render capable of future fervices him who before was unqualified for any: might not that prince, I fay, although he proceeded upon no other confiderations than the ftrict rectitude and expediency of the measure, grant a favour or pardon to this man, which he did not grant to another, who was too proud, too lazy, or too busy, too indifferent whether he received it or not, or too infenfible of the fovereign's abfolute power to give or to withhold it, ever to ask for it; or even to the philofopher, who, from an opinion of the fruitlefinefs of all addreffes to a prince of the character which he had formed to himself, refufed in his own example, and difcouraged in others, all outward returns of gratitude, acknowledgments of duty, or application to the fovereign's mercy or bounty; the difufe of which (feeing affections do not long fubfift which are never expreffed) was followed by a decay of loyalty and zeal amongst his fubjects, and threatened to end in a forgetfulness of his rights, and a contempt of his authority? Thefe, together with other af fignable confiderations, and fome perhaps inscrutable, and even inconceivable by the persons upon whom his will was to be exercised, might pafs in the mind of the prince, and move his counfels; whilft nothing, in the mean time, dwelt in the pctitioner's thoughts but a sense of his own own grief and wants; of the power and goodnefs from which alone he was to look for relief; and of his obligation to endeavour, by future obedience, to render that perfon propitious to his happiness, in whofe hands, and at the dif pofal of whofe mercy, he found himself to be. The objection to prayer fuppofes, that a perfectly wife being must neceffarily be inexorable: but where is the proof, that inexorability is any: part of perfect wisdom; especially of that wifdom, which is explained to confift in bringing about the most beneficial ends by the wifest means? The objection likewise affumes another principle, which is attended with confiderable difficulty and obfcurity, namely, that upon every occafion, there is one, and only one mode of action for the beft; and that the divine will is neceffarily determined and confined to that mode: both which positions prefume a knowledge of univerfal nature, much beyond what we are capable of attaining. Indeed when we apply to the divine nature fuch expreffions as thefe, "God "must always do what is right," "God cannot, "from the moral perfection and neceffity of his nature, act otherwise than for the beft," we ought to apply them with much indeterminate nefs and reserve; or rather, we ought to confefs, that there is fomething in the subject out of the reach of our apprehenfion: for in our apprehenfion, to be under a neceffity of acting according to any rule, is inconfiftent with free agency; and it makes no difference, which we can understand, whether the neceffity be internal or external, or that the rule is the rule of perfect rectitude. But efficacy is afcribed to prayer without the proof, we are told, which can alone in such a subject produce conviction, the confirmation of experience. Concerning the appeal to experience, I fhall content myself with this remark, that if prayer were fuffered to disturb the order of fecond caufes appointed in the universe too much, or to produce its effect with the fame regularity that they do, it would introduce a change into human affairs, which in fome important refpects would be evidently for the worse. Who, for example, would labour, if his neceffities could be fupplied with equal certainty by prayer? How few would contain within any bounds of moderation thofe paffions and pleafures, which at prefent are checked only by dif eafe or the dread of it, if prayer would infallibly restore health? In fhort, if the efficacy of prayer prayer were fo constant and obfervable as to be relied upon before-hand, it is eafy to foresee that the conduct of mankind would, in proportica to that reliance, become carelefs and diforderly. It is poffible in the nature of things, that our prayers may, in many inftances, be efficacious, and yet our experience of their efficacy be dubious and obfcure. Therefore, if the light of nature inftruct us by any other arguments to hope for effect from prayer; ftill more, if the fcriptures authorize these hopes by promises of acceptance; it seems not a fufficient reason for calling in question the reality of fuch effects, that our obfervations of them are ambiguous: especially since it appears probable, that this very ambiguity is necessary to the happiness and safety of human life. But fome, whose objections do not exclude all prayer, are offended with the mode of prayer in use amongst us, and with many of the fub jects, which are almoft univerfally introduced into public worship, and recommended to private devotion. To pray for particular favours by name, is to dictate, it has been faid, to divine wisdom and goodnefs: to intercede for others, especially for whole nations and empires, is ftill worfe; it is to prefume that we poffefs fuch D4 fuch an interest with the Deity, as to be able, by our applications, to bend the most important of his counfels; and that the happiness of others, and even the profperity of communities, is to depend upon this intereft and upon our choice. Now how unequal foever our knowledge of the divine œconomy may be to the folution of this difficulty, which requires perhaps a comprehenfion of the entire plan, and of all the ends of God's moral government, to explain fatisfactorily, we can understand one thing concerning it, that it is after all nothing more than the making of one man the inftrument of happiness and mifery to another; which is perfectly of a piece with the course and order that obtain, and which we must believe were intended to obtain, in human affairs. Why may we not be affifted by the prayers of other men, who are beholden for our support to their la bour? Why may not our happiness be made in fome cafes to depend upon the interceffion, as it certainly does in many upon the good offices of our neighbours? The happiness and mifery of great numbers we fee oftentimes at the difpofal of one man's choice, or liable to be much affected |