as to the latter, by the words, as some hold opinion, and refers to a case in the year-book of the 32 Henry VI. p. 29, 30, where Sergeant Danby, arguing on a question of misnomer, says, posito que home soit fait conte a terme ď auter vie, &c. It may be argued, that as the judges discussed the case supposed by Danby, such a limitation was held legal. But that inference may perhaps not be entitled to much weight, unless so far as to shew that the limitation in question was not held to be so palpably illegal, as to be absurd when used as a hypothetical case for the purpose of argument, according to the method of judicial investigation in use at that time. In one way, however, it is clear that the crown may create a peer pour autre vie, namely, by calling the eldest son of a peer to the house of lords by a barony which is in his father. There the title enures during the father's life; and on his death, the succession will operate by way of merger, so that the two will become one dignity. And, by analogy, the crown may perhaps create a peer's eldest son to be a peer during his father's life by patent. But the manifest inconveniences and absurdities which must arise from such limitations,' in all cases where, by the death of the person on whose life the duration of the peerage depends, the person so created would become a commoner, furnish a strong, and perhaps conclusive, argument against their legality.

There are several modern instances of dignities granted for life, with a remainder over. Thus in 1784, Hugh, duke of Northumberland, was created lord Louvaine, baron of Alnwick, with remainder to his second son and the heirs of his body; and in 1786, George, duke of Montague, was created lord Montague, with remainder to his grandson, lord Henry James Montague, second son of Henry, duke

1 Earl of Devon's case, 2 Dow and Clarke, 205.

of Buccleugh, and the heirs male of his body. But there is not the objection to the validity of such creations which Hargrave urges against peerages for life. For it would be difficult to shew that the grant of a dignity for life, with a remainder over for an estate of inheritance, is in substance any thing more than a particular modification of the hereditary devolution of the dignity, by means of a limitation to the grantee for life, with remainder to another person in tail or in fee; which involves nothing inconsistent with the hereditary nature of the peerage contended for by Hargrave, and the maintenance of that order as it now subsists.

Peers created by letters patent are also summoned by writ to parliament. But the writ is a mere consequence of the right given by the letters patent, and depending on the construction of that instrument.1

It is a general principle, that dignities are of the nature of real property, and their descent is governed by rules analogous to those which regulate the descent of land, with but few exceptions. Thus a dignity may be entailed with remainder over. But we have seen, that if a man be generally called by a writ of summons to parliament, and sits by virtue thereof, his blood is ennobled to him and his heirs lineal, both male and female, that is to say, the heirs of his body, and not his heirs collateral. A dignity may be limited to heirs general by letters patent, but is usually made descendible to the heirs male of the body of

1 Lords' First Rep. on the Dign. of the Peer. p. 393. Hence the question arises, what would be the effect of a writ being issued on a wrong construction of letters patent, or by virtue of the letters patent, but to a wrong person, if the person so erroneously summoned were to take his seat? Would a barony by writ be thereby created?

2 Cruise on Dign. c. iv. per tot.

3 lbid. c. iv. § 12, § 16.

Nevil's case, 7 Rep. 33.

the person first ennobled. And a dignity may be granted to the heirs male of the grantee for ever,-that is to say, to his heirs male, both collateral and lineal,-as well as to the heirs male of the body. This was decided, though after much doubt, in the case of the earldom of Devon.2

Women are capable of inheriting dignities, and transmitting them to their posterity; but where there are several sisters heiresses of a dignity, they cannot inherit it together, and the eldest has no right of primogeniture, consequently the dignity remains suspended, or in abeyance. But the king, as the sovereign of honour and dignity, may confer the dignity, by his prerogative, upon which of the daughters he please.3 And if at any time one of the heiresses survives the others, or by the extinction of all the descendants of such sisters but one, there remains but one heir or heiress to the dignity, the abeyance is terminated, and the person who is the sole heir becomes immediately entitled to the dignity.4

