that peace and happiness which for twenty years together they had lost, in a solemn parliamentary convention of the estates, restored the right heir to the crown. And in the proclamation for that purpose, which was drawn up and attended by both houses,' they declared, that, according to their duty and allegiance, they did heartily, joyfully, and unanimously acknowledge and proclaim, that immediately upon the decease of our late sovereign lord king Charles, the imperial crown of these realms did by inherent birthright and lawful and undoubted succession descend and come to his most excellent majesty Charles II., as being lineally, justly, and lawfully next heir of the blood royal of this realm: and thereunto they most humbly and faithfully did submit and oblige themselves and their heirs and posterity for ever."

It must here be observed, that the crown is declared to have descended on Charles II. immediately upon the decease of Charles I.; and the acts passed in the first year after the restoration are therefore called, the acts in the twelfth year of his reign; and all the other legal proceedings are reckoned from the year 1648, and not from the year 1660. Upon this principle, that the king commences his reign from the day of the death of his ancestor, it has been held, that compassing the king's death before the coronation, or even before proclamation, is treason, under the stat. 25 Ed. III. stat. 5, c. ii., he being king immediately, and the proclamation and coronation only honourable ceremonies for the farther notification thereof.2

Thus it clearly appears, from the highest authority within the realm, that the crown of England is an hereditary crown, though subject to limitations by parliament. The next instance in point of time of parliament de

1 Com. Journ. 8 May, 1660.

23 Inst. 7. Hale's Hist. P. ch. ci.

liberating respecting the succession, is the famous bill of exclusion, by which it was proposed, in the reign of Charles II., to set aside the rights of the duke of York, the king's brother and heir presumptive, on the score of his profess ing the doctrines of the Church of Rome. The bill passed the house of commons, but was rejected by the lords, the king having also declared beforehand that he never would be brought to consent to it.

From this transaction Blackstone draws two conclusions: 1st, That the crown was universally acknowledged to be hereditary, and the inheritance indefeasible unless by parliament, else it would have been needless to prefer such a bill; and 2dly, That parliament had power to have defeated the inheritance, else such a bill had been ineffectual. However, the duke of York succeeded to the throne as king James II.

We come now to one of the most remarkable events in the history of the succession to the throne, namely, the revolution of 1688.

"The true ground and principle," says Blackstone, upon which that memorable event proceeded, was an entirely new case in politics, which had never before happened in our history, the abdication of the reigning monarch, and the vacancy of the throne thereupon. It was not a defeasance of the right of succession, and a new limitation of the crown, by the king and both houses of parliament, it was the act of the nation alone, upon a conviction that there was no king in being; for in a full assembly of the lords and commons, met in a convention ,upon the supposition of this vacancy, both houses came to this resolution, that king James, having endeavoured to subvert the constitution of the kingdom by breaking the original contract between the king and people, and by the advice of Jesuits and other wicked persons having violated

the fundamental laws, and having withdrawn himself out of this kingdom, has abdicated the government; and that the throne is thereby vacant. Thus ended at once, by this sudden and unexpected vacancy of the throne, the old line of succession, which from the Conquest had lasted above six hundred years, and from the union of the heptarchy almost nine hundred. The facts themselves thus appealed to, the king's endeavour to subvert the constitution by breaking the original contract, his violation. of the fundamental laws, and his withdrawing himself out of the kingdom, were evident and notorious; and the consequences drawn from these facts (namely, that they amounted to an abdication of the government, which abdication did not affect only the person of the king himself, but also all his heirs, and rendered the throne absolutely and completely vacant,) it belonged to our ancestors to determine. For whenever a question arises between the society at large and any magistrate vested with powers originally delegated by that society,' it must be decided by the voice of the society itself: there is not upon earth any other tribunal to resort to. And that these consequences were fairly deduced from these facts, our ancestors have solemnly determined, in a full parliamentary convention representing the whole society. The reasons upon which they decided may be found at large in the parliamentary proceedings of the times, and may be matter of instructive amusement for us to contemplate as a speculative point in history. But care must be taken not to carry this inquiry

1 It is somewhat curious that this doctrine of the delegation of the regal power by the nation to the king is to be found in that very text of the Pandects which so much alarmed our ancient lawyers, as an assertion of despotic authority. Quod principi placuit, legis habet vigorem: utpote cum lege regia, quæ de imperio ejus lata est, populus ei et in eum omne suum imperium et potestatem conferat. L. 1. ff. de Constit. Princip. and § 6 Inst. de Jur. Natur. Gent. et Civ.

farther than merely for instruction and amusement.

The idea, that the consciences of posterity were concerned in the rectitude of their ancestors' decisions, gave birth to those dangerous political heresies which so long distracted the state, but at length are all happily extinguished. Therefore rather choose to consider this great political measure upon the solid footing of authority, than to reason in its favour from its justice, moderation, or expedience, because that might imply a right of dissenting or revolting from it, in case we should think it to have been unjust, oppressive, or inexpedient. Whereas our ancestors, having most indisputably a competent jurisdiction to decide this great and important question, and having in fact decided it, it is now become our duty, at this distance of time, to acquiesce in their determination, being born under that establishment which was built upon this foundation, and obliged by every tie, religious as well as civil, to maintain it."

It has already been observed, that, in the resolution of the convention, the word abdication was not used to signify a legal and regular cession of the crown, but a species of forfeiture incurred by the king, by breaking the original contract, violating the fundamental laws, and withdrawing himself out of the kingdom. In truth it had become impossible for king James to govern the country any longer; and he had, moreover, been compelled to make his escape. The convention had to deal with the facts as they stood. How far those who invited over king William III. were justifiable in their own consciences, is another question; but it was absolutely necessary to make a provision for the continuance of the monarchy, especially on account of the doubts that were deeply rooted in the public mind respecting the legitimacy of the prince of Wales, and which must have been dispelled more thoroughly than it

was probably possible to do before James II.'s dynasty could have been continued on the throne.

The convention therefore took advantage of the colour afforded to them by the king's flight, to declare his abdication; and then proceeded, on the assumption that the throne was vacant, to resolve "that William and Mary, prince and princess of Orange, be, and be declared to be, king and queen of England, France, and Ireland, and the dominions thereto belonging, to hold the crown and dignity of the said kingdoms and dominions to them, the said prince and princess, during their lives and the life of the survivor of them; and that the sole and full exercise of the regal power be only in and exercised by the said prince of Orange, in the names of the said prince and princess, during their joint lives; and, after their decease, the said crown and royal dignity of the said kingdoms and dominions to be to the heirs of the body of the said princess; for default of issue, to the princess Anne of Denmark and the heirs of her body; and for default of such issue, to the heirs of the body of the said prince of Orange."

This settlement was certainly a total departure from the law of succession to the throne. Mary, king James's eldest daughter, was indeed made queen, but she in reality only held the situation of queen consort, except in having her name in the style. She was in the same predicament as Philip of Spain during his marriage with queen Mary I. The crown was bestowed on William, and the claims of the princess Anne postponed during his life. But no provision was made for the succession to the throne, in the event of a failure of issue from those in whom it was thus

' It must be observed, that an act of parliament 2 W. and M. c. vi. was required to enable queen Mary to exercise the regal power during the king's absence from England.