to that portion of mankind who have received a revelation of the true religion. It follows thence, that natural liberty, that is to say, the utmost liberty compatible with the nature of man, is that which is restrained only by natural law and the revealed laws of religion. But natural law cannot be enforced or maintained in full vigour except in the social state, which is the condition most adapted to the nature of man, and that in which alone he can live in a manner worthy of that nature. And the social state cannot be maintained without the institution of a sovereign power adequate to govern the common wealth, prescribing to all its members certain laws or rules of conduct, and compelling them to conform thereto. It follows thence, that the institution of civil government is of natural law, since it is a necessary consequence of the principles thereof; and that, in the same manner as the natural liberty of man is freedom restrained only by the rules of that law, so civil liberty is that which has for boundary the municipal as well as natural law. Civil liberty must be by far the most perfect and secure, as well as the best calculated to procure the happiness of man, because the institution of civil government gives new vigour to natural law, and the establishment of a sovereign power provides effectually for its observance.

The establishment of government and sovereignty, it is true, modifies natural liberty to a considerable degree; since it requires that man should give up his independence, that is to say, the supreme power which he possessed over his person and actions. But it is evident that nothing can be more desirable than the renunciation of a degree of liberty most dangerous to possess,-retaining only the freedom which is requisite for real and sound happiness. Civil liberty, then, is in substance the same as natural liberty, but stripped of that portion which con

stituted the independence of individuals, by the authority which they have vested in the sovereign.

But this doctrine, that every individual under civil government renounces a portion of his natural liberty for the purpose of obtaining and securing the full enjoyment of the remainder, by no means implies that there is any sound foundation for the notion of a social contract, or compact, constituting the sovereign power of government. It is clear, that the duty of submitting to civil government, and obeying the laws thereof, arises from the law of nature, and not from any consent given by individuals to such submission and obedience, subject to certain stipulations. How, indeed, can it be supposed that the law of nature is binding on mankind, unless they are also under the obligation of adopting the only effectual means whereby that law can be maintained? Besides, men are evidently bound by natural law to live in the social state, which alone is adapted to their nature, and to their interests, physical, moral, and religious; and that state cannot exist without government. The consent of men can add nothing essential to the force of these obligations, which spring from the nature impressed upon them by the Creator. And the reciprocal nature of the obligations of allegiance or obedience to government, and protection, clearly affords no argument whatever in favour of the supposed existence of a social contract; an error which seems to have sprung from that of Trebonian, who either invented or adopted the term of quasi-contract, to designate the source of a class of obligations which, in truth, spring from the law itself, without, or independently of, the consent of the persons bound thereby, which consent is essential to every species of contract properly so called. The principle, that the obligation of obedience to the civil government on the part of the subject, and the

duty of protection on the part of the state, are reciprocal, the one in consideration of the other, necessarily arises from the nature of the obligatory force of the institution of civil government. For if the government ceases to fulfil the purpose for which it is instituted, its authority necessarily vanishes with the reasons of natural law, on which that authority is founded, and it, in fact, ceases to be a government. And, on the other hand, when the subject no longer pays due obedience to the civil power of government, he becomes an offender against the law, as well natural as municipal, and an object not of protection, but of punishment.

It follows, from these principles, that every offence against municipal law, or the law of the state, is also directly or indirectly an offence against natural law. This is easily perceived; for if the municipal law, violated in the particular instance, be merely confirmatory of natural law, the one cannot be violated without a violation of the other; and, on the other hand, if it be a mere arbitrary law,-that is to say, a law grounded not on justice, but on convenience, utility, or policy,—the offender is guilty of setting at defiance the civil power of government, springing from the law of nature, and without strict obedience to which that law cannot be maintained.

We have seen that civil liberty is the liberty limited by the municipal law, that is to say, by the law of the civil community. This agrees with the celebrated definition of Florentinus, who says, that liberty is the natural faculty of doing whatever each man pleases, except so far as he is restrained by physical necessity or legal obligation. But the degree of that liberty is the next question to be considered.

L. 4. princ ff. de Stat. Hom. Libertas est naturalis facultas ejus, quod cuique facere libet, nisi si quid vi aut jure prohibetur.

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It follows from the objects and grounds of civil ment, that the natural liberty of mankind ought to be no further restrained by municipal laws than is necessary and expedient for the general advantage of the public. Thus Blackstone justly remarks, that that constitution or frame of government, that system of laws, is alone calculated to maintain civil liberty, which leaves the subject entire master of his own conduct, except in those points wherein the public good requires some direction or restraint. Any restraint upon the natural freedom of mankind beyond what is requisite for the objects of civil society is positively unjust. But what precise amount of liberty is compatible with the attainment of those objects, is a very extensive and important subject of inquiry, embracing almost every detail of government. Into that subject we cannot here enter. Suffice it to say, that the balance of power in our constitution is intended to secure the people from any oppression on the part of those to whom the sovereign power, or the administration of different portions thereof, are entrusted. This is accomplished, as we have already seen, by not clothing any one person or body within the community with the whole sovereign power, but distributing that power among the different orders and parts of the body politic, and modifying its exercise by certain peculiar restraints and limitations. The faculty of freely exercising the portion of this power vested by law in each man, is properly called political, as contradistinguished from civil, liberty. Thus the freedom enjoyed by every man, of disposing of and using his property as he pleases, so far as the law allows, is part of his civil or individual liberty; and the free enjoyment of the parliamentary or municipal franchise, annexed by the law to that property, belongs to political liberty. And thus political liberty is the faculty of exercising political power according to law.

We will now proceed to a more particular investigation of the three great heads under which the primary civil rights of the subject are arranged: namely, the right of personal security; the right of personal liberty; and the right of property. These rights are all part the law of nature; and their full and complete enjoyment and security are the chief objects of the institution of civil communities and government.

I. The right of personal security consists in a person's full and uninterrupted enjoyment of his life, his limbs, his body, his health, and his reputation.

Of these, life is evidently the chief and most important; and its preservation is the first object of all human institutions, because it is conferred by God alone, and its loss is irreparable. As man is brought into the world, by the supreme Lawgiver, for the fulfilment of certain duties of natural and revealed law, it follows that he has no power over his own life, and must wait until he is summoned away by that Superior who placed him here.' Hence it is that man is not only allowed, but bound to preserve and defend his life, and upon the same principles his limbs also, from the injuries of nature and of other That preservation and defence, which in general, in the civil state, belong to the magistrate, are nevertheless incumbent on every individual where the ordinary protection of the laws cannot be effectually obtained. Thus the law of England pardons even homicide, if committed in self-defence, or in order to preserve life or limb. For whatever is done by a man to save either life or member, is looked upon as done upon the highest neces sity and compulsion.

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But it is necessary for the welfare of mankind and the ends of civil society, that the supreme power of the state should have a right over the lives of the subjects. 1 Pufend. de Offic. Hom. et Civ. 1. i. c. v. § xi.