doned. And the first cannot be the sin against the Holy Ghost, for, 1. The Jews whom Christ spake unto did then commit this sin, and yet they had not continued in it to their death. 2. Final unbelief is rather a sin against the Son; but the sin against the Holy Ghost is distinguished from that. 3. Our Saviour saith, Those that commit this sin shall not be forgiven in this world nor in the world to come. Not in this world. If therefore final unbelief or impenitency be this sin, then Christ should threaten that he that dies in his sin shall not be forgiven whilst he lives. 4. If a man sin against the Father or Son, and die impenitently in that sin, he shall not be forgiven either in this life or in the life to come: but herein the sin against the Holy Ghost is worse than the sins against the Father or the Son, and therefore it cannot consist therein. 5. The apostle saith, 1 John v. 16, " There is a sin unto death, I say not that you pray for it." Doth he say that we must not pray for a man, and for the forgiveness of his sin when he is dead? 6. It is that sin for which there lies no remission, but a man may sin such a sin whilst he lives: for if any man sin wilfully, there remaineth no sacrifice for sin, and wilfully a man may sin before his death. 7. It is such a sin as a man may know another man is guilty of whilst he lives, for saith the apostle, "There is a sin unto death, I say not that you pray for it :" but final unbelief and impenitency is not known till death. 8. Our Saviour saith, "He that speaketh a word against the Holy Ghost shall not be forgiven." But a word may be spoken against the Spirit long before a man dies, and therefore surely this sin against the Holy Ghost doth not consist in final impenitency and unbelief; final unbelief and impenitency is not this sin against the Holy Ghost. 9. For then all wicked men living under the gospel, and dying impenitently, should sin the sin against the Holy Ghost, which is false.*

* Altissiodorensis, lib. ii. Tract. 30, in Sentent. Desperatissimos convertit Deus.—Augustin.

Sic homo potest penitere de finali impenitentia.—Altissiodorensis, ib.

† Blasphemia in Spiritum Sanctum ea esse videtur qua quis destinata malitia contra proprium animi sui sensum Spiritus Sancti gratiam et virtutem deique gloriam oppugnat.-Luc. Brugen. in Matt. xii.

* Ος αν ειπη λογον κατα του υιου του ανθρωπου αφεθησεται, ος δε αν ειπη κατα του αγιου πνευματος ουκ επι διαλι οτι τουτο γνοριμον υμιν εςτι και προς τα δηλα εναιχυντείλε —Chrysostom in Math. xii.

You will say, then, What is this sin against the Holy Ghost, and wherein doth it consist?

Affirmatively. It is that wilful sinning against God, whereby a man doth maliciously oppose and blaspheme the proper and peculiar work of the Holy Ghost, and that after he hath been convinced thereof by the Holy Ghost.

I say, It is a wilful sinning against God; and so the apostle speaks, saying, "If any man sin wilfully, after he hath received the knowledge of the truth, there remains no more sacrifice for sin," Heb. x. 26. So that the sin for which there is no sacrifice, and of which there is no remission, is a wilful sin. Now a man is said to sin wittingly, willingly, and wilfully wittingly, in opposition to ignorance; willingly, in opposition to force and constraint; wilfully, in opposition to light, knowledge and reason; and so he that sins against the Holy Ghost doth sin; for says the apostle, " If any man sin wilfully, after he hath received the knowledge of the truth," or after the acknowledgment, Tηy eпiyvwσir, &c.

