cal or a metaphysical system, as of Smith's Theory of Moral Sentiments, for instance, or of the doctrines of Cudworth's Immutable Morality; where we draw the materials of our judgment, not from extrinsic knowledge, but from the first principles of reason, and the study of our own minds.

This critical internal evidence necessarily consists of many and minute particulars, every one of which, singly, is of comparatively little power; but which, when they are made to converge to one focus, form a full and satisfactory light. The inquiry has been pursued by different minds, on very various principles, and, in fact, embraces two wholly independent branches of argument. Of these, one is purely critical, comprehending a large extent of scholarship and of antiquarian research, directed and chiefly limited to the question of the authenticity* of the commonly received books of scripture, as shown by their conformity with the style, opinions, manners, and history of their professed time and country. The other, guided only by good sense and a general acquaintance with human nature, argues

* Some respectable writers, on subjects of critical inquiry, have distinguished between the words genuineness and authenticity, referring one to the character of the work, the other to the veracity of its statements.— Their own use of the word, however, is contradictory; and there is no authority in good English usage for the distinction: these words being constantly used as synonymous. The true distinction is between the authenticily of a writing and its credibility.

boldly and directly from the coherence of the narrative, and the manner of narration, to the probable truth of the facts related, and thence backward to the genuineness of the books. Most of the first part of Dr. Lardner's great work on the Credibility of the Gospel History, relates mainly and primarily to the former question; while no better model of the manner in which investigations of the other kind should be carried on, can be given, than that most original, ingenious, and well reasoned work of Paley, the Horæ Paulinæ, in which he proves the veracity of St. Paul, and of the historian of his early labours, from their unaffected circumstantiality in narrating, and in transiently and naturally alluding to facts, and the indirect, and evidently undesigned coincidences which are scattered over their writings.

All such investigations, on whatever principles they are conducted, end in presenting to us a complication of probabilities, which can be accounted for, by the candid and diligent inquirer, upon one supposition only, that of the genuineness and truth of the narrative.

Nevertheless, it must be allowed, that the assent thus produced, though it may be full and undoubting, is yet comparatively cold and feeble, and were there no other ground than this for our reception of revealed truth, it would probably be received much as we receive historical accounts

of past ages and distant countries; as being valuable and curious information-as being truth certainly, but not as truth coming directly home to our personal interests, sympathies, and duties.

This evidence, too, is limited in its application, being addressed to comparatively but a few: to the scholar versed in languages and antiquitiesto the general reader, somewhat accustomed to compare styles, and judge of probability and consistency-or to the reasoner and man of observation, trained by the discipline of professional studies, of active habits of business, or at least of the varied commerce of life, in some degree to examine evidence, to analyze character, to sift out and weigh all those indications of veracity and honesty, which influence the judgment of men towards each other in society. The other species, which is that moral evidence arising from the manner of teaching, and the character of the doctrines taught, is of a grander and nobler nature, as well as of a far broader utility.

It addresses itself, not to the scholar, the critic, the practised and sharp-sighted inquirer into human conduct and motives; but to man, as a moral being, as an accountable creature, as possessing certain common and universal principles of reason, feeling and conscience.

I will not here enlarge upon this subject, because its importance demands a separate and

more minute examination of its character. My chief object in this Essay, is to call the attention of the reader, to the fact of the remarkable variety of the several classes of the evidences of revelation, and of the numerous and diversified particulars of which each class is composed, and to show how strikingly they are adapted to invite the examination, and to instruct the reason, of men of all ranks of intellect and acquirement: provided, only, that they be examined with diligence, attention, candour, and a fair use of that sort and degree of knowledge within the reach of every individual, For this is a condition upon which the discovery of all moral truth seems more or less suspended; a condition founded on the moral nature of man, and uniformly asserted in the revelation itself.

Now, from all this variety, thus harmonizing in one united attestation to the same facts, results a very peculiar, and, to my mind, a very impressive argument.

Let us suppose every distinct head of proof to be much weaker than it really is-or, taking the case of any individual, let us suppose, that from want of knowledge, from preconceived opinions, prejudices of education, or any other cause which may tend to cloud the judgment-any or all of these several arguments, though appearing, as they must, in no inconsiderable degree probable,

should yet seem to him to lie open to very serious objections, and to labour under difficulties which he is wholly unable to remove.

Nevertheless, unless he allows the religion to be true, so far at any rate as relates to its fundamental facts, how can he possibly account for the existence of so many different probabilities, whatever he may think of their force singly, yet all uniting upon one great argument, and bearing witness in corroboration of each other. If he does not admit the substantial truth of the religion, must he not literally embrace the rhetorical paradox of Rousseau, and confess that the inventors of such a narrative were more miraculous than the hero?

Is there any doubtful historical relation so corroborated? Any other religious creed so supported? Any ethical or philosophical system of human invention so evidenced? Arguing, then, from the common laws of belief, can he conceive possible that all these, so many and such different kinds of probabilities, (even if some of them should be but faint and inconclusive,) have yet been heaped together from so many quarters, without any real foundation in truth-that such an unparalleled conjunction of the ordinary marks of veracity, should have thus unaccountably been brought together, to give credit and currency to a mass of fraudulent or enthusiastic delusions?