It has been decided by the house of lords, that where a barony was in abeyance between two persons, the attainder of one of them for high treason did not terminate the abeyance, so as to give the other coheir a right to the barony and, indeed, it has been doubted whether the attainder of one coheir for high treason did not preclude the crown from terminating the abeyance in favour of

1 Cruise on Dign. c. v. § 87, 88.

2 Earl of Devon's case, 2 Dow. and Clarke, app. cases, 200. The grant was to Sir Edward Courtney and his heirs male for ever. Sir Edward died unmarried in 1556. His heir male was Sir William Courtney of Powderham. From Sir William Courtney the claimant was lineally descended. And the claim was allowed.

3 Co. Litt. 165, a.

4 Cruise on Dign. c. v. § 56, 61. Case of the Barony of Willoughby de Broke. Collins, 321. Skin. R. 432.

5 Cruise on Dign. c. v. § 75. Case of Barony of Beaumont, 1794, 5.

another coheir. But the house of lords has lately resolved, upon the unanimous opinion of the judges, that the attainder of a coheir does not produce that effect.1

The rank of Scotch and Irish peers was regulated by statute at the time of the unions of those kingdoms with England, when an important change took place in the whole peerage.

By the acts of union with Scotland, all peers of Scotland are declared to be peers of Great Britain, and rank after those of the same degree at the time of the union, A.D. 1707: and the acts of union with Ireland make all peers of Ireland peers of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, assigning to all Irish peerages existing at the time of the union precedence immediately after persons holding peerages of the like degree in Great Britain, subsisting at the time of the union; and enacting, that all peerages of Ireland created after the union shall have rank with the peerages of the United Kingdom, according to the dates of their creations.

The acts of union have already been considered; and it will therefore here suffice to shew their general effect on the nobility of the three kingdoms. The rights of the temporal peers of England were thus modified by the acts of union with Scotland; they became peers of a new kingdom, the kingdom of Great Britain; and there were associated with them, in the exercise of their legislative and judicial functions, sixteen persons, peers of Scotland, elected by, and representing the peers of Scotland, and made, by

1 Case of Barony of Camoys, 1839. Case of Barony of Beaumont, 1840. Note, that in the case of the Barony of Camoys the attorneygeneral (Campbell) argued, that the person from whom the claim was traced was a banneret, and not a lord of parliament, being called a banneret in divers records; but the house held that he was a lord of parliament notwithstanding.

the act of union, peers of the new kingdom of Great Britain. There were also associated with the peers of England, except in the exercise of the legislative and judicial functions, all the peers of Scotland, entitled to all the rights and privileges of the peerage of England, except the rights and privileges incident to their legislative and judicial functions; and these were also made peers of Great Britain. Added to these, there were the peers of Great Britain created after the union, forming, with the peers of England before the union, and the sixteen Scotch representative peers, the lords temporal in parliament; and with all the peers of England and Scotland created before the union, the peerage of Great Britain.1

These observations are also applicable to the acts of union with Ireland, but with the following distinctions: 1. The election of the sixteen peers of Scotland is for the parliament only in which they are elected, their rights determining with the dissolution of that parliament; but the twenty-eight representative Irish peers are elected for life. 2. The Irish peers, who are not of the number of the twenty-eight representative peers, may divest themselves of their privileges of peerage, by sitting in the commons house of parliament, to which the Scotch peers are not eligible. 3. The power of creating new peers of Ireland is reserved to the crown; whereas the prerogative is restrained from creating new peers of Scotland by the construction of 22d article of union.2 The words of that article are, "Of the peers of Scotland at the time of the union, sixteen shall be the number to sit," &c.; and the words of the Scotch act, incorporated into the stat. 5 Ann, c. viii., are," that the said sixteen peers, &c., shall be named by the said peers of Scotland whom they repre1 Lords' First Report on the Dignity of a Peer, p. 121.

2 Ibid. p. 122, 123.