He that commits this sin doth also oppose and blaspheme the proper and peculiar work of the Holy Ghost; for it is called here, a blasphemy, and a blaspheming of the Spirit, as distinct from the Father and the Son. Now the work of the Father is to create, the work of the Son to redeem, the work of the Holy Ghost to sanctify; and therefore he that sins this sin, doth oppose and blaspheme holiness and goodness; and so these Jews did: for when our Saviour Christ did cast out the devil, that unclean spirit, they said, he did it by the power of the devil, calling the work done, a work of the devil, and did oppose him therein.* Yet this is not all, for,

It is that sin, whereby a man doth maliciously oppose, and blaspheme; and so the word Eкоows, Heb. x. 26, is used by the Septuagint, Exod. xxi. 13, 14. And thus did those pharisees sin, for the Evangelist tells us, that when Christ saw their thoughts, verse 25, "He said unto them," &c. So that it was not a bare opposing or blaspheming, but a malicious opposing and blaspheming of this great work of the Holy Ghost, which made them so deeply guilty.†

* Dicere verbum contra spiritum sanctum est verbis impugnare Deum sanctificantem. Cajet. in Matt. \ii. vide sixth Senens. in locum.

†Peccatum in spiritum sanctum dicitur illud ex carta malitia sit quod solent VOL. IV.

But how can a man sin, ex malitia, or maliciously, seeing that, voluntas temper ferter in bonum, et omnis peccans est ignorans. Now if the will be always carried out upon what is good, and every man that sins, doth sin ignorantly, how any can man be said to sin maliciously, or ex malitia?

:

Yes, very well for although the will be always carried out upon that which is good; yet that good, is either morally good, called, bonum honestum, honest good; or naturally good, called, bonum utile, or jucundum, profitable, or delightful good. Now the will is not always carried out upon that which is honestly good in appearance; for voluntas est appetitus universalis, the will is an universal appetite. And if the will should be always carried out upon that which is honestly good in appearance, then, as Suarez reasons well, every thief and adulterer, should be an heretic, which no man will say. And if the will may be carried out sometimes upon that which is pleasantly, or delightfully, or naturally good; then it may hate that which is morally, and spiritually, and honestly good; for, amor odii causa, love is the cause of hatred; the will doth naturally hate that which is contrary to the thing loved; and if the will may hate that which is honestly and spiritually good, then it may oppose and blaspheme the same, and that out of hatred and malice; for every man speaks evil of and opposes what he hates.

If this be a reason why a man cannot sin maliciously, or ex malitia, because the will is always carried out upon what is good; then the devils and damned in hell, do not sin maliciously, or ex malitia; for they have wills in hell, as well as men on earth; but I presume it will not be said that the devils and damned in hell do not sin maliciously; for then if they sin upon some mistake, and ex ignorantia, they should have some excuse for their sin.*

distingui tria genera peccatorum, peccatum in patrem ex infirmitate humana, peccatum in filium ex ignorantia, quod patri appropriatur potentia filio sapientia, peccatum in spiritum sanctum, ex malitia quia bonitas attribuitur spiritui sancto. Altissidorens. Lib. 2. Tract. 30. in Sent. Scot. in Sent. Lib. 2. Ques. 2.

* Non existimo absolute necessarium ad operandum malum per voluntatem ut præcedat defectus erroris in judicio intellectus vel speculativo vel practico. Suar. Metaphys. disp. de necess. et conting. Eff. Sect 7.

Prima Propositio.-Cum perfecta scientia et consideratione vel habituali vel naturali potest esse peccatum et defectus in voluntate, est communis sententia et certa de fide.

Though every man that sins doth sin ignorantly, yet he doth not sin ex ignorantia, out of ignorance; ignorance is sometimes the cause of the sin, and so the man sins out of ignorance: sometimes ignorance is the companion and consequent of the sin, and then he sins ignorantly. Now it is granted, that every man that sins doth sin ignorantly, there is always a darkness and obscuration of the mind, which goeth along with every sin; but every man that sins, doth not sin ex ignorantia, out of ignorance: I say, it is not true, that every sin doth arise from some precedent error, or ignorance in the understanding, as the cause thereof: For then,

Why should the Holy Ghost make so great and vast a difference between him that sins ignorantly, and him that sins presumptuously? Num. xv. If any sinned through ignorance, there was a sacrifice for him, verse 27, 28, but if any man sinned presumptuously, there was no sacrifice for him, verse 30, 31. Now if every sin do arise ex ignorantia, from some precedent error and ignorance in the understanding, as the cause thereof; then presumptuous sins also should arise from this cause, and so there would be no such distinction between them, as the Holy Ghost makes.*

If every sin in the will, should arise from some error or ignorance in the understanding; then the will should be

Secunda Propositio.-Non est necesse præcedere in intellectu aliquem errorem speculationum qui sit quasi origo ad peccandum.

