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Our conduet in America, fince that epocha *, has been far ' from blameable. Upon advice being received, in the begin.
ning of the year 1755, that the French were preparing a feet
to be sent to North America, with troops on board, under the • command of Mr. Dubois de la Mothe, Mr. Boscowen was fent
with a numerous fleet in quest of the French, and to attack * them, in case they endeavoured landing their forces in Ame• rica. Here the unthinking, uninform'd censurer †, takes oc'cafion to let us know, that the French fleet was fuperior to the -English that failed from here, and that if Mr. Macnamara's
return to Brest had not diminithed it, we should certainly have * been vanquilhed before Mr. Holbourne's arrival in the Ameri
can feas, to renforce the squadron under Adiniral Boscawen; and this flep be attributes to the ignorance of the m • But this he would not have asserted, could he but have reflected,
that a piore certain intelligence than ever he could have come at, might very well have informed the m
“That tho' " the French squadron was fuperior to the English, having no “ orders to attack Mr. Boscawen's fleet, and Mr. Macnamara's “ division of it being deitined to sail only to a certain latitude, “ and then recurn to Brest, a superior English fleet would be ún.
neceílary in the European seas; and as this fileet, when arrived “ at America, would be reinforced by several ships there already “ ftationed, it would be next to impossible for the English feet " to miss in:ercepting the French in their paffage to St. Law“ rence's river." So chat if any comment can be made upon the • conduct of the manor, or super-intendent of public affairs, • in this respect, it inuft be to applaud the parfimony with which . they applied the public inoney, where the unnecessary expence
of equipping a larger fleet at first, with fach great diligence, • could not have been attended with more success than the taking • the Alcide and Lys, two fine French ships, now riding in our « harbours.?
There is also a note at the foot of page 34, in which, speaking of the Fourth Letter to ihe People of England, he says, “There
are but two facts stated in it that are probable; and they, upon
* Washington's defeat. f' See the first and fourth Letters to the People of England.
I • The fleet which was fent under the Command of Admirals • Boscawen and Moftyn, was composed of no less than twelve men • of war of the line, besides frigates : and that truly experienced
sailor, who fo worthily presides at the head of our naval affairs, being apprehensive, that accident of some sort or other inight re
duce the force of this formidable feet, before it arrived in the • Amurican leas, judiciously caused a second fleet to be equipped,
vito urprizing ciligence, and which failed under the command of Admiral Holbourne. This second fleet confifted of fix men of * war of the lire, besides frigate:,'
enquiry, prove absolutely without foundation-- namely, the dittribution of the ammunition destined for America; and the purchase of Dutch gun-powder, that evaporated like law duft.'
And again, in p. 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, we have the revelations following. • But
the French, finding we would not give into their lure, played an efter game, unthought of till they found their feint
would nat succeed. As soon as we had certain advices of their 3d real design, we were not behind-hand in taking such measures
• as the exigence of the cafe required, and if our feet did not svo fail till the beginning of April, it was not to be attributed to ---af any backwardness in the orders from the Admiralty ;--they
were repeated and reiterated for the speedy equipment of these
thips.;--and, indeed, the fleet was 'ready fome weeks before bu they failed, but they were not completely manned till the very Srid day of their departure from Spithead, and then the only expe
dient that could be found for manning them, was the turning cover all the crews of the other ships in that port on board them,
- which is a fufficient answer to all questions, “Why did we of not fend a superior fleet under Mr. Byng ?” as there were then Tu s bát three men of war in Plymouth Sound, and two of them
returned from Sir Edward Hawke's feet in the Bay of Biscay *, on account of the fickness of their crews ;--the other was the guard fhip at Plymouth. • But I believe no body has doubted, that if Mr. Bog had made all the fail he could to Gibraltar, and carried there no longer than was needful; or behaved well in the action of the 20th of May, that the French would have gained any victory
us in the Mediterranean, either by land or fea.
As to any inviduous insinuations, that Mr. B-g had not or! ders to fight, or land the troops that were on board his fleet at • Minorca ; it will be only necessary to cite, verbatim, Lord An
• fon's letter to Mr. Byng, concerning the disposition of Lord 3. Robert Bertie's regiment, which was produced at Genera!
Fowke's trial; vizi
" It being his Majesty's pleasure, that Lord Robert Bertie's re22.16 giment do serve on board your fleet, to do duty there ; and his
" Majefty having iflued orders by the Secretary at war, to Gene2 ".ral Fowke, to make a detachment equal to a battalion, from " his garrison, for the relief of Minorca ; you are to conform
- I fuppofe none of the most inveterate minifterial critics would pretend-laying, we should have sent Admiral Hawke's fleet to the Mediterranean, any more than the cruizers in the Channel ; since • the first of these measures 'must inevitably have produced the re
Jease of the Brest fquadron, and the other given the French all the advantages they could defire for a descent here.
