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Æmiliús fell, oppreffed with wounds; and that life which had 6 on all occasions been devoted to the fervice of his country, "was lost in its defence. The Romans, though surrounded --thus on every fide, turned their faces to the enemy, and re« filted yet for some time longer. But as the troops on the 6 outside fell, their body, by degrees, was more and more di
minished; till at last they were preffed together within a verył, narrow space, and were there all destroyed. Among them
fell Regulus and Servilius, the Consuls of the former yeat; .boch eminent for their virtue, and whore behaviour in the " action was such, as fhewed them to be worthy the name of «Romans.
During the time of all this slaughter, the Numidians pursuing the cavalry of the left, who fled before them, killed
the greatest part, and threw many from their horses. A 6 fmall number only escaped fafe to Venufia; among whom
was Varro, that base and worthlefs.Conful, whose government proved fo pernicious to his country.. 9. Such was the battle of Cannæ: in which both sides long « contended for the victory, with the greatest bravery. Of this the action itself affords the clearelt proof. For of fix " thousand horfe, which was the whole cavalry of the Roman
army, seventy only Aed with Varro to Venusia; and three 6 hundred more of the allies escaped to different citiesOf o the infantry, ten thousand men, indeed, were taken prison
ers; but these had no part in the action. And about three sthousand also found means to escape to some of the cities « that were near. But the rest, to the amount of feventy thou“ fand men, all died with honour in the field of battle.-On ( the side of Annibal were flain four thousand Gauls, fifteen
hundred Africans, and Spaniards, with about two hundred horfe.'
Thus did that brave, and numerous army fall a sacrifice to the ignorance and rafhness of their General. By Annibal's; fituation, it appears, that if Varro had pofTeffed a little more patience, the Carthaginians must, for want of provisions, in a short time, have been reduced to fight upon his own terms. But, in fact, the Roman Senate itself was equally culpable ; Having, in their letters to the army, signified their defire that a decisive battle should be attempted. This was more than fufficient to kindle Varro's natural impetuosity into a Aame : a fame that went near to have burnt the whole Roman Rei public to alhes. We have had many subsequent examples of the fatal consequences of States and Ministers interfering in the command of their Generals, A Minister of State may be
a wise home-politician, yet be entirely ignorant in military politics. Besides, no man can possibly judge of what is proper or improper, in the field, if he is not upon the spot. The many mistakes committed by the Roman General on this occasion, are so flagrant, that it may seem unnecessary to point them out: nevertheless, to some of our young military Readers, (for military Readers we have) it may not be entirely useless.
Firft then, as we binted before, he ought not, by any means, to have risqued a general engagement; as the enemy must inevitably have fallen into his hands without it. When the Carthaginians advanced their center, he ought not to have weakened his wings to assist bis own; particularly as their ranks in that part, muft have appeared extremely thin. When he found their center retreat within their front line, he ought not, on any account, to have suffered his own to exceed the line of battle, by advancing before their wings. Then, as his number of infantry was greatly superior to that of the enemy, he ought, after the battle was begun, instead of drawing them towards his center, to have extended them on the extremities of each fank, with orders to wheel to the right and left inwards, and to flank the Carthaginian cavalry and as his cavalry were inferior in numbers, they should have been supported by the remainder of his light-armed troops, which continued useless in the rear. If he had followed those plain and easy maxims, which the first principles of his profesfion seem to dictate, An-, nibal, with his whole army, muft unavoidably have fallen into the very fnare in which the Romans were caught.
Both antient and modern Writers of the Roman History, have been extremely lavish in praising the inflexible constancy, and conduct of that people during the second Punic war: and on the opinions of those Historians it is, that our universal admiration is founded. But when we come to consider the facts themfelves, we find that the councils of this wise people were, beyond measure, faolish; and that their misfortunes were entirely owing to their want of judgment. It appears, that they had very early intelligence of Annibal's intention to invade İtaly: full as early as we had, that the French designed to attack Minorca. It was likewise their own fault, if they were not acquainted with his route. Why did they not attempt to oppole his entrance into Piedmont? If they had taken care to secure the narrow passes of the Alps, they might have deftroyed his whole army with a very inconsiderable force. And, after Annibal's arrival in the plains of Italy, what a strange judgment did the Romans form of the capacity of those
men, to whom they gave the command of their armies ! On juge (says Mr. Folard) du merite des Princess et des Republiques, par le choix des sujets qu'ils employent dans la conduite d'une guerre; which being translated into modern English, runs thus; We judge of the merit of an Admiralty, by their choice of an Admiral to command a fleet. This Varro, so famous for his defeat at Cannæ, happened to be related to Bebius, Tribune of the people; who, by the assistance of a little money, properly applied, together with his great popularity, and seditious eloquence, raised his noble kinsman to the Consulate; and we have seen the confequences ! Aristophanes, in one of his comedies, intro duces a gentleman, endeavouring to persuade a maker of faufages to push for the ministry: but the honest man, too modest, and too sensible of his own inability, declined. Pho! says the gentleman, inability stuff, and nons
fenfe.--'There is nothing in the world so eafy; for a man ¢ of your profession especially. Continue to act as you have been used to do. Mix and jumble all things together. Mince
your words as you did your meat; it will be thought affability. Continue to talk of your cookery; your profession has made you popular, and taught you knavery. In short, my friend, you have every qualification requisite in a mini•fter of ftate, except affurance.
