The two houses of parliament are therefore only temporarily called together, for the purpose of legislating with the queen, providing supplies, exercising a supervision over the ministers of the crown and all other functionaries, and advising her majesty on matters of public moment. But to the crown is intrusted the permanent and constant task of government, to be fulfilled in accordance with the law of the realm, and by the advice of servants responsible to parliament. And here we cannot but perceive the error of those who think that the business of government consists mainly in proposing new laws to parliament, and who reduce all government to the functions of a parliamentary leader. The crown is besides invested with the character of representative of the majesty of the state; and to the crown belongs dominion over the territories and the whole patrimony of the nation.

For these reasons the attribute of sovereign majesty is conferred upon the queen alone by the constitution.

The crown is enabled to fulfil these important and perpetual duties by being invested with certain high attributes and powers, which are called the royal prerogative.

Prerogatives are of two sorts. Some are in the nature of exceptions to the private law of the land; and to them Finch particularly refers when he says, that the prerogative is that law in the case of the king which is no law in the case of the subject.' Such are the rules, that the queen cannot be a joint-tenant; that no costs can be recovered against her in any court; and that her debt shall be preferred to that of any of her subjects. These are called by Blackstone incidental prerogatives, and they do not come within the scope of our inquiries. The remaining class of prerogatives (named by Blackstone direct 1 Finch, Law, 85.

2 Blackst. Com. b. i. c. vii. p. 239.

prerogatives) are such positive substantial parts of the royal character and authority as belong to the fulfilment of the high functions inherent by the constitution in the regal office. Such are the rights of declaring war, concluding peace, pardoning offenders, and assembling, proroguing, or dissolving parliament.

This species of prerogatives is divided by Blackstone into three kinds, being such as regards,-1st, The queen's royal character. 2dly, Her royal authority. And, 3dly, Her royal revenues or income.1

This chapter will be confined to the former; the two latter requiring to be separately treated.

First, then, of the royal dignity,- that is to say, the character and attributes with which the constitution of these realms invests the queen.

I. The chief attribute which the law ascribes to the queen is sovereignty. "The king," says Bracton," is the vicar and servant of God on earth: every thing is subject to him, and he is subject to no one except God."2 The queen is said to have imperial dignity; and in charters before the Conquest her predecessors are frequently styled basileus and imperator, the titles respectively assumed by the emperors of the east and west.3 Her realm is declared to be an empire, and her crown imperial, by many acts of parliament, particularly the statutes 24 Hen. VIII. c. 12, and 25 Hen. VIII. c. xxviii.,4 which at the same time declare the king to be the supreme head of the realm in matters both civil and ecclesiastical, and of consequence inferior to no man upon earth, dependent on no man, accountable to no man.

1 Blackst. Com. b. i. c. vii. p. 240.

2 Bracton, 1. i. c. viii.

3 Seld. Tit. of Hon. i. 2.

4 See also 24 Geo. II. c. xxiv.; 5 Geo. III. c. xxvii.

From this supreme dignity and jurisdiction of the crown, having no superior on earth, it follows that the queen is amenable to no tribunal whatever, because no tribunal can exercise jurisdiction or authority over her. Hence, likewise, the royal person is by law sacred and inviolable; and the sovereign is responsible for no measures of his government, however unwise, tyrannical, and unjust they may be. The reasons of this are very solid; for if the sovereign were liable to be called to account and put upon trial for any cause whatever, the monarchy would be suspended whenever that power was exercised; and such a suspension, even if not followed by his punishment, would be a temporary revolution. During the time that the sovereign was under trial, the kingdom would, in fact, become a republic; and this would open a door to all those dangers, arising from private ambition and the instability of the supreme magistrate, which belong to republican institutions. Besides, the crown would cease to be part of the supreme power, if it were liable to the animadversions of any other authority. In the same manner, the two houses of parliament would no longer be parts of the supreme power, if they were not respectively irresponsible to each other and to the crown. The balance of the constitution is maintained by that species of independence of the parts into which the supreme power is divided; for if either the crown, or one or both of the houses of parliament had avowedly a right to animadvert on the other branch or branches of the legislature, that branch, subject to such a jurisdiction, would cease to be part of the supreme power, the balance of the constitution would be overturned, and the branch or branches in which this jurisdiction resided would be absolutely supreme. It is in furtherance of these principles that nothing done in parliament can be called in question elsewhere; and the

crown ought not to take notice of business actually depending in parliament, because this would be an infringement of the privileges securing the independence of that assembly. The constitution therefore establishes the maxim, that the king can do no wrong. But the constitution requires that every act of the royal authority should be performed by the advice of councillors, who are responsible to parliament and to the law of the land. Thus, any man who assists the crown in contradiction to the laws of the land, is liable to be indicted before the ordinary courts of law, or to be tried by the House of Lords, on an impeachment by the House of Commons, acting as the grand inquest of the whole nation.

The advisers of the crown are likewise responsible for the policy and wisdom as well as the legality of the measures of government, because they are bound to use all their endeavours in the service of the crown; and, on the other hand, deserve punishment, if they undertake so important a duty without possessing the ability requisite for its discharge.1

But the modern system of conducting the government renders it scarcely ever necessary to impeach a minister.

The responsible servants of the crown are obliged to give an account of their measures in parliament, because they can remain in office only so long as they possess the confidence of that assembly. If a ministry retain office after they have ceased to be supported by a majority in the House of Commons, some vote will follow, either directly or impliedly censuring them, and perhaps an ad

1 There is a good maxim in the Pandects, applicable to this point of law and morals. Gajus says, Nec videtur iniquum, si infirmitas culpæ adnumeretur; cum affectare quisque non debeat, in quo vel intelligit vel intelligere debet infirmitatem suam alii periculosam futuram. L. viii. ff. ad Leg. Aquil.

dress to the crown praying for their removal; and the next step will be a refusal of the supplies. Ministers may however dissolve the parliament, and thereby appeal to the country; but the decision upon that appeal must be final.

The consequence of this system is, that the government can only be conducted by the advice of ministers possessing the confidence of a majority in parliament, but especially of the commons, who have the control of the public purse, and are supported by the weight and influence of the great mass of the nation whom they represent.

Thus a total change of the measures of the government may be effected, without any convulsion or danger, by a change of administration brought about in parliament. And here we must observe, that this indirect and qualified control of parliament over the choice of ministers by the crown is strictly consonant with constitutional principles, for the following reasons. The high court of parliament is, in the words of lord Hale, the greatest and highest council of advice and deliberation that the crown has. It follows that the two houses of parliament have a right to advise the crown on all matters of state, including the unfitness of particular persons to be ministers of state. The two houses of parliament cannot point out to the crown what persons shall be placed in office, any more than they can appoint ministers and other public functionaries, because that would degrade the dignity as well as destroy the independence of the sovereign and the balance of the constitution; but they are bound to advise the crown to dismiss evil or incompetent councillors; and of their doing so, either expressly or by implication, there are many instances in our history.

The usual course at the dissolution of an administra

1 Hale, Jurisd. of the H. of Lords, c. ii. p. 9.