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Liberals of Spain that the great opposition | ago we foiled you the other day. Why rewas made to Napoleon's invasion, or that in-vive these irritating topics? domitable and indefatigable spirit shown, But further, you told us that you invaded which so materially assisted the Duke of Spain because you apprehended danger to Wellington in recovering the country.

France from the triumph of the Revolution there; you now tell us that you interfere because the king is one of your own royal family; and moreover, that whatever may be the wishes of the people, nothing but "One hundred thousand Frenchmen, commanded by a prince of my family, by him what he shall grant shall be suffered to rewhom my heart delights to call my son, are main to them. This appears to England ready to march, invoking the God of St. Lou- as an interference, for the sake, not of Spain is, for the sake of preserving the throne of but of France; which alters the character Spain to a descendant of Henry IV.-of pre-of the measure, and prevents us from deserving that fine kingdom from its ruin, and claring at once her neutrality. of reconciling it with Europe.

In the midst of the discussions between the two ministers, Louis XVIII. thus addressed the chambers:

Let Ferdinand VII. be free to give to his people institutions which they cannot hold but from him, and which, by securing them tranquillity, would dissipate the just inquietudes of France. Hostilities shall cease from that

moment."

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Still less," wrote Mr. Canning, "could England admit a peculiar right in France to force her example (of institutions emanating from the will of the sovereign) specifically upon Spain; in virtue of the consanguinity of the reigning dynasties of those two kingdoms. -This latter reason would, on the contrary, suggest recollections and considerationswhich must obviously make it impossible for Great Britain to be the advocate of pretensions founded upon it."

This language was thought so portentous, that a paragraph strongly indicative of neutrality, was consequently left out of our king's speech. Mr. Canning invoked his tory in his correspondence with the French One further letter, after a considerable minister;* and addressed to him an expo- interval, from Chateaubriand, who left all sition, perhaps somewhat exaggerated, of these topics unnoticed, closed the corres the universal feeling of indignation against pondence between the two poet ministers, of France, which, according to Mr. Canning, which Mr. Canning, and probably Chateauprevailed among Jacobins, Whigs, and briand also, had now discovered the utter Tories. inutility.

Perhaps in endeavouring to impress upon It may possibly be thought that Mr. CanM. Chateaubriand's mind the arguments ning made distinctions more accurate than which the language of France might sug- important. If France were to invade Spain, gest to Spain, our accomplished statesman in the cause of monarchical power, it mat imagined a regard for general principles, tered little to England whether she appealed which never occurred to the ministers of to the consanguinity of the two kings, or to Spain, and which the minister of France the common interests of princes. If Mr. laughed to scorn.

Canning's remonstrance could have been But that which most excited the jealousy made before-hand, and the French king's of Mr. Canning was the language of the speech worded accordingly, the danger to king of France himself. Ferdinand, as it arise from a union of France and Spain appeared to our sensitive minister, was to would have been neither more nor less. be restored to power, because he was a Bour- If Mr. Canning laid too much stress upon bon, and inherited the claims of Philip V. the language of France, France entirely "You remind us," said Mr. Canning, in misinterpreted the language, and miscon substance, "of the time when we vainly received the principles of England. The sisted France in establishing this succes- Duke of Wellington had said, at Verona, sion, but you teach us also to remember our that England would not interfere with Spain more recent and successful efforts to restore unless her own essential interests were af a Bourbon to Spain in spite of France.- fected. The French minister pretended to There is, on your part, a triumph and a think, and perhaps did think, that commer. threat, a boast of what you did formerly cial interests were intended, and that interagainst England in Spain, and a defiance of ference in the internal affairs of a state England now that it is to be done again. would be justified, if thereby a better mar. We English cannot hear this without re-ket could be obtained for the goods of Engmembering, that if you foiled us a century land. And he conceived that what he

* Jan. 28, 1823, Ann. Reg. p. 149.

* Letter to Sir W. A'Court, in Parl. Deb. viii,

See Canning's Speech in Parl. Deb. viii. 1506.948.

deems the interference of England between answer; not only because its reasoning was Spain and her colonies, for the sake of colo- just, but because he desired, on the part of nial trade, was analogous to the march of the French army into Spain, to prevent apprehended dangers to the French govern

ment.

Not to mention minor circumstances, this difference is entirely overlooked; that in one case force was used, in the other none. Had France, for her own reasons, good or bad, declined to acknowledge the government of Spain, or had she recognized only the regency of Urgel, there would have been some analogy to the conduct of England. Had England assisted the South Americans, by her fleets and armies, to throw off the supremacy of the mother-country, there would have been some analogy in England to the conduct of France.

