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projects of Parliamentary Reform, out of lost in 1774, there was also a sincere desire the youthful and untempered notions which to secure to the French Canadians their reMr. Pitt imbibed from his father, and from ligion and customs; and this liberal policy, those with whom he was associated at the it was thought, would be most effectually end of the American war. And he over-realized by separating them from the rest of looked this simple distinction; the Consti- the Colony.*

tution of England contemplates and provides But several circumstances were overlooka supreme and independent power, whereas ed. First, Lower Canada, though princiit was not intended to give supreme power pally peopled by the French, was also occuto a Colony: and however liberally the Co-pied by English settlers, not inconsiderable lony might be governed, there must always in number; this indeed was admitted; but be questions to be decided by the King and due allowance was not made for the tenParliament of Great Britain, without refer- dency of the English settlers to increase raence to the wishes, or even the interests of the Colony. Such are questions of peace and war, of trade with the mother country, with other colonies, and with foreign states; and those questions of much rarer occurrence, but strictly within the purview of the Constitution, which regard the succession to the throne.

From 1782 to 1800, Great Britain and Ireland were in a relative position, in which collisions of this nature might have occurred; and though the difference which the French war might have occasioned did not in fact exist, there was a case, not two years previous to 1791, in which the Irish and British Parliaments proceeded differently, in reference to a regency, upon the then temporary disability of George III. A little want of discretion, and a continued illness, might have made this a mortal quarrel, and have divided the royal authority.

pidly; nor was it sufficiently considered, that this race was more enterprizing than the natives, more likely to acquire property and importance.

Secondly, the two provinces being both situated on one great navigable river, that which was nearest to its mouth, or Lower Canada, had a great advantage over the other, which was thus, in some degree, dependent upon it. It was impossible to make a truly equal division of a country so circumstanced.

Much praise has lately been given to Mr. Fox, for the superiority of his plans, at this time, over those of Mr. Pitt. Fox himself would hardly clain this merit, for the case was, as he admitted, one of great doubt; while the minister leaned one way, the leader of opposition naturally inclined the other. He observed truly, which Pitt did not deny, that a portion of British settlers would be We mention these things here to show, left in Lower Canada, subject to an assembly that the statesmen of 1791, if they really did almost entirely French; but he contempersuade themselves that they were extend-plated with much complacency the alternaing to the Canadians the benefits of the Eng- tive, which would place the French Canalish Constitution, were misled by names, dians under the dominance of the English mistaking circumstances; their intentions were benevolent, but their attempts were delusive. The extent and effect of the delusion we shall soon exhibit.

Another branch of the measure of 1791 was the separation of the provinces of Lower and Upper Canada. Almost all parties now concur in condemning this separation;which stood, however, when adopted, upon intelligible and attractive grounds of policy. Lower Canada was, for the most part, in habited by the descendants of the French, who had their own Roman Catholic religion, and for the most part their French laws, including very peculiar laws affecting the tenure of land. Upper Canada was peopled by emigrants from the foriner British provinces, now composing the United States, and by English settlers-chiefly, if not entirely, Protestants, and attached to the laws and customs of England. With the wish to give to the English in Canada the advantages which, as they then alleged, they

party, which in an assembly common to the undivided province, would have the majority. It is true that he spoke of making laws by which matters might be regulated between the two races; but he did not, and could not say, how those laws could be framed and rendered acceptable.

The plan of Pitt had assuredly more of what would now be styled a liberal character than that of Fox. It approached more nearly to the principle of self-government, under laws of the choice or preference of the people.

But, under another head, Fox's views were the more democratic: he objected not only to the hereditary seats in the Legislative Council, but to the seats for life. He

See Mr. Pitt's speech, March 4, 1791, Parl. Hist. xxxviii. 1377.-"The division, it was hoped, could be made in such a manner as to give each a great majority in their own particular part, although it could not be expected to draw a line of complete separation."

