CHA P. II.

OF THE DUTY AND OF THE EFFICACY

SAME

OF PRAYER, SO FAR AS THE APPEAR FROM THE LIGHT OF NATURE.

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WHEN one man defires to obtain any thing

of another, he betakes himself to intreaty: and this may be obferved of mankind in all ages and countries of the world. Now what is univerfal, may be called natural; and it feems probable, that God, as our fupreme governor, fhould expect that towards himself, which, by a natural impulfe, or by the irrefiftible order of our conftitution, he has prompted us to pay to every other being on whom we depend.

The fame may be faid of thanksgiving.

Again, prayer is neceffary to keep up in the minds of mankind a fenfe of God's agency in the universe, and of their own dependency upon him.

But after all, the duty of prayer depends upon its efficacy: for I confefs myself unable to

conceive, how any man can pray, or be obliged to pray, who expects nothing from his prayers; but who is perfuaded at the time he utters his request, that it cannot poffibly produce the fmalleft impreffion upon the being to whom it is addreffed, or advantage to himself. Now the efficacy of prayer imports, that we obtain something in confequence of praying, which we fhould not have received without prayer; against all expectation of which, the following objection has been often and feriously alleged. "If "it be most agreeable to perfect wisdom and jus"tice, that we fhould receive what we defire, "God, as perfectly wife and juft, will give it

to us without asking: if it be not agreeable "to these attributes of his nature, our intreaties. cannot move him to give it us; and it were impious to expect they should." In fewer words, thus; "If what we request be fit for us, "we fhall have it without praying; if it be not "fit for us, we cannot obtain it by praying." This objection admits but of one answer, namely, that it may be agreeable to perfect wisdom, to grant that to our prayers, which it would not have been agreeable to the fame wisdom to have given us without praying for. But what virtue, you will ask, is there in prayer, which should make

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a favour confiftent with wifdom, which would not have been fo without it? To this question, which contains the whole difficulty attending the fubject, the following poffibilities are offered in reply.

1. A favour granted to prayer may be more apt, on that very account, to produce good effects upon the perfon obliged. It may hold in the divine bounty, what experience has raifed into a proverb in the collation of human benefits, that what is obtained without asking, is ofttimes received without gratitude.

2. It may be confiftent with the wifdom of the Deity to withhold his favours till they be afked for, as an expedient to encourage devotion in his rational creation, in order thereby to keep and circulate a knowledge and fense of their dependency upon him.

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3. Prayer has a natural tendency to amend the petitioner himself; and thus to bring him within the rules, which the wifdom of the Deity has prefcribed to the difpenfation of his favours.

If these, or any other affignable fuppofitions, serve to remove the apparent repugnancy between the fuccefs of prayer and the character of the Deity, it is enough; for the question with the petitioner is not from which, out of many mo

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tives,

tives, God may grant his petition, or in what particular manner he is moved by the fupplications of his creatures; but whether it be confiftent with his nature to be moved at all, and whether there be any conceivable motives, which may difpofe the divine will to grant the petitioner what he wants, in confequence of his praying for it. It is fufficient for the petitioner, that he gain his end. It is not necessary to devotion, perhaps not very confiftent with it, that the circuit of caufes, by which his prayers prevail, fhould be known to the petitioner, much less that they should be prefent to his imagination at the time. All that is neceffary is, that there be no impoffibility apprehended in the

matter.

Thus much must be conceded to the objection; that prayer cannot reasonably be offered to God with all the fame views, with which we oftentimes addrefs our intreaties to men (views which are not commonly or easily feparated from it), viz. to inform them of our wants or defires; to tease them out by importunity; to work upon their indolence or compaffion, in order to perfuade them to do what they ought to have done before, or ought not to do at all.

But fuppofe there exifted a prince, who was known by his fubjects to act, of his own accord, always and invariably for the beft; the fituation of a petitioner, who folicited a favour or pardon from such a prince, would fufficiently resemble ours and the question with him, as with us, would be, whether, the character of the prince being confidered, there remained any chance that he should obtain from him by prayer, what he would not have received without it. I do not conceive, that the character of fuch a prince would neceffarily exclude the effect of his fubjects' prayers; for when that prince reflected, that the earnestness and humility of the fupplication had generated in the suppliant a frame of mind, upon which the pardon or favour asked, would produce a permanent and active sense of gratitude; that the granting of it to prayer would put others upon praying to him, and by that means preferve the love and submission of his subjects, upon which love and submission, their own happiness, as well as his glory, depended; that, beside that the memory of the particular kindness would be heightened and prolonged by the anxiety with which it had been fued for, prayer had in other respects so disposed and prepared the mind of the petitioner, as to render

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