authority of the laws, for any reason, which, in the judgment of the legislature, renders such a measure neceffary to the common welfare. Moreover, as the precepts of religion may regulate all the offices of life, or may be fo conftrued as to extend to all, the exemption of religion from the control of human laws might afford a plea, which would exclude civil government from every authority over the conduct of its fubjects. Religious liberty is like civil liberty, not an immunity from reftrained, but the being reftrained by no law, but what in a greater degree conduces to the public welfare.

Still it is right "to obey God rather than

man. Nothing that we have faid encroaches upon the truth of this facred and undisputed maxim the right of the magiftrate to ordain, and the obligation of the subject to obey, in matters of religion, may be very different; and will be fo as often as they flow from opposite apprehenfions of the divine will. In affairs that are properly of a civil nature; in "the things "that are Cæfar's," this difference seldom happens. The law authorizes the act which it enjoins; revelation being either filent upon the fubject, or referring to the laws of the country, or requiring only that men act by fome fixed rule,

rule, and that this rule be established by competent authority. But when human laws interpose their direction in matters of religion, by dictating, for example, the object or the mode of divine worship; by prohibiting the profeffion of fome articles of faith, and by exacting that of others, they are liable to clash with what private perfons believe to be already fettled by precepts of revelation, or to contradict what God himself, they think, hath declared to be true. In this cafe, on whichever fide the miftake lies, or whatever plea the state may allege to juftify its edict, the fubject can have none to excuse his compliance. The fame confideration also points out the diftinction, as to the authority of the state, between temporals and spirituals. The magiftrate is not to be obeyed in temporals more than in fpirituals, where a repugnancy is perceived between his commands, and any credited manifestations of the divine will; but fuch repugnancies are much lefs likely to arife in one cafe than the other.

When we grant that it is lawful for the magiftrate to interfere in religion as often as his interference appears to him to conduce, in its general tendency, to the public happiness; it may be argued from this conceffion, that, fince falvation

Y 4

falvation is the highest interest of mankind, and fince consequently to advance that is to promote the public happiness in the best way, and in the greatest degree, in which it can be promoted, and it follows, that it is not only the right, but the duty of every magiftrate, invefted with fupreme power, to enforce upon his fubjects the reception of that religion, which he deems most acceptable to God; and to enforce it by fuch methods as may appear most effectual for the end propofed. A popish king, for example, who fhould believe that falvation is not attainable out of the precincts of the Romish church, would derive a right from our principles (not to say that he would be bound by them) to employ the power with which the conftitution entrusted him, and which power, in absolute monarchies, commands the lives and fortunes of every subject of the empire, in reducing his people within that communion. We confefs that this confequence is inferred from the principles we have laid down concerning the foun-. dation of civil authority, not without the refemblance of a regular deduction: we confefs alfo that it is a conclufion which it behoves us to dispose of: because if it really follow, from our theory of government, the theory itself ought

to

to be given up. Now it will be remembered, that the terms of our propofition are thefe: "That it is lawful for the magiftrate to inter"fere in the affairs of religion, whenever his in"terference appears to him to conduce, by its ge"neral tendency, to the public happiness." The clause of "general tendency," when this rule comes to be applied, will be found a very fignificant part of the direction. It obliges the magistrate to reflect, not only whether the religion which he wishes to propagate amongst his subjects, be that which will beft fecure their eternal welfare; not only, whether the methods he employs be likely to effectuate the establishment of that religion; but also upon this further queftion, whether the kind of interference, which he is about to exercife, if it were adopted as a common maxim amongst states and princes, or received as a general rule for the conduct of government in matters of religion, would, upon the whole, and in the mafs of inftances, in which his example might be imitated, conduce to the furtherance of human falvation. If the magiftrate, for example, fhould think, that, although the application of his power, might in the inRance concerning which he deliberates, advance the true religion, and together with it the hap

piness

piness of his people, yet that the fame engine, in other hands, who might affume the right to ufe it with the like pretenfions of reafon and authority that he himself alleges, would more frequently shut out truth, and obftruct the means of falvation; he would be bound by this opinion, ftill admitting public utility to be the fupreme rule of his conduct, to refrain from expedients, which, whatever particular effects he may expect from them, are in their general operation dangerous or hurtful. If there be any difficulty in the subject it arises from that, which is the cause of every difficulty in morals, the competition of particular and general confequences or what is the fame thing, the fubmiffion of one general rule to another rule which is ftill more general.

Bearing then in mind that it is the general tendency of the measure, or in other words, the effects which would arife from the measure being generally adopted, that fixes upon it the character of rectitude or injuftice; we proceed to enquire what is the degree and the fort of interference of fecular laws in matters of religion, which are likely to be beneficial to the public happiness. There are two maxims which will in a great measure regulate our conclusions upon