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proposed an Elective Council, the qualifica- | fewer who could be assigned to a superior tion of the councillors being "infinitely class. higher than those of the members of the How then could the Upper Chamber be Assembly, and those of the electors in pro- constituted? How was a select body of men portion. In making this suggestion he ar- to be got together, not representing the mass gued strongly for an aristocracy, as an in- or even the lower orders of the class of pertegral part of the legislature; but contended sons sufficiently intelligent to be entrusted that, in a country like Canada, property was with the suffrage, but occupying a position the fit basis of aristocracy. To hereditary infinitely higher? It was avowedly intendseats he was opposed, because there were noted that this body should operate as a check in Canada the materials for a body similar upon the more popular Assembly; a check to our House of Lords. To the councillors more requisite than in England, in proporfor life he objected, as being too much de- tion to the want of property and education pendent upon the crown.* Pitt and Burke in that Assembly. It was intended, also, both answered, that it was of the essence of that these members of the Upper Chamber an Upper Chamber, corresponding with our should have some ccnnection with the crown, House of Lords, to be more near to the and yet not be, from time to time, dependcrown than to the people. ent upon the crown for their seats.

All agreed that there must be an Upper Chamber, very different in its composition from the Lower; there was unquestionably much difficulty in constructing this body, but we believe that the difficulties of Fox's plan would have been as great as those of Pitt's.

It is true that Canada did not contain persons to whom, according to our notions, peerages would be appropriate. But is it less true, that there were not in the province persons sufficiently raised above the rest to satisfy Mr. Fox's condition? The laws and habits of the French Canadians were not favourable to the growth of an aristocracy of any sort; and we doubt whether persons were to be found so "infinitely higher" than the rest in point of property, as to entitle them to selection; nor, perhaps, a sufficiency of more substantial electors. We find in the act no qualification prescribed for the members of the Assembly. It is difficult. to account for this omission, unless, in fact, there was so much of equality, that no line of distinction could be drawn between the electors and the eligible; and if it be now true that some even of the latter cannot write, it is probable that, in 1791, there were still

We cannot easily see what other course could be taken than that which was taken; enabling the Government to select, as legislative councillors for life, the best qualified men that circumstances might produce; and always bearing in mind that the English constitution was the acknowledged model, it appears to us quite right, and almost a matter of course, that if persons should arise, as society advanced in civilization, who had acquired a considerable permanent interest in the soil, and even a family influence, it should be lawful to make the seat in the Chamber hereditary in the family of such persons, so as gradually to relieve the Government from the invidious and difficult task of selection; and by raising up an independent aristocracy, with its due weight in the legislature, correcting and finally overcoming the very evil-dependence upon Government-which Fox had deplored.

And be it observed, that the French Canadians were not, like the inhabitants of many of the thirteen states, republican in their origin, or puritans in church or state. It would seem, from the evidence of 1774, that they were monarchical in their feelings, and that a privileged noblesse was familiar to them. To such men the notion of hereditary titles of honour could not be altogether strange.

* In arguing this point, Mr. Fox gave a decided opinion against the introduction of peerages for life into our English system:-"The But it is not only among men bringing check upon making peers here, he had ever con- with them the ancient " customs of Paris," sidered as attended with this advantage, that when the king made a peer, he entailed an here- that such titles are acceptable. Some of the ditary legislator on the country. A doubt exist- leaders of the American revolution were ed whether the king had a right to make a peer discussing, soon after they had completed for life, without his title being hereditary, and at their triumph, the means by which Lord this time he understood there was such a judicial North might have averted it. The prevaquestion collaterally existing in the House of Lords, which was a clear proof that the practice lent opinion was, that if England had given was unknown. If the crown had such a power, to the discontented provinces a representathe life peers might overwhelm the hereditary tion in the British House of Commons, and peerage, and thus destroy the constitutional con

trol of the aristocracy, in case they attempted to had conferred titles of honour upon some of resist the crown."-p. 413. the most eminent Americans, the separation

might have been avoided.*

We know not, for certain, whether English peerages were contemplated, or a new provincial nobility, but the fact, in either form, would help to justify the measure of 1791.

