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of this reasoning, it will be sufficient to observe, that the objection holds equally against all religious Sanctions whatsoever. And so indeed it was fairly urged by Lord Shaftesbury: who pretended that every motive regarding SELF, tended to servilize Virtue. Without doubt, one sort, just as much as another; a future state, just as well as an equal Providence. Nay, if we were to appreciate matters very nicely, it would seem, that a future state without an equal providence (for they are always to be considered separately, as they belong to different Dispensations) would more strongly incline the Will, than an equal providence without a future state: as the value of future above present good is, in this case, immensely great. But the human mind being so constituted, that the distance of good takes off proportionably from its influence, this brings the force of the two sanctions nearer to an equality; which at length proves but this, That the objection to the merit of Virtue holds against all religious sanctions whatsoever. In the use of which objection, Lord Shaftesbury was not only more ingenuous, as he urged it against them all, but more consistent, as he urged it on his doctrine of a perfect disinterestedness in our nature; whereas Lord Bolingbroke is amongst those who hold, that self-love and social, though coincident, are two essential principles

in the human frame.

"That two consistent motions act the Soul,

"And one regards ITSELF, and one the WHOLE."

But we might go further, and retort upon both these noble Adversaries of Religion, that the charge of making virtue servile affects all moral, as well as religious sanctions; as well that, whose existence they allow, as those which they would persuade us to be

visionary;

visionary; both these illustrious Patrons of infidelity acknowledging that moral sanction which arises from God's making the practice of virtue our INTEREST as well as duty*. Now interest and servility is, it seems, the same thing, with these generous Spirits, as it was with the good old woman, Joinville speaks of, amongst the Enthusiasts of Syria, who carried about a pan of live-coals in one hand, and à dish of cold water in the other, to burn up Paradise and to extinguish Hell, that men might be brought to serve God dispassionately, without hope or fear.-So near akin are Fanaticism and Free-thinking, that their nature betrays them even when they strive most to hide their common parentage.

His Lordship's third cavil to an equal Providence is, that it would RELAX GENERAL BENEVOLENCE.

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"But would there not be, at the same time, 46 some further defect in this scheme? I think there "would. It seems to me, that these good men being "thus distinguished by particular providences, in their "favour, from the rest of mankind, might be apt "either not to contract, or to LOSE THAT GENERAL BENEVOLENCE, which is a fundamental Principle " of the Law of Nature, and that PUBLIC SPIRIT, "which is the life and soul of Society. God has made the practice of morality our interest, as well 'as our duty. But men who found themselves constantly protected from the evils that fell on others, "might grow insensibly to think themselves uncon"cerned in the common fate: and if they relaxed in "their zeal for the Public good, they would relax in "their virtue; for public good is the object of Virtue. "They might do worse; spiritual pride might infect "them. They might become in their own imaginations

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"the little Flock, or the chosen Sheep. Others have "been so by the mere force of Enthusiasm, without <6 any such inducements as those which we assume, in "the same case; and experience has shewn, that there are no Wolves like these Sheep*.

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The case assumed, to which his Lordship objects, and against which he pretends to argue, is that of an equal Providence which exactly distributes good to Virtue, and to Vice, evil. Now the present objection to such a state is, an' please you, that this favourable distinction of good, to the virtuous man, would be apt to destroy his general benevolence and public spirit. These, in his Lordship's account, and so in mine too, are the most sublime of all Virtues; and therefore, it is agreed, they will be most highly rewarded: But the tendency of this favourable distinction, if you will believe him, may prove the loss of general benevolence and public spirit. As much as this shocks common sense, his Lordship has his reason. God has made the practice of morality our INTEREST as well as duty. But men, who find themselves constantly protected from the evils that fall on others, might grow insensibly to think themselves unconcerned in the common fate.

God has made the practice of morality our INTEREST as well as duty. Without doubt he has. But does it not continue to be our interest, under an equal, as well as under an unequal Providence? Nay, is it not more evidently and invariably so, in the absence of those inequalities which hinder our secing clearly, and feeling constantly, that the practice of morality is our INTEREST as well as duty?

-But men who found themselves constantly protected from the evils that fall on others, might grow insensibly to think themselves unconcerned in the Vol. v. p. 429.

COMMON

COMMON FATE. What are those evils, under an equal Providence, which fall on others, and from which the good man is protected? Are they not the punishments inflicted on the wicked? And how is the good man protected from them? Is it not by his perseverance in Virtue? It is therefore impossible he should grow unconcerned to those evils which his Lordship calls the common fate, when he sees his interest and his duty so closely connected, that there is no way of avoiding those evils but by persevering in virtue. But the name of common fate, which he gives unto them, detects his prevarication. He pretends to reason against an equal Providence, yet slurs in upon us, in its stead, a Providence which only protects good men; or rather one certain species of good men; and leaves all other to their COMMON FATE. But admit it possible for the good man to relax in his benevolence, and to grow insensible to the common fate: there is, in the state here assumed, a speedy means of bringing him to himself; and that is, his being no longer protected from the evils that fall on others: for when men relax in their benevolence, his Lordship tells you, they relax in their virtue and, give me leave to tell his Lordship, that when men relax in their virtue, an equal Providence relaxes in its protection; or, to speak more properly, the rewards of virtue are abated in proportion.

However, spiritual pride (he says) might infect the virtuous, thus protected: And this he will prove à fortiori, from the case of ENTHUSIASTS; who only immagine they have this protection, and have it not. Now, what if we should say, it is this very it is this very enthusiastic spirit itself, and not the visions of Protection it is apt to raise, which is the true cause of spiritual pride? ENTHUSIASM is that temper of mind, in which the imagination

imagination has got the better of the judgment. In this disordered state of things, Enthusiasm, when it happens to be turned upon religious matters, becomes FANATICISM and this, in its extreme, begets the fancy of our being the peculiar favourites of Heaven. Now, every one sees, that SPIRITUAL PRIDE is the cause, and not the effect of the disorder. For what but spiritual pride, springing out of presumptive holiness, could bring the Fanatic to fancy himself exalted above the common condition of the Faithful? It is true, when he is got thus far, the folly which brought him hither, may carry him further; and then, all to come will be indeed the effect of his disorder. But suppose it were not the enthusiastic Spirit, but the visions of protection, it is apt to raise, which is the cause of spiritual pride; Is there no difference between a vision and a reality? Fancy may occasion those disorders which Fact may remove. This, I persuade myself, is the case here: The real communication of Grace purifies those passions, and exalts them into virtues, which the strong delusion of such a state only renders more gross and violent. And here it may be worth while to take notice, that his Lordship, in this objection to an extraordinary Providence, from the hurt it does to general benevolence, seems to have had the Jewish People in his eye; who in the latter ages of their Republic were commonly charged, and perhaps not altogether unjustly, with want of benevolence to the rest of mankind: a fact, which though it makes nothing for his purpose, makes very much for mine, as it furnishes me with an example to support what is here said of Fanaticisin; an infirmity pretty general amongst the Jews of those Ages. They had outlived their extraordinary Providence; but not the memory, nor even the effects of it; nay, the warmer

tempers

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