any other committee of the house appointed for that particular purpose.1

We now come to consider the appropriation of the supplies.

When the committees of supply and ways and means are closed, the House of Commons pass a bill, in which the several grants which have been made in the committee of ways and means, by land-tax, malt-tax, loan, &c., are recapitulated, and directed to be applied to those services which have been voted in that session in the committee of supply; specifying the particular sums granted for each service; appropriating the money that shall be paid into the exchequer for their discharge; and directing that the said supplies shall not be applied to any other than the purposes mentioned in the said act.2

The measure of appropriating the grants of the commons to particular services was attempted, and in some instances carried into execution, soon after the Restoration.3 The extravagance of Charles II., and the several pretences used by him for obtaining supplies for extraordinary services, which, when obtained, he immediately squandered in defraying the expenses of a dissolute court, perhaps suggested the idea at this time; and though it was strongly objected to by lord Clarendon and the other ministers, from its novelty, and being, as they termed it, a republican measure, the necessity of adopting some such expedient, in order to secure to the public use the money

1 Hats. Prec. vol. iii. p. 196-199.

2 Ibid. p. 201, 202.

3 See earlier attempts, 14 Ed. III. st. 2. c. i., and 5 Rich. II. st. 2. c. iii.; and see Hats. Prec. vol. iv. p. lii., case of Michael de la Pole.

4 See, in append. to Dalrymple's Memoirs of Great Britain and Ireland, letters between Charles II., the duke of York, and the French ministers.

granted for that purpose, recommended it to the House of Commons, and induced them to carry it into effect.'

That supplies granted by parliament are only to be expended for particular objects, specified by the authority of that assembly, became from this time an undisputed principle, recognised by frequent, and at length constant, practice. It produced the effect of compelling the ministers of the crown to lay estimates regularly before the House of Commons; and by exposing the management of the public revenues, has given to parliament not only a real and effective control over an essential branch of the executive administration, but in some measure rendered them partakers in it." The House of Commons has thereby obtained so effectual a control over the executive power, that no administration can possibly subsist without its concurrence; nor can the session of parliament be intermitted for an entire year, without leaving both the naval and the military force of the kingdom unprovided for. In time of war, however, it is sometimes necessary to relax the strict rule of appropriation; and it has not been very uncommon in such cases to grant considerable sums on a vote of credit, which the crown is thus enabled to apply at its discretion during the recess of parliament: and Hallam observes, that we have also had too frequent experience that the charges of the public service have not been brought within the limits of the last year's appropriation.3

The mode of appropriation varied throughout the reign of king William and queen Anne: sometimes the produce of the duties was applied in the same act by

1 Hats. Prec. vol. iii. p. 202. Sir George Downing, one of the tellers of the exchequer, introduced the appropriating clause here referred to into a subsidy-bill in 1665, and it was carried by 172 to 102. Hallam, Const. Hist. vol. ii. c. xi. p. 482.

2 Hallam, Const. Hist. vol. ii. c. xi. p. 483. 3 Ibid. vol. iii. c. xv. pp. 159, 160.

which they were authorised to be levied; in other instances, monies that had been levied by one act were appropriated by another act of the same session: sometimes the sums brought into the exchequer were specifically applied, in different proportions, to particular services; at other times, during the reign of queen Anne, the grants were appropriated generally to the public services of the army, navy, and ordnance, but without specifying the particular sums for each service. This difference in the mode of appropriation probably arose from the difficulty of ascertaining in time of war (and especially a war carried on in so many different parts of the world as that was in the reign of queen Anne), the precise sums which would be found necessary for each service; for, upon the conclusion of the peace of Utrecht, the Commons returned to what had been the practice throughout the reign of king William; and in the acts of the tenth year of queen Anne, c. xxvi., and the 12th of queen Anne, sess. 2, c. ix., again specified the particular sums which they thought necessary to be applied to the different services they had voted in the course of that session. And this mode has been from that time followed, without any variation.'

We must now proceed to the method of application of the supplies to the public service.

It is evident that unless a system of control over the application of the public revenue to the various purposes of government by the officers of the crown were established, not only malversation could with difficulty be prevented, or even detected, but the appropriation of the supplies by parliament might easily be evaded.

The principle of that control was admirably carried into effect by the ancient constitution of the receipt of

Hatsell, Prec. vol. iii. p. 204, 205.

the exchequer. From the Norman conquest, the exchequer has been the great conservator of the public money; not only having to provide for the safe custody and proper appropriation of the public revenue, but exercising a direct and decided control over the office of the lord high treasurer, the commissioners of the treasury (when that office is executed by commission), and the executive government. The general principle of that control is, the separation of the custody or guardianship of the public money from the function of payment. The peculiar function of the exchequer is to receive the public revenues; and that of the treasury to apply them, or pay them to the different departments of government. Thus the first branch of the duty of the exchequer is the receipt of the public money; and the second is the issue of the same, under orders from the proper authority. The exchequer is armed with a power of denying its sanction to any demands upon it, from whatever minister or department they are made, unless those demands are found in accordance with the determinations of the legislature; and the second branch of its functions, namely, that of issue, therefore involves the most important duty of control. Both branches, on the other hand, require, in a matter of such national and historical importance, the duty of record. Thus, not only the exchequer is a control upon the treasury, but the recorded accounts of monies issued by the former check those of the sums drawn out of it by the latter. A further check, as to accounts, is provided by the ancient constitution of the exchequer in that department itself; for the records of receipt and those of issue, kept by separate officers, mutually check each other. Such are the general principles on which the

1 Report, on the exchequer, of the commissioners of public accounts. Ordered to be printed by the House of Commons, 10th Oct. 1831.

ancient system of the administration of the receipt and payment of the public revenue is founded. And here we cannot but admire the wisdom of a constitution so ancient, so complicated in its details, and yet in which general principles are accurately understood, and judiciously brought into practice. The ancient machinery of that important department was somewhat tardy, but in the main it effected its object. It has safely preserved the revenue committed to its charge; no great frauds have been committed; and, on the contrary, many great frauds have frequently been prevented and detected.1

The system, however, had its origin in, and derived many of its characteristics from, a period when all the facilities and securities now in operation for the transfer of money, when banks, bank-credit, bank-checks, and bank-paper, were entirely unknown.2 It was therefore recommended, by the commissioners appointed in 1831 to inquire into the subject of public accounts, to make such alterations therein as the change of the system of finance, the decay of the ancient ordinary patrimony of the crown, and the new sources whence the public supplies are drawn, appeared to demand; but without impairing those princi ples of control and record on which the ancient constitution of the exchequer was constructed. These recommendations were carried into effect by statute 4 Wm. IV. c. xv., under the provisions of which the chief features of the present system are as follows:

The bank of England performs the same functions towards the crown which every banker fulfils to a customer having an account with his house. Thus the public revenue is paid into the bank to the credit of the comptroller of the exchequer, whose duties correspond

1 Sir James Graham's speech in the House of Commons, March 14, 1834. Hansard, Parl. Deb. vol. xxii. p. 195.

2 Ibid. p. 196.