Not one of the eminent statesmen who discussed the mode of assimilating the Canadian to the English Constitution, saw the utter absurdity of the attempt.

would be neither so absurd nor so dangerous as it appears in any other view. We make this observation as well for the vindication of Mr. Pitt and the ministers of 1791, as by way of introduction to what we shall presently offer with a view to the future. And it will be seen that it is the deviation from the course which we have described, that produced the present embarrassment.

We cannot in this place trace the several steps by which the Assembly arrived not only at the power of refusing supplies altogether, and, as we may say almost without a metaphor, starving the Government. So much as is necessary of this delineation will appear in the account of more recent events, which we think it sufficient to commence with the

In that year the whole system was reviewed in Parliament. The complaints of the Lower Canadians against the Governor (Lord Dalhousie) and the Legislative Coun. cil, and also against the British Parliament, were referred to a Committee of the House of Commons.

Nor was anything said in those debates on the subject of finance, although so much of the working of the British Constitution turns upon money. But it is important to observe that an act was in existencet (of which we shall hear more presently) by which certain import duties were imposed at Quebec (in lieu of others which had been collected by the French government) in order "to estab-year 1828. lish a fund towards further defraying the charges of the administration of justice, and support of the civil Government within the province of Quebec" and that the revenue thus arising was to be applied to its purpose by the Lords of the Treasury in England, and the surplus, if any, to remain "for the future disposition of Parliament." The Crown was at this time possessed of certain casual and hereditary revenues, of which it had the absolute disposal. Clearly, therefore, it was not the intention of the framers of the arrangement of 1791, that the Crown should be dependent upon the provincial Assembly for the ordinary expenses of administration. If not, and the Government were not under the necessity of applying for a mutiny bill, or for extraordinary supplies, the power of the purse which the Constitution gave to the Assembly, could not be so used as to control or distress the Government. And consequent ly, the incompatibility of this power with the condition of a dependent colony would not be felt.

The provincial legislature might go on making provision, subject to the veto of the Crown, for all local purposes, and working its constitutional powers on this confined scale, without affecting the movement of the great machine of imperial government.

In this view the imitation of the British Constitution would be less perfect, but it would be as complete as the nature of the case admits, and the attempt to effect it

The suggestions however of the Canada Committee of 1828 were carried into effect between 1828 and 1832. It is a very im. portant point in this case, that the Legislative Assembly of Lower Canada acknowledged that the recommendations of this Committee embraced all their grievances; and England has therefore a right to say that her account with Lower Canada up to 1828 is "even and quit," and if the Colony now alleges a grievance it must be sought in some proceeding subsequent to 1828.

What the grievances were in 1828, and how they were redressed, appears no where so clearly as in a minute recorded by the Earl of Aberdeen, at the moment in which he quitted the Colonial Office over which he presided for five months, with assiduity, temper, and ability, now universally acknow. ledged. To this paper, the present ministers have appealed, and it may justly be considered as no party document, but the mani. festo of England herself.

It is too long for insertion, nor would we willingly copy so much of it, as to deter readers from perusing it* at length.

First among the concessions enumerated by Lord Aberdeen, and foremost among the * We derive this anecdote from a very intelli- points now at issue between England and the gent American gentleman, who was in England in 1837, and whom we met when employed in Colony, is the matter of finance. For some recording, for the instruction of some of his time previous to 1828 the expenses of the younger countrymen, what had passed upon the civil government of Lower Canada were occasion to which we refer. Should this note meet his eye, he will, perhaps, with the courtesy which we know belongs to him, communicate to us an authentic account of the conversation which we have imperfectly narrated. + Act 14 Geo. III. c. 88.