France, some portion of the trade which England was seeking for herself. It was therefore necessary for him to recognize the principles of the English note, at the same time that, on the alleged ground of the paramount importance of maintaining the legimate authority of the mother country, he suggested an attempt on the part of the European powers to settle, in concert with Spain, the question between her and her colonies.

Our

Obviously this would not suit England, whose relations towards the question were totally different from those of the continental powers; but we cannot go further here into the question of recognition. point is, that not only did England not interfere by force in South America, with a view to her commercial interests: but she did not avail herself of her early connection with the new states, to obtain for herself any exclusive privileges.

The Duke of Wellington's note did not assert, nor has England anywhere asserted, a right to extend its commerce by force of arms. She only claims a right to protect her subjects and commerce: and if the existence of any particular government, or the Her stipulation has always been that absence of government in any country of the which is technically known as that of the world, occasions piracies or other unlawful "most favoured nation;" that is, she claimed interruptions to her commerce, she holds her a right to be treated with the same favour self at liberty to put down that government, with any other foreign state; she was quite and not to confine herself to the capture or willing to compete, in the newly-opened punishment of such of the individual offend-markets, with France or the United States, ers as her ships may happen to catch. She upon equal terms. would be justified, in the case supposed, in taking possession of the country itself. To assist one party against another, so as to bring about the establishment of a government capable of causing her rights to be respected, is a mitigated exercise of the extreme right of self-redress.

In reasoning upon the right of interven tion, Chateaubriand quotes, as a precedent, the assistance given to our American Colonies by France, notwithstanding that, as he owns, she could not allege that her interests were affected. It would be difficult to find an instance of more reckless profligacy than the interference of France in our dispute with America!

"The existing relations," said the Duke of Wellington, "between the subjects of Great Britain and other parts of the world, have, for Nothing is more apparent in these exa long time, placed his Britannic Majsty under tracts than the inveterate hostility of the the necessity of recognizing de facto the gov- writer towards England. But his hostility ernments that have been formed in the differ- was accompanied by a very respectful jeaent provinces, so far as it was necessary in order to treat with them: the relaxation of the lousy. In one letter he advises the Empeauthority of Spain in the whole of this part of ror of Russia not to assemble too large an the world has occasioned the rise of a host of army in Poland, lest England, feeling satispirates and buccaneers; it is impossible for England to extirpate this insupportable evil without the co-operation of the local authorities who occupy the coast; the necessity of this co-operation cannot fail to lead to some new act of recognition in respect of one or more of these self-created governments."*

Not one of the continental powers ventured to controvert the Duke of Welling. ton's positions, and Chateaubriand himself seemed much inclined to occupy the same. He owns that he found the note difficult to

* Chat, i. 62, ch, xvi.

See Stapleton, ii. c. 8, noticing Mr. Canning's masterly letter of 25th March, 1825.State Papers of 1824-5, p. 909. + Ch. 46.

We have not time to follow Chateaubriand through all his misrepresentations of England and Englishmen; but we must find room for an indignant protest against such expressions as this, borrowed from the most vulgar of English radícal journals:-" Le Marquis de Londonderry et le Duc de Wellington, ennemis des franchises de leur pays;" and another, too notoriously false to be found even in the worst of English journals"M. Canning et tous ces Torys adverses pendant trente ans à la motion de Wilberforce;" on the Slave Trade.-ch. xiv. p. 34.

fied that Russia intended to interfere, should ed the inquietudes of his latter days! And interfere on the other side. This advice, this he says with singular infelicity of arhowever, had partly another origin in the rangement, just before informing us what tortuous policy of Chateaubriand. He was, those projects were. though upon other grounds, as anxious as To such a pitch of patriotic, we ought Mr. Canning that Russia should obtain no perhaps to say poetical exaltation did the share of the glory to be acquired in Spain; victories in Spain carry M. Chateaubriand, and he was a little alarmed when Mr. Can- that although he thought himself worthy ning's publication of his communications of a riband for preserving the peace of Euwith England showed the pains that he had rope by his own single act, he contemplated taken to disclaim the alliance, and to treat nothing less than a war for the recovery of the question as entirely French. "I was the French frontiers; and the Emperor obliged," he says to Russia, "to pretend Alexander, as he says, listened to his prothat you had nothing to do with the matter, jects, probably without the slightest intenin order to avoid a war with England." In tion of assisting him to realise them. How another letter he is assured that the Em-ever, he himself thought so much of them, peror Alexander must rejoice at the French that when disappointed of a riband, he retriumphs of Spain, that France might again become "the natural bulwark of Europe against the power of England.;' †