“ yourself to the said orders, and to carry that detachment on “board your feet, and land them at Minorca. And in cafe,
upon confèrence had with General Blakeney, he lhall think it of necessary, you shall thèn land Lord Robert Bertie's régiment also " at Mahon, from on board your fleet.
“ Signed ANSON.” After this, I ami positive, no man that feels for his native land, and has not some finifter view in raising commotions in the state, can suppose, thật Lord A-n's orders, or any from the Ad-ty, instructed Mr. B-g to behave like a coward,
or a villain. I wish I were authorized to publish here this é Ad
-l's instructions at large, which I am sure (if you are a lover of your country) would give you all that satisfaction which must be conceived in being convinced that nobody at home, was privy to any daftardly ačtions in the Mediterranean ; but I am not, take this letter as a sample, and be not so ungrateful to a man, who did his country such real service in the Taft war, as not to have as much confidence in him as you • would in the most common trader, whose goods you' purchase
upon a specimen ; at least fufpend your judgment till' Mr. Byng's trial, which cannot' now be far off, when, as your gracious Sovereign has told you,“ He will not fail to do justice
upon any persons who shall have been wanting in their duty to “ him and their country.”
How well qualified this writer was for the trust reposed in kim of arrangeing these documents, and of making the most notable use of them, the reader has it in his own power, from these ex. cerpts, to determine. V. M' Esay on the Times. 8vo. 18. Henderson.
This is a miscellaneous piece, written in a quaint, tumid, and verbose stile; notwithstanding which, it is in many respects, worthy of more notice than perhaps it has met with : for tho' the author confines his animadversions to a few known facts, and makes an antiminifterial use of almost all of them, he does not revile one party, for the sake of making his court to the other on the contrary, he takes occasion toʻshew, that opposition may be abused, as well as power ; and upon the whole, throws a good share of political knowlege into lo equal a mixture of light and Made, that it is hard to say, whether his wit or his discretion is predominant.
He begins with a severe censure on that rage of patching up a nitive treaty of Aix; and, what was an unpardonable fault, left our own claims undefined. He then takes some pains to prove, that the French were notoriously the aggressors in the present quarrel, and by consequence, that the eventual instructions given to Braddock, stand in need of no vindication : but having done this piece of justice to his country, he makes as free an use of his
• which is not of a nature for any prescription of time, to recon
cile to it the objects of its arbitrary oppression. What goodwill to the service of their country can be expected from the captives of their own country-men? or into what enemies hands could they fall, that would give them worse than such usage? · It is said too that the unwillingness of the common seamen
to enter on board men of war, does not entirely proceed from 'the wages being less than what are given in merchantmen, nor
from their considering them as floating jails, but from the intolerable domineering and insolence, generally speaking, exercised upon them, under the notion, that it is absolutely necessa
ry to what they call carrying a command, a term, of which the • mif-construction has probably done more mischief to the naval • service, than all the points of abuse besides ; as surely it can • never be the way to raise the
of the men by crushing of their spirit. Those poor heads, whom a little power is enough to intoxicate, will have no conception of this. But how much more nobly and wisely did that great admiral Blake think, and
address himself to his ship's company, when he told them, “ That the meanest of them were free-born Englishmen as well
as himself, and that officers and fore-mast-men were all fellow“ servants to the government of their country." Words of this
import must found rather more animating to a British ear, than • those with which the public papers (falsely no doubt) make an 'admiral lately conclude his harangue
is there are only two “ choices, fight or be hanged !" an alternative surely to • be addressed with more propriety to a pirate crew, on a man • of war's coming up with them, than to English failors going
against the enemies of their country.'
The idolatry of pelf; the mercenary habit grafted upon it; the danger to be apprehended from an overgrown national debt, and an unweildy mass of precarious wealth created by it; a nonattention to the endangered condition of our colonies; ill-timed, ill-proportioned, ill-directed supplies; the want of a great pervading, all embracing, enterprising spirit to unite and consolidate the whole British empire into one fyftem ; the characters and qualifications of our minilters at foreign courts; and the manner of filling and sustaining the great offices at home, are the next topics that he expatiates upon. After which he proceeds in these words :
• Even the old manly British eloquence, was not proof against the epidemical enervity, and degenerated into fuftian rants, pue
rile conceits, and those witticisms, which may more properly • be esteemed florishing the point, than pushing it, the most cele• brated harangues, presented an image of fquibs, crackers, and • artificial fire-works, bouncing and bursting into a thousand little
sparks, the false glare of which rather created a momentary • dazzle, than threw a steady light upon the point in debate. The • petulance of groundless presumption, an intemperance of acri.