also called policy. It may appear doubtful whether taxation is in every case a function proper to the executive. Grotius, Pufendorf, and Burlamaqui agree in not attributing the right of raising a revenue to the legislative power. They place it under a separate head. But the establishment of a permanent tax must, it would seem, be by a law enacted by the legislative power: excepting, however, in that species of case, the power of raising money for the public use seems to belong neither to the legislative nor to the executive power. Our English constitution is in conformity with the opinions of the eminent writers cited above; for though no tax or impost can be raised except by the authority of parliament, yet the form of money-bills, as they are called, is totally different from that of other acts of the legislature; and they were originally mere grants, or gifts, of the nation to the sovereign.

Such are the general parts or divisions of the sovereign power of the state.

Different constitutions, or forms of government, are distinguished from each other according as the whole sovereign power is vested in a single person, in an assembly of a few persons, or in the whole body of the people, -in which last case it is most conveniently exercised by their representatives. These three species of governments are called respectively monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy. They are all called simple, or regular forms of government,' because in them the sovereign power is undivided, and vested in one person or body.

In some countries a mixed or composed, or, as Pufendorf calls it, an irregular form of government is established, by mingling those simple forms, making a par

1 Burlam. D. des G. tom. iv. par. ii. c. i. Pufend. D. de la N. et des G. 1. vii. c. v. Pufend. Dev. de l'H. et du Cit 1. ii. c. viii.

tition of the sovereign power, and confiding the different parts thereof to different hands. Thus monarchy is tempered with aristocracy, and at the same time the people are admitted to some share of sovereignty.1

But, in making that partition of the sovereign power, care must be taken not to destroy its unity, so as to institute two sovereigns in the state. Thus, if the entire legislative judicial or executive powers were each vested in two or more co-ordinate persons or bodies independent of each other, the unity of the sovereign power would be destroyed, and the ruin of the state would probably follow. The members of the community would not know which legislature, or which judicature, they should obey, or to which public force they must submit.

But the unity of the sovereign power does not prevent the constitution being so regulated by a fundamental law, that the exercise of the different parts of that power may be committed to different persons, or assemblies, who may act independently of each other, within the limits of the rights confided to them, but still in subordination to the law from which they derive those rights.

Provided the fundamental laws, which establish this partition of the sovereignty, define the respective limits of the power of those to whom the parts are entrusted, in such a manner that it can easily be seen what is the extent of the jurisdiction of each of these collateral powers, that partition produces neither a plurality of sovereigns. nor opposition among them, nor any irregularity in the government. In fact, strictly speaking, there is still but one sovereign invested with the plenitude of sovereignty; there is but one supreme will. That sovereign is the

1 Burlamaqui, Dr. de la N. et des Gens, tom. iv. par. ii. § 2, 6, &c. Pufendorf, Dev. de l'H. et du Cit. 1. ii. c. viii. § 12. Pufendorf, Dr. de la N. et des G. 1. vii. c. v. § 13, 14.

body formed by the union of all the orders or estates among whom the sovereign power is distributed; and that supreme will is the law whereby that body makes known its will, to which all the members of the community must conform their conduct.

This frame of government and constitution of the state, therefore, does not destroy that unity which properly belongs to a body corporate, composed of several persons or several bodies truly distinct and separate, but at the same time united together by a reciprocal obligation, by a fundamental law, whereby they constitute together one whole.

The result of these principles is, that in all mixed forms of government the sovereign power is always limited. As the different branches thereof are not all entrusted to one person or body, but are placed in different hands, the power of those who have a share in the government is thereby restrained, and the power of each keeps that of the others in check. The result is a balance of power and authority, which ensures the public welfare and the liberty of individuals.'

Thus, as Blackstone observes,2" where the legislative and executive authority are in distinct hands, the former will take care not to entrust the latter with so large a power as may tend to the subversion of its own independence, and therewith of the liberty of the subject."

These general principles of mixed or (as they may be called) composite forms of government are those on which the constitution of England is constructed. The legislative power and that of taxation are, in this country, vested in parliament, which is composed of the Queen, the Burlam. loc. cit. Vinnius ad Inst. § 6. De Jur. Natur. Gent. et Civ.

2 Blackst. Com. b. i. c. ii. p. 146.

House of Lords, and the House of Commons; and the executive and judicial powers are entrusted to the Queen. But both these last-mentioned attributes of the crown are subject to certain salutary checks and restraints, of which we shall have occasion to speak more at large, - the former being exercised with the advice of servants responsible to parliament, and the latter being invariably administered by means of magistrates, who may be removed for misbehaviour by the concurrent act of the crown, the lords, and the commons.

We will now proceed to consider the legislative power in the English constitution. And, first, of its constituent parts.

"These," says Blackstone, "are the king's majesty, sitting there in his royal political capacity, and the three estates of the realm,'-the lords spiritual, the lords temporal (who sit together with the king in one house), and the commons, who sit by themselves in another. And the king and these three estates together form the great corporation, or body politic, of the kingdom,2 of which the king is said to be caput, principium, et finis. For on their coming together, the king meets them, either in person or by representation, without which there can be no beginning of a parliament; and he also has alone the power of dissolving them."4

1 Concerning the three estates of the realm, see a note to p. 13, c. viii. in the second volume of Hallam's Middle Ages. That learned writer shews that they are the nobility, clergy, and commons, or, at least, their representatives in parliament. He, however, mentions that Whitlock (on Parliam. Writ. v. ii. p. 43) argues, that the three estates are king, lords, and commons; and that the commons say, in the 2d Henry IV., that the states of the realm are the king, the lords (spiritual and temporal), and the commons.

24 Inst. i. ii. stat. 1. Eliz. c. viii. Hale on Parl. i.

34 Inst. vi.

4 Blackst. Comm. b. i. c. ii. p. 153.

The division of the legislative power into three parts, without whose concurrence no law can be made, is an important feature in this part of the constitution.

It is necessary to restrain the executive; and this is accomplished by the enactment of laws limiting that power to its proper functions. The executive is more easily restrained when undivided. But laws cannot restrain the legislature, because it can make and unmake laws. Yet, for this very reason, the legislature must practically be restrained, to ensure the stability of the constitution. That end is attained by dividing the legislative power, whereby each of the parts serves to restrain the other. If one of those parts of the legislature were to undertake something dangerous or inexpedient, there is a probability that one, at least, of the remaining parts would refuse its assent, and thus defeat the measure: and, indeed, they are naturally led by this not to offer to each other any propositions which are not at least plausible. As for the division of the legislature into three parts, rather than a greater or a less number, it is manifest that a twofold division would hardly offer so great securities against change and ill-considered measures as appears desirable; while a quadruple partition would, perhaps, tend to delay public business inconveniently.

It is, as Blackstone remarks, highly expedient that a part of the legislative power should be vested in the same person who holds the executive authority, because it tends to secure the executive against encroachments which might be attempted by the legislature. Thus, as we are told by that great commentator, "the long parliament of Charles I., while it acted in a constitutional manner with the royal concurrence, redressed many heavy grievances, and established many salutary laws. But

De Lolme on the Constit. of England, b. i. c. iii.