a wealthy man, a greater share in elections than is consistent with general liberty. If it were probable that every man would give his vote freely, and without influence of any kind, then, upon the true theory and genuine principles of liberty, every member of the community, however poor, should have a vote in electing those delegates, to whose charge is committed the disposal of his property, his liberty, and his life. But since that is hardly to be expected in persons of indigent fortunes, or such as are under the immediate dominion of others, all popular states have been obliged to establish certain qualifications; whereby some, who are suspected of having no will of their own, are excluded from voting, in order to set other individuals, whose wills may be supposed

rich commercial nation, the interests of which are various, multiform, and intricate. We are members for that great nation, which, however, is itself but part of a great empire, extended by our virtue and our fortune to the farthest limits of the east and west."

independent, more thoroughly upon a level with each other."1

Thus every elector must possess a certain amount of property. "Nor is comparative wealth or property entirely disregarded in elections; for though the richest man has only one vote at one place, yet if his property be at all diffused, he has, probably, a right to vote at more places than one, and therefore has many representatives."

Another principle has (especially in later times) been, with abundant reason, dwelt upon as a ground for requiring that electors should possess some property as a qualification to vote. It is presumed that a man possessed of an amount of property placing him above actual want, may, probably, have some degree of education, and be, therefore, more capable of doing his duty than those grossly ignorant persons, who could not be intrusted with an important political power without danger to the community. Besides, a man who has something to lose is less likely to support desperate measures, and dangerous adventurers, than one who can lose nothing, or very little. It is, however, very difficult to say where the line should be drawn. Trustworthy men should not be excluded from the discharge of so important a duty as electing representatives, to whose charge their property, their liberty, and their lives are committed; but when we see how much the greatest and most vital questions of policy depend on the result of votes given on the hustings, we must be convinced, that whenever ignorant and needy men obtain a preponderance in the electoral body, the downfal of this country will be very difficult to avert.

But to return to our qualifications; and, first, of the

1 Blackst. Com. b. i. c. ii p. 170, 171.