"And the Profeffion of the Soul's mortality being generally efteemed “as fcandalous as that of ufury, fuch men will be most exact and fcrupulous in point of honour, as your ufurer, to keep up the "credit of his calling, is of all men the most religious obferver of "his word *"

MR:

SECT. IV.

R. BAYLE, the laft fupporter of this paradox, is of a very different character from thefe Italian Sophifts: A writer, who, to the utmost strength and clearness of reasoning, hath added all the liveliness, and delicacy of wit: who, pervading human nature at his ease, struck into the province of PARADOX, as an exercise for the unwearied vigour of his mind who, with a foul fuperior to. the fharpeft attacks of fortune, and a heart practifed to the best philosophy, had not yet enough of real greatness to overcome that laft foible of fuperior minds, the temptation of honour, which the ACADEMIC EXERCISE OF WIT is conceived to bring to its profeffors.

A writer of this character will deferve a particular regard for paradoxes, which in the hands of a Toland or a Tindal end in rank offenfive impiety, will, under the management of a BAYLE, always afford fomething for use or curiofity: Thus, in the very work we are about to examine +, the many admirable obfervations on the nature and genius of polytheism, happen to be a full answer to all which the Author of Chriflianity as old as the Creation hath advanced against the use of revelation. For a fkilful chemist, though difappointed in his grand magifterium, yet often difcovers, by the way, fome useful and noble medicament; while the ignorant pretender to the art, not only lofes his labour, but fills all about him with the poisonous fteams of fublimate.

* Cap. xxxiii. ejusd. tract.

Penfées diverfes, ecrites à un docteur de Sorbonne à l'occafion de la comete qui parût au mois de Decembre, 1680. &-Continuation des Penfées diverfes, &c. ou Reponse à plufieurs difficultez, &c.

The

The profeffd defign of Mr. Bayle's work is to enquire, which is leaft hurtful to mankind, ancient idolatry, or modern atheism: And had he confined himself to that fubject, we had had no concern with him, but fhould have left him in the hands of Meff. Jacquelot and Bernard. I freely own they are both ftark naught: All the difference is, that Atheism directly excludes and deftroys the true fenfe of moral right and wrong; and Polytheifm fets up a falfe fpecies of it.

But the more particular, though lefs avowed, purpose of this elaborate treatise is to prove, that Atheism is not deftructive of Society; and here he falls under our notice; no diftinct anfwer, that I know of, having been yet attempted to this part of his performance.

His arguments in fupport of this Paradox, are occafionally, and fo without any method, interspersed throughout that large work: But, to give them all the advantage they are capable of, I have here collected and difpofed them in fuch order, that they mutually fupport, and come in to the aid of one another.

It had been generally esteemed a proof of the destructive nature of Atheism to Society, that this principle excludes the knowledge of moral good and evil; fuch knowledge being, as will be feen, pofterior to the knowledge of a God. His firft argument therefore for the innocence of Atheism is,

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I. “That an Atheist may have an idea of the moral difference "between good and evil, becaufe Atheists, as well as Theifts, may comprehend the first principles of morals and metaphyfics, from "which this difference may be deduced. And in fact (he fays) both "the Epicurean atheist, who denied the providence of God, and the "Stratonic atheist, who denied his Being, had this idea *.

This often repeated argument is fo loosely expreffed, that it is capable of many meanings; in fome of which the affertion is true, but not to the purpofe; in others to the purpofe, but not true.

* Voiez les Penfées diverfes, cap. clxxviii. & fuiv. & l'addition à ces Penfées cap. iv. Reponse à la 10 & à la 13 objections, & la Continuation des Penf, div. cap. exliii. L2 There

Therefore before any precife answer can be given to it, it will be neceffary to trace up moral duty to its first principles. And though an enquiry of this fort should not prove the most amusing either to myself or my reader, it may be found however to deferve our pains. For a fpirit of difpute and refinement hath so entangled and confounded all our conclufions on a subject, in itself, very clear and intelligible, that I am perfuaded, were MORALITY herself, of which the ancients made a Goddess, to appear in perfon amongst men, and be questioned concerning her birth, fhe would be tempted to answer as Homer does in Lucian, that her commentators had fo learnedly embarraffed the difpute, that fhe was now as much at a lofs as They to account for her original.

