how far, and for what reafons, it is expedient to adhere to former determinations; or, whether it be neceffary for judges to attend to any other confideration than the apparent and particular equity of the cafe before them. Now although to affert, that precedents established by one fet of judges, ought to be incontrovertible by their fucceffors in the fame jurifdiction, or by thofe who exercise a higher, would be to attribute to the fentence of thofe judges all the authority we ascribe to the most folemn acts of the legiflature; yet, the general fecurity of private rights, and of civil life, requires, that such precedents, especially if they have been confirmed by repeated adjudications, fhould not be overthrown without a detection of manifeft error, or without fome imputation of dishonesty upon the court by whofe judgment the queftion was first decided. And this deference to prior deci, fions is founded upon two reasons; first, that the difcretion of judges may be bound down by pofitive rules; and, fecondly, that the fubject upon every occafion, in which his legal intereft. is concerned, may know beforehand how to act, and what to expect. To fet judges free from any obligation to conform themselves to the decifions of their predeceffors, would be to lay open open a latitude of judging, with which no defcription of men can fafely be entrusted: it would be to allow space for the exercise of thofe concealed partialities, which, fince they cannot by any human policy be excluded, ought to be confined by boundaries and landmarks. It is in vain to allege, that the fuperintendency of parliament is always at hand to control and punish abuses of judicial discretion. By what rules can parliament proceed? How fhall they pronounce a decifion to be wrong, where there exists no acknowledged measure or standard of what is right, which, in a multitude of inftances, would be the cafe, if prior determinations were no longer to be appealed to? Diminishing the danger of partiality, is one thing gained by adhering to precedents; but not the principal thing. The fubject of every system of laws muft expect that decifion in his own cafe, which he knows that others have received in cafes fimilar to his. If he expect not this, he can expect nothing. There exifts no other rule or principle of reafoning, by which he can foretell, or even conjecture the event of a judicial conteft. To remove therefore the ground of this expectation, by rejecting the force and authority of precedents, is to entail upon the fubject the worst property R 4 property of flavery-to have no affurance of his rights, or knowledge of his duty. The quiet also of the country, as well as the confidence and fatisfaction of each man's mind, requires uniformity in judicial proceedings. Nothing quells a spirit of litigation, like despair of fucccfs: therefore, nothing fo completely puts an end to law fuits, as a rigid adherence to known rules of adjudication. Whilft the event is uncertain, which it ever muft be, whilft it is uncertain whether former determinations upon the fame fubject will be followed or not, law-fuits will be endless and innumerable: men will continually engage in them, either from the hope of prevailing in their claims, which the smallest chance is fufficient to encourage; or with the defign of intimidating their adversary by the terrors of a dubious litigation. When juftice is rendered to the parties, but half the business of a court of justice is done : the more important part of its office remainsto put an end, for the future, to every fear, and quarrel, and expence upon the fame point; and fo to regulate its proceedings, that not only a doubt once decided may be ftirred no more, but that the whole train of law-fuits, which issue from one uncertainty, may die with the parent queftion. Now this advantage can only be at tained by confidering each decifion as a direction to fucceeding judges. And it fhould be observed, that every departure from former determinations, especially if they have been often repeated, or long fubmitted to, fhakes the ftability of all legal title. It is not fixing a point anew; it is leaving every thing unfixed. For by the same stretch of power, by which the present race of judges take upon them to contradict the judgment of their predeceffors, thofe who try the question next, may fet afide theirs. From an adherence however to precedents, by which fo much is gained to the public, two confequences arife which are often lamented; the hardship of particular determinations, and the intricacy of the law as a science. To the first of these complaints, we muft apply this reflection, "that uniformity is of more importance than "equity, in proportion as general uncertainty "would be a greater evil than particular injuf"tice." The second is attended with no greater inconveniency than that of erecting the practice of the law into a separate profeffion which this reason, we allow, makes neceffary; for if we attribute so much authority to precedents, it is expedient that they be known in every cause, both to the advocates and to the judge: this know ledge ledge cannot be general, fince it is the fruit oftentimes of laborious research, or demands a memory ftored with long-collected erudition. To a mind revolving upon the subject of human jurifprudence, there frequently occurs this question; why, fince the maxims of natural juftice are few and evident, do there arife fo many doubts and controverfies in the application? Or, in other words, how comes it to pafs, that although the principles of the law of nature be fimple, and for the most part fufficiently obvious, there should exift nevertheless, in every system of municipal laws, and in the actual adminiftration of relative justice, numerous uncertainties and acknowledged difficulty? Whence, it may be afked, fo much room for litigation, and fo many fubfifting disputes, if the rules of human duty be neither obfcure nor dubious? If a system of morality, containing both the precepts of revelation, and the deductions of reafon, may be comprised within the compass of one moderate volume; and the moralift be able, as he pretends, to describe the rights and obligations of mankind, in all |