It is in p. 36 of Commons Papers, No. 113 of 1836, but it will be found at the end of "The Canadian Controversy," ascribed to Mr. Elliot, the secretary to Lord Gosford's Commission.

provided by the revenues imposed by the act others for the virtues which they themselves He felt that it would be more of 14 Geo. III. c. 88, (as before mentioned,) possess. and appropriated by the English treasury, generous, and he fancied that it would be partly by a sum of 5000l. per annum pre- equally effectual, were he to give up the viously appropriated by the Canadian legis- revenues first, and trust to the Assembly for lature, and partly by revenues levied within granting a civil list afterwards. He sugthe province, and at the disposal of the As-gested* that which he conceived to be a sembly from time to time. proper civil list, to be granted for the king's life, or for seven or more years. But his bill contained an unconditional surrender The Duke of Wellington of the revenues. equally honest, but more clear-sighted, warned Lord Ripon that he was acting im. prudently, and recorded his opinion in a pro. test, but the bill passed.†

To us it appears that Lord Ripon made

The system of defraying a part of the expenses by annual votes of the Assembly was new about the year 1818, and arose out of the desire of the Assembly to acquire the control incident to the power of the purse. And they now put forward two claims; first, they insisted upon their right to appropriate and control the whole of the expenditure, not confining their control to that which was two mistakes in matters of fact. He proprovided for by their own votes: and second- posed to imitate the conduct of William the Îy, (this depended upon the construction of Fourth, who on his accession "freely gave acts of parliament not necessary to be dis- up his interest in his hereditary revenues," cussed here,) they denied the right of the while the civil list was left to be arranged by crown to apply the duties under 14 Geo. Parliament. The ministers of William the III. c. 88. Fourth did not advise his majesty to be thus imprudent. They obtained his leave to acquaint Parliament that in arranging a civil list they might deal as they pleased with those revenues; but his right to them remained in the king, until the moment in which the civil This was the list act received his assent. precedent which Lord Ripon ought to have followed.

It is obvious, and was afterwards admitted, that " so long as the Assembly was called upon to provide for and to regulate any portion of the public expenditure, it would virtually acquire a control over the whole."

Probably impressed with this opinion, and greatly desirous of conciliation, the Committee recommended that "the receipt and expenditure of the whole public revenue," in- But it was also an error to suppose that cluding the duties of 1774, and apparently the Assembly had declared their intention of including also the hereditary revenues of the giving a civil list in return for those revenues. crown, "should be placed under the superin- The Government appears to have been mistendence and control of the House of Assem- led by Mr. Hume, or to have read incorbly," but they proposed to annex this reason-rectly the resolutions passed by the House able condition, that the governor, judges, and of Assembly after seeing the Report of 1828. members of the executive council, should be Those resolutions§ promised a civil list (not made by a permanent provision for their very extensive) when "the whole public resalaries, independent of the annual votes of the Assembly.

The Duke of Wellington's government, in which Sir George Murray was Secretary for the Colonies, proceeded to carry this recommendation of the Committee into effect. A bill was introduced for appropriating the revenues collected under the act of 1774 to the high civil and judicial officers of the government of the two Canadas, and placing the residue at the disposal of the colonial legislature.*

But owing to the king's death and the resignation of the ministers, this bill was drop. ped. Sir George Murray was succeeded by Lord Goderich, (now Earl of Ripon,) who, in an evil hour, accepted office with Lord Grey and Lord John Russell. Lord Ripon is a man of remarkable frankness and honesty, and such men are apt to give credit to

• See bill printed 29th April, 1830.

venue arising within the province should be given up to them;" whereas Lord Ripon, not quite consistently with the principles enunciated in his despatch, had still reserved in the hands of the English Government, certain revenues, known as the casual and he reditary revenues of the Crown. This re serve might be perfectly right, but it was a great deduction from the generosity of the grant, and might have been expected either after general principles, or from a knowledge of the Assembly and its proceedings, to deprive the donor of all benefit from that which he gave. Lord Ripon, with the same generosity which characterized his measure, has acknowledged that he acted "under the in

* Dec. 24, 1830. No. 37 of 1837, p. 18, Lord Ripon's suggestion went rather beyond the enactment of Sir G. Murray's bill. + Act 1 & 2 Will. IV.

