of regularity in its formation, or of intelligible juftice in its principle, and by fuch difputes fhould disturb the tranquillity of nations, and at the fame time lay the foundation of future disturbances, would be little lefs criminal, than he who breaks the public peace by a violation of engagements to which he had himself confented, or by an attack upon those national rights, which are founded immediately in the law of nature, and in the first perceptions of equity. The fame thing may be repeated of the rules which the law of nations prescribes in the other inftances that were mentioned, namely, that the obfcurity of their origin, or the arbitrarinefs of their principle, fubftracts nothing from the respect that is due to them, when once established.

WAR may be confidered with a view to its caufes and to its conduct.

The justifying caufes of war are deliberate invafions of right, and the neceffity of maintaining fuch a balance of power amongst neighbouring nations, as that no fingle ftate, or confederacy of ftates, be ftrong enough to overwhelm the reft. The objects of just war are precaution, defence, or reparation. In a larger

fenfe,

sense, every just war is a defenfive war, inasmuch as every juft war supposes an injury perpetrated, attempted, or feared.

The infufficient causes, or unjustifiable motives of war, are the family alliances, the perfonal friendships, or the perfonal quarrels of princes; the internal difputes which are carried on in other nations; the juftice of other wars; the extenfion of territory, or of trade; the misfortunes or accidental weakness of a neighbouring or rival nation.

There are two leffons of rational and fober policy, which, if it were poffible to inculcate into the councils of princes, would exclude many of the motives of war, and allay that restless ambition which is constantly stirring up one part of mankind against another. The first of these leffons admonishes princes to

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place their glory and their emulation, not in extent of territory, but in raising the greatest quantity ❝ of happiness out of a given territory." The enlargement of territory by conqueft is not only not a juft object of war, but in the greater part of the instances in which it is attempted, not even defirable. It is certainly not desirable where it adds nothing to the numbers, the enjoyments, or the fecurity of the conquerors. E e

VOL. II.

What

What commonly is gained to a nation, by the annexing of new dependencies, or the fubjugation of other countries to its dominion, but a wider frontier to defend; more interfering claims to vindicate; more quarrels, more enemies, more rebellions to encounter; a greater force to keep up by fea and land; more fervices to provide for, and more establishments to pay? And, in order to draw from these acquifitions fomething that may make up for the charge of keeping them, a revenue is to be extorted, or a monopoly to be enforced and watched, at an expence which cofts half their produce. Thus the provinces are oppreffed, in order to pay for being ill governed; and the original state is exhausted in maintaining a feeble authority over difcontented fubjects. No affignable portion of country is benefited by the change: and if the fovereign appear to himself to be enriched or ftrengthened, when every part of his dominion is made poorer and weaker than it was, it is probable that he is deceived by appearances. Or were it true that the grandeur of the prince is magnified by thofe exploits; the glory which is purchased, and the ambition which is gratified by the diftrefs of one country, without adding to the happiness of another, which at the fame

time enflaves the new, and impoverishes the an cient part of the empire, by whatever names it may be known or flattered, ought to be an object of universal execration; and oftentimes not more fo to the vanquished, than to the very people whofe armies or whofe treasures have atchieved the victory.

There are, indeed, two cafes in which the extenfion of territory may be of real advantage, and to both parties. The firft is, where an empire thereby reaches to the natural boundaries which divide it from the reft of the world. Thus we account the British channel the natural boundary which separates the nations of England and * France and if France poffeffed any counties on this, or England any cities or provinces on that fide of the sea, the recovery of fuch towns and districts, to what may be called their natural fovereign, though it might not be a just reason for commencing war, would be a proper ufe to make of victory. The other cafe is, where neighbouring ftates, being feverally too fmall and weak to defend themselves against the dangers that furround them, can only be fafe by a ftrict and constant junction of their strength: here conquest will effect the purposes of confederation and alliance and the union which it produces is of

ten more close, and permanent, than that which refults from voluntary affociation. Thus, if the heptarchy had continued in England, the different kingdoms of it might have separately fallen a prey to foreign invafion; and although the interest and danger of one part of the island was in truth common to every other part, it might have been difficult to have circulated this perfuafion amongst independent nations; or to have united them in any regular or steady oppofition to their continental enemies, had not the valour and fortune of an enterprising prince incorporated the whole into a fingle. monarchy. Here the conquered gained as much by the revolution as the conquerors. In like manner, and for the fame reason, when the two royal families of Spain were met together in one race of princes, and the feveral provinces of France had devolved into the poffeffion of a fingle fovereign, it became unfafe for the inhabitants of Great Britain any longer to remain under feparate governments. The union of England and Scotland, which transformed two quarrelfome neighbours into one powerful empire, and which was firft brought about by the course of fucceffion, and afterwards completed by amicable convention, would have been a fortunate conclufion of

hoftilities,