Having ftated what we have been able to collect, in opposition to the lawfulness of fuicide, by way of direct proof, it feems unneceffary to open a separate controverfy with all the arguments which are made ufe of to defend it; which would only lead us into a repetition of what has been offered already. The following argument, however, being fomewhat more artificial and impofing than the reft, as well as diftinct from the general confideration of the fubject, cannot fo properly be passed over. If we deny to the individual a right over his own life, it seems impoffible, it is faid, to reconcile with the law of nature that right which the state claims and exercifes over the lives of its fubjects, when it ordains or inflicts capital punishments. For this right, like all other just authority in the ftate, can only be derived from the compact and virtual confent of the citizens which compofe the state; and it seems felf-evident, if any principle in morality be fo, that no one, by his confent, can transfer to another a right which he does not poffefs himself. It will be equally difficult to account for the power of the state to commit its fubjects to the dangers of war, and to expose their lives without fcruple in the field of battle; especially in offenfive hoftilities, in

which the privileges of self-defence cannot be pleaded with any appearance of truth: and still more difficult to explain, how in fuch, or in any circumstances, prodigality of life can be a virtue, if the preservation of it be a duty of our na

ture.

This whole reasoning fets out from one error, namely, that the ftate acquires its right over the life of the subject from the subject's own confent, as a part of what originally and perfonally belonged to himself, and which he has made over to his governors. The truth is, the ftate derives this right, neither from the consent of the fubject, nor through the medium of that confent, but, as I may fay, immediately from the donation of the Deity. Finding that such a power in the fovereign of the community is expedient, if not neceffary for the community itself, it is juftly prefumed to be the will of God, that the sovereign fhould poffefs and exercise it, It is this prefumption which conftitutes the right; it is the fame indeed which conftitutes every other; and if there were the like reafons to authorize the prefumption in the case of private persons, suicide would be as justifiable as war, or capital executions. But, until it can be shown, that the power over human life

may

be

converted

converted to the fame advantage in the hands of individuals over their own, as in those of the ftate over the lives of its fubjects, and that it may be entrusted with equal fafety to both, there is no room for arguing from the existence of fuch a right in the latter, to the toleration of it in the former.

MORAL

MORAL PHILOSOPHY.

BOOK V.

DUTIES TOWARDS GO D.

CHAP. I,

DIVISION OF THESE DUTIES.

N one sense, every duty is a duty towards

IN

God, fince it is his will which makes it a duty but there are fome duties, of which God is the object, as well as the author; and these are peculiarly, and in a more appropriated sense called duties towards God.

That filent piety, which consists in a habit of tracing out the Creator's wisdom and goodness in

the

the objects around us, or in the hiftory of his difpenfations; of referring the bleffings we enjoy to his bounty, and of reforting in our diftreffes to his fuccour, may poffibly be more acceptable to the Deity, than any visible expressions of devotion whatever. Yet these latter, which, although they may be excelled, are not fuperfeded by the former, compofe the only part of the subject which admits of direction or disquisition from a moralift.

Our duty towards God, fo far as it is external, is divided into worship and reverence. God is the immediate object of both: and the difference between them is, that the one confifts in action, the other in forbearance. When we go to church on the Lord's day, led thither by a sense of duty towards God, we perform an act of worship: when, from the fame motive, we rest in a journey upon that day, we discharge a duty of reverence.

Divine worship is made up of adoration, thankfgiving, and prayer. But, as what we have to offer concerning the two former may be observed of prayer, we fhall make that the title of the following chapters, and the direct subject of our confideration.

1

CHAP.