into the house of lords, is but an equitable compenfation to the clergy for the exclufion of their order from the house of commons. They are a fet of men confiderable by their number and property, as well as by their influence, and the duties of their ftation; yet, whilft every other profeffion has thofe amongst the national reprefentatives, who, being converfant in the fame occupation, are able to ftate, and naturally dif pofed to fupport, the rights and interefts of the. clafs and calling to which they belong, the clergy alone are deprived of this advantage. Which hardship is made up to them by introducing the prelacy into parliament; and if bishops, from gratitude or expectation, be more obfequious to the will of the crown, than thofe who poffefs great temporal inheritances, they are properly inferted into that part of the conftitution, from which much or frequent refiftance to the meafures of government is not expected. I acknowledge, that I perceive no fufficient reafon for exempting the perfons of members of either houfe of parliament from arreft for debt. The counfels or fuffrage of a fingle fenator, especially of one who in the management of his own affairs may juftly be fufpected of a want of prudence or honefty, can feldom feldom be fo neceffary to thofe of the public, as to justify a departure from that wholesome policy, by which the laws of a commercial ftate punish and ftigmatize insolvency. But whatever reason may be pleaded for their perfonal immunity, when this privilege of parliament is extended to domeftics and retainers, or when it is permitted to impede or delay the course of judicial proceedings, it becomes an abfurd facrifice of equal juftice to imaginary dignity. There is nothing, in the British constitution, fo remarkable, as the irregularity of the popular, reprefentation. The house of commons confifts of five hundred and forty eight members, of whom, two hundred are elected by feven thoufand conftituents: fo that a majority of these feven thousand, with any reasonable title to fuperior weight or influence in the ftate, may, under certain circumftances, decide a queftion against the opinion of as many millions. Or, to place the fame object in another point of view; if my eftate be fituated in one county of the kingdom, I poffefs the ten thoufandth part of a fingle reprefentative; if in another, the thoufandth; if in a particular district, I may be one in twenty who choose two representatives; if in in a still more favoured spot, I may enjoy the right of appointing two myself. If I have been born, or dwell, or have ferved an apprenticeship in one town, I am reprefented in the national assembly by two deputies, in the choice of whom, I exercife an actual and fenfible share of power; if accident has thrown my birth, or habitation, or fervice into another town, I have no representative at all, nor more power or concern in the election of those who make the laws, by which I am governed, than if I was a subject of the Grand Signior-and this partiality subsists without any pretence whatever of merit or of propriety, to juftify the preference of one place to another. Or, thirdly, to defcribe the state of national reprefentation as it exists in reality,it may be affirmed, I believe, with truth, that about one half of the house of commons obtain their feats in that affembly by the election of the people, the other half by purchase, or by the nomination of fingle proprietors of great estates. This is a flagrant incongruity in the constitution; but it is one of thofe objections which ftrike most forcibly at first fight. The effect of all reasoning upon the fubject is to diminish the first impreffion on which account it deferves the more attentive examination, that we may be affured, affured, before we adventure upon a reformation, that the magnitude of the evil juftifies the danger of the experiment. In the few remarks that follow, we would be understood, in the first place, to decline all conference with those who wish to alter the form of government of these kingdoms. The reformers with whom we have to do, are they, who, whilst they change this part of the fyftem, would retain the reft. If any Englishman expect more happiness to his country under a republic, he may very confiftently recommend a new modelling of elections to parliament; because, if the king and house of lords were laid afide, the prefent difproportionate representation would produce nothing but a confused and ill-digested oligarchy. In like manner we wave a controverfy with those writers who infift upon representation as a natural right:* we confider it fo far only as a right at all, as it conduces to public utility; that is, as If this right be natural, no doubt it must be equal, and the right, we may add, of one fex, as well as of the other. Whereas every plan of representation, that we have heard of, begins, by excluding the votes of women: thus cutting off, at a single stroke, one half of the public from a right which is afferted to be inherent in all; a right too, as fome reprefent it, not only univerfal, but unalienable and indefefible. it it contributes to the establishment of good laws, or as it fecures to the people the just adminiftration of thefe laws. Thefe effects depend upon the difpofition and abilities of the national counfellors. Wherefore, if men the most likely by their qualifications to know and to promote the public intereft, be actually returned to parliament, it fignifies little who return them. If the propereft perfons be elected, what matters it by whom they are elected? At least, no prudent statesman would fubvert long established or even fettled rules of representation, without a prospect of procuring wifer or better reprefentatives. This then being well obferved, let us, before wę feek to obtain any thing more, confider duly what we already have. We have a houfe of commons compofed of five hundred and fortyeight members, in which number are found, the most confiderable landholders and merchants of the kingdom; the heads of the army, the navy, and the law; the occupiers of great offices in the ftate; together with many private individuals, eminent by their knowledge, eloquence, or activity. Now, if the country be not fafe in fuch hands, in whofe may it confide its interefts? If fuch a number of fuch men be liable to the influence of corrupt motives, what affembly |