Another proof of the consummate wisdom of the Roman senate, was, the dividing the consmand of their troops between two men fo opposite in character, sentiments, and difposition. Our own memories, without having recourse to history, will furnish us with instances of this fort. The Romans being a wise nation, we were certainly right in following their example; and it was also just, that the effect should be the fame. What could be the reason, that this great people, so well skilled in the art of war, did not sooner attempt to draw Annibal out of Italy, by making a diversion in Spain, or on the African coast? It is very astonishing, that they should chufe to act upon the defensive, when it was in their power to have acted offensively; but it is stil? more astonishing, that other nations should chuse to copy their mistakes. In thort, upon an impartial examination, we find, they were fo far from being the people they are generally reprefented, that they appear to have pursued every measure that was most likely to complete their deftruction. Comparisons, they say, are odious; therefore we shall draw no parallel: otherwise, it would be en easy talk to find a nation, which, for some time past, feems to have acted upon the fame principles, To what, then, did
Romans owe their deliverance? To fortune, and to the spirit
of one man. Scipio was their redeemer. More The
conduct of the Romans, says M. Folard, reminds
me of Anacharlis observation to Solon, as they were returning from å public assembly; viz. That he could not help being greatly aftonished to find, that, in their deliberations, it was the Wise that spoke, and the Fools that decided. Which in publick affemblies, is commonly the case, where party governs, and the most powerful cabalis generally composed of the least rational. :
As some of our Readers may posibly think, that we ought not to take our leave of this work, without mentioning a word or two, concerning the merit of Mr. Hampton's per formance, we may here observe, that this has been rendered unneceffáry, by the various fpecimens given; and which the learned peruser may, for his own fatisfaction, compare with the original: whilft Readers less qualified, or less curious, will, perhaps, deem it fufficient, if we assure them, without enume rating particulars, that we look upon Mr. Hampton's Polybius
one of the best translations that has appeared in the EngKh language.
MONTHLY CATALOGUE 9193 For DECEMBER, 1756, continued. cich ľ
POLITICAL. I. Onfiderations on the present State of Affairs, with some
Rcfections on the Dutch Observator. Hooper.
This pamphlet seems to be the work of an Author, who has w more chan once, this winter, appeared in the service of the Public and never in the occasional way, without a reasonable claim to pub
Jic acknowlegements; which are particularly due to him for these bi considerations,as they contain an unanswerable refutation of the falofhoods and calumnies discharged against this nation, by the French
partizan, indicated in his title-page. It is this part of his under *Faking, which he first carries into exceution ; and he enters upon ir it with ebis remark, l'har Europe has more. to apprehend from
che filent policy of Lewis XV. than from the open manifestations of c power, which rather gratified the pride, than served the interest,
of Lewis XIV. The indignities offered to fome powers, ferving So to exasperate all against him; while the more refined fyftem of
the present French court, has had such a soporific effect on its neighbours, that tbey have slept securely, till they are in a fair way to be secured, forever, in the fetters of France.
Whether this is precisely true, or not, we need not stay to enquire. ---France is, and long has been, so formidable, that we can never be too much upon our guard against her. And that the French management of Holland, and of the anti. ftadtholderate party, in particular, by the means of Van Haaren's corrupt eloquence, and the Obfervator's equally corrupt writings, is the triumph of their politics, as the Conliderer phrases it, may also be taken upon content.We have lost the long-boasted, dear. bought benefits of our Durch alliance, it is plain ; and whether through French practice, or English misconduct, makes but little difference in the event. Our national character we may posibly revive, but our footing in that Republic, it is to be feared, we shall never recover : and it is in this light the Confiderer is entitled to our acknowlegements.--The wicked web of the last of the above mentioned two deceivers, he has certainly untwiited, in the fairest and fulleft manner; and it is only to be lamented, that a piece so well calculated to take off the odious imputations cast upon us abroad, should be written in a language which is understood only at home.
We have been charged, it feems, by these French emiffaries, not only with forming designs on the liberties of the Republic,
but even with a ming at universal commerces, and the Dutch - have been simple enough to believe it which is so much the
more strange, as all the world might have known, that we have aimed at nothing for many years past, but barely keeping a crazy vessel afloat, as long as we could.We have been charged farther, with being the first aggreffors in the present war, because we were the first in Europe to commence hostilities; where. as it has been over and over again proved, that we commenced hostilities only to correct their aggressions; and even then, as a last resource, when all other expedients had failed. And, indeed, from the whole of the Confiderations before us, and all that might be added to them, it is but too plain, that we have more to answer for to ourselves, than to any other power upon earth.
What follows in the subsequent part of the pamphlet, and which is comprehended under the firit part of the title, is of too miscellaneous a nature to be represented any other way, than by a flying ketch of the topics contained in it: which are--The mischiefs reciprocally refuiting to Britain and Hanover, from an over close connection the common duty, both of Hanoverian
and British Ministers, to make suitable representations ;--the 9 little danger refulting to the latter from a proper discharge of that at duty, and the disgrace which he fupposes has befallen them from
a neglect of it ;-the neceflity of an entire change of measures, and a new spirit of councils, preferable to any inferior or fecon
dary point, fuch as a distasteful enquiry into paft miscarriages, * &c.--the probability that in fuch cafe, other Powers would
think us worth saving, and really alist in forming a common cause against a common enemy ;-the use to be made of our prefent misfortunes, ty a thorough sense of the impolicy of over in