To proceed therefore with all poffible brevity: Each animal hath its inftinct implanted by nature to direct it to its greatest good. Amongst these, man hath his; to which modern philofophers have given the name of

1. The MORAL SENSE: whereby we conceive and feel a pleasure in right, and a distaste and aversion to wrong, prior to all reflexion on their natures, or their confequences. This is the first inlet to the adequate idea of morality; and plainly, the most extensive of all; the Atheist as well as Theist having it. When instinct had gone thus far,

2. The reafoning faculty improved upon its dictates: For, men led by reflexion to examine the foundation of this moral fenfe, foon discovered that there were real effential differences in the qualities of human actions, established by nature; and, confequently, that the love and hatred excited by the moral fenfe were not capricious in their operations; for, that in the effential properties of their objects there was a SPECIFIC DIFFERENCE. Reason, having gone thus far (and thus far too it might conduct the Stratonic atheist) it ftopped; and faw that fomething was ftill wanting whereon to establish the MORALITY, properly fo called, or ACTIONS, that is, an OBLIGATION on men to perform fome, and to avoid others; and that,

that, to find this fomething, there was need of calling in other principles to its affiftance: Because nothing can thus oblige but,

3. A fuperior WILL: And fuch a will could not be found till the being and attributes of God were established; but was difcovered with them.

Hence arofe, and only from hence, a MORAL DIFFERENCE. From this time human actions became the fubject of obligation, and not till now: For though INSTINCT felt a difference in actions; and KEASON difcovered that this difference was founded in the nature of things; yet it was WILL only which could make a compliance with that difference a DUTY.

On these three Principles therefore, namely the moral fenfe, the effential difference in human actions, and the will of God, is built the whole edifice of practical morality: Each of which hath its diftinct motive to enforce it; Compliance with the moral fenfe exciting a pleasurable fenfation; compliance with the essential differences of things promoting the order and harmony of the universe; and compliance with the will of God obtaining an abundant reward.

This, when attentively confidered, can never fail of affecting us with the most lively fenfe of God's goodness to Mankind, who, graciously refpecting the imbecillity of Man's nature, the flownefs of his reason, and the violence of his paffions, hath been pleafed to afford three different excitements to the practice of Virtue; that men of all ranks, conftitutions, and educations, might find their account in one or other of them; fomething that would hit their palate, fatisfy their reason, or fubdue their will. The first principle, which is the moral fenfe, would ftrongly operate on those, who, by the exact temperature and balance of the paffions, were difengaged enough to feel the delicacy of it's charms; and have an elegance of mind to refpect the noblenefs of its dictates. The fecond, which is the effential difference, will have its weight with the fpeculative, the abstract and profound reafoners, and on all those who excel in the knowledge of human nature. And the third, which refolves itself into the will of God, and takes in all

the

the confequences of obedience and difobedience, is principally adapted to the great body of Mankind.

It may perhaps be objected, to what is here delivered, that the true principle of morality should have the worthieft motive to enforce it: Whereas the Will of God is enforced by the view of rewards and punishments; on which motive, virtue bath the small ft merit. This character of the true principle of morality is perfectly right; and agrees, we fay, with the principle which we make to be the true : For the legitimate motive to virtue, on that principle, is compliance with the Will of God; a compliance which hath the highest degree of merit. But this not being found of fufficient power to take in the Generality, the confequences of compliance or non-compliance to this Will, as far as relates to rewards and punishments, were first drawn out to the people's view. In which they were dealt with as the teachers of mathematics treat their pupils; when, to engage them in a fublime demonstration, they explain to them the use and fertility of the theorem.

To thefe great purposes ferve the THREE PRINCIPLES while in conjunction: But now, as in the civil world and the affairs of men, our pleasure, in contemplating the wisdom and goodness of Providence, is often disturbed and checked by the view of fome human perversity or folly which runs across that Difpenfation; fo it is here, in the intellectual. This admirable provision for the support of virtue hath been, in great measure, defeated by its pretended advo-, cates; who, in their eternal fquabbles about the true foundation of morality, and the obligation to its practice, have facrilegiously untwisted this THREEFOLD CORD; and each running away with the part he esteemed the strongest, hath affixed that to the throne of God, as the golden chain that is to unite and draw all unto it.

This man proposes to illuftrate the doctrine of the MORAL SENSE; and then the morality of actions is founded only in that fenfe: with him, metaphyfics and logic, by which the effential difference, in human actions, is demonftrated, are nothing but words, notions, vifions; the empty regions and fhadows of philofophy. The profeffors,

of