Tertia Propositio.-Ad peccandem non est necessarium ut præcedat inconsideratio speculativa tanquam origo peccandi.

Quarta Propositio.-Etiam ad peccandum non est necessarius error practicus qui peccatum antecrdat et sit quasi origo ejus.

Quinta Propositio.-Moraliter loquendo semper in omni peccato occurrit aliqua inconsideratio practica vel pravitatis objecti vel actus licet si absolutam voluntatis potentiam consideremus neque iste defectus intellectus simpliciter videtur necessarius ad peccandum.

Sexta Propositio.-Licet cum actu peccati semper sit conjunctus ille defectus intellectus non tamen ille est prima origo peccandi sed potius illa reducitur in defectum voluntatis.

Septima Propositio.-Voluntatem posse peccare est defectus quidam naturalis ipsius voluntatis.

Suarez de Causis propriis et interior. peccatorum Disputat. 5. Sect. 1.

* Quod aliquis ignoret illud quod scire debet contingit tripliciter: Uno ex impotentia qua scire non potesi: Alio ex nescientia qua quis nescit quod scire debet: Alio ex voluntate quando quis renuit scire quod debit, illa ignorantia est peccatum mortale, quod est effectus voluntatis, quod est in potestate voluntatis ignorare vel non ignorare. Holcot de imputabilitate peccati.

always carried out upon bonum honestum, honest good, at least in appearance; but the will is an universal appetite, and the wills of the devils and damned in hell, are not carried out upon that which is apparently honest.

If every sin should suppose such a precedent error and ignorance in the understanding, then the will cannot fall off from, or resilire from the ultimate dictate of the understanding, but must necessarily and continually follow the same; and so the liberty will be formally, and not radicately, in the understanding, and not the will; then the will cannot move, and apply the understanding to cousider a thing, nor be the cause of ignorance in the understanding; yea, then there shall be no sin in the will, because it follows the understanding, as God hath set a law upon it to do; but where grace is, there is sin also.

If the will doth always pre-suppose such an error and ignorance in the understanding, and doth necessarily follow such an act of the understanding, presenting some truth, or honest good, either real, or apparent, then the created and defiled will of man, cannot tend unto any object upon any reason, upon which the divine will of God cannot tend unto its object; for the divine will can tend, and be carried out upon any good, being abstracted from all deformity: and although the created will be carried out, and tend unto that which is apparently good, and the divine will is always carried out upon that which is really good, yet the reason why the created will is carried out upon that which is apparently good, is because it appears to be real, and so the divine will, shall be carried out upon its object, upon no other reason than the created will of man, yea, than the wills of devils, and the damned in Hell, which I suppose none will affirm.*

It is confessed by all that there is a sin of malice, and a sin of ignorance. Now if there be a sin of malice, as Ocham reasons, then he that sins out of malice, hath either an universal, or particular knowledge, or both; if both, then as he

* Utrum voluntas creata possit peccare ex malitia volendo aliquod non ostensum sibi sub ratione boni veri, boni simpliciter vel boni apparentis et secundem quid, &c.

Si non potest tunc videtur quod voluntas creata non possit tendere in objectum sub aliqua ratione sub qua non possit tendere voluntas Divina, voluntas enim divina potest tendere in omne bonum substractum illi deformitati. Scotus lib. 2 Sent. Dist. 44. Quest. 2.