Parl. Deb. 3d. Ser. iv. 1002.

§ December 6, 1828, No. 73 of 1830, p. 26.

fluence of an imprudent confidence." It is hardly necessary to add that the Assembly have not to this day voted any civil list, or made even the judges independent.

In the year 1832 the Assembly passed a supply bill, providing, or very nearly, for all the demands of the Government; and there were in this session other indications of a more reasonable disposition in the Assembly, and of their conviction that their grievances had been redressed.† The mover of the re. solutions to this effect was Mr. Neilson, the honourable and intelligent representative of the petitioners of 1828.

In 1833 also, the Assembly passed a bill of supply, but they now annexed to some of their grants certain conditions, which in duced the Legislative Council to reject the bill, and would have induced the Crown to disallow it, if it had come home for appro bation.

These conditions afforded the first instance of the exercise by the Assembly of the power of the purse in a way unknown to British practice. To the grant of salary to each person holding office, all of whom were mentioned by name, they added a proviso, that he be not a member of the Legislative Council, or, as to others, of the Executive Council. The salaries of the judges were made conditional upon their not holding any other office under the Crown.

We know of no instance of a grant of this sort being made by the Commons of Eng

land.

Mr. Stanley, now Secretary of State, gave orders for paying the official persons out of that part of the revenue which had not been surrendered by Lord Ripon. And it was in the year 1833, that the Assembly first proposed to make a fundamental alteration in the Constitution of 1791, by making the Legislative Council elective.||

In 1834 the same contumacy prevailed in the Assembly, and in this year a fresh appeal was made to the British Parliament, and a new committee appointed to consider the petition of the Assembly. Of this, Mr. Roebuck was the mover, and from his speech we learn that the Assembly fancied itself acting in the spirit of the English Constitution, and imitating our recognized and habitual practice.

But here is a two-fold mistake, first, in

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deeming it possible that the constitution of a colony could be assimilated to that of the parent state, and secondly in believing that the power of the purse, either exists, or is ever used in England, in the way and to the extent in which the Canadians now assert it. Into the first mistake the Cana. dians have been unfortunately led by the language used here in 1791. The nature of the second mistake may be best explained by Mr. Roebuck's speech.*

"The executive" (in England, he says) "has no funds at its disposal, and is utterly dependent upon Parliament." "The Cana dians wish to approximate to the English practice, and therefore as they have no Mutiny bill to pass, and their chief expenses are on the civil list, they have very wisely deter mined to pass the estimates yearly." Again,

"The people's representatives determined to vote their money by items, so much to this functionary, so much to that, a very wise precaution, and one almost universally adopted by the English House of Commons."

It is surely a mistake to treat the power of the Commons to withhold supplies, as deliberately given to them for the purpose of enabling them to control the Crown in the exercise of its functions. We admit that it is not easy to pronounce what was the intention of a constitution which does not ex. ist in writing and is only to be deduced from practice; but surely the power which our Commons have acquired of forcing the Crown into any course of proceeding, is rather an incidental consequence, than a function deliberately assigned. But, be this speculation correct or not, we may confidently say that it has not been the practice of the House of Commons to compel the Crown by refusing to vote supplies into any course or measure unconnected with the vote of supply; or to refuse to support an army for any other reason than that of disapproving of the purpose for which it was to be employed. The power of the Commons, it is true, has no limit but such as is imposed by their own discretion.

Discretion may be abused; and it is an inherent evil of absolute power, in the hands whether of one man, or of one or more bodies of men, that it may do a wrong with out a remedy. There is no absurdity or injustice of which a Sovereign, whether King or Parliament, may not be guilty, without any technical infringement of the law. In every empire one such evil, one such liabili ty to abuse, must exist, but it is one good

Parl. Deb. 3d Ser. xxii p. 771.

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