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tained on their account his post in the gov ernment, though he might have retired, (in all this we speak his own words,) in the Chateaubriand attached the most exag- most brilliant manner after the war in Spain. gerated importance to the successes of the Nous pouvions braver l'Angleterre; une French army in Spain. They were, un guerre avec celle-ci ne nous eut point questionably, more rapid than Mr. Canning effrayés; nous aurions voulu faner les lau. had thought probable, but to speak of them riers de Waterloo. Telles furent les cauas a glorious triumph is ridiculous Our ses qui nous déterminèrent à rester." author ascribes to them the résurrection So! the latter days of Mr. Canning were militaire of France, such as to give uneasi- to have been made comfortable by the reness to the court of Vienna. This opinion flection, that be had contributed to blight the he imparted to M. de Serre, confidently, laurels of Waterloo ! because notre mètier, he said, est un peu contraire à la franchise.* Russia had no such jealousy; but of England he says, in terms which can excite, in an Englishman, nothing but a smile,

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Surely, if the disclosures (are they such?) of the French ex-minister prove any thing, they prove that Canning was right in disclaiming all participation with France. If they would justify a deviation from neu. trality, it would be a deviation the other he said that "Chateaubriand had a good way. Charles X was not far wrong when heart and a hot head."

In one remark only of M. Chateaubriand can we in any way concur " Premier minis tre," he says, alluding to Mr. Canning,

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des vœux publics contre un autre état, si, en d'un grand royaume, je n'aurais pas fait même temps, je n'avais pas tiré l'épée.'t Our neutrality, perhaps, would have been more admirable, if it had been, in Mr. Canning's phrase, more imperturbable, and had not been disturbed by words or gesture.

But this is of little importance, it was only in Chateaubriand's ideas that England was "fort amoindrie" by the part she took. What interest of England has been affectevents of 1823? ed, or put in jeopardy, by the measures or

We have no space for tracing Spanish af fairs from 1823 to 1834, when the Whig government-if such we may call one which entrusts its foreign affairs to the ld

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Tory, Lord Palmerston-laid aside the system of non-interference.

And we may now reverse the question which we asked before. What interests of England have been benefitted by the measures of 1834 and later years?

solicitude the progress of events which may affect the stability of a government, the peaceable settlement of which is of the first importance to this country, as well as to the general tranquility of Europe."*

Now, we take our stand at this early stage of the proceeding. We say nothing of the recognition of Isabella; perhaps it was hastily done, but it is unquestionably convenient to have an acknowledged sover

possession was neither undisputed nor undisturbed, it might be enough to justify acknowledgment.

In observing upon the policy and measures of Lord Palmerston, in respect to Spain, we may throw aside much of that which has been said about it, on both sides, with great ability. We shall pursue no critical inqui-eign every where, and although the queen's ry into the stipulations of the Quadruple Treaty, as compared with the employment of marines or guns. If that treaty was founded in good policy, not only ought it to be carried into effect according to its spirit, liberally construed, but all further measures ought to be taken to give effect to the same good policy. It does not follow that all the measures adopted, such as the suspension of the Foreign Enlistment Act, have been wise; but it is no sufficient objection to them that they are not within the terms of the treaty, provided that they tend to that end which the treaty was intended to accomplish.

We are sure that it will be found that if in any part of his elaborate speeches Lord Palmerston has, after close argument, appeared to be successful, his triumph has been always over some minute or technical objection to the construction of his treaty, or the mode of his operations; and that he has entirely failed in justifying his interference. It will not, we trust, be denied that we have a right to throw the burden of the proof of necessity or expediency upon him who contracts any stipulation with another state, or who meddles in the affairs of another country; still more upon one who, in what ever mode, employs warlike force. Least of all will this be denied by a person who undertook the conduct of foreign affairs, for the first time, under a minister who inaugurated himself in a speech, of which this is an important passage.

"Our true policy is, to maintain universal peace; and therefore NON-INTERFERENCE is the principle, the great principle which ought to be, and will be, heartily adopted by the present administration."*

Our question then is, whether our interference in Spain forms a justifiable excep

tion?

King Ferdinand died in September, 1833. Our king soon afterwards announced to his parliament that he had not hesitated to acknowledge the young Queen Isabella, and that he should "watch with the greatest

Speech of Earl Grey, Nov. 22, 1830. Parl. Deb. 3d Ser. ch. i. p. 610,

Neither do we inquire here, whether we ought to have acknowledged Don Miguel as king of Portugal; though we have the authority of the Duke of Wellington for saying, that as this de facto king performed his part of the treaties between the two countries, we ought to have performed our part also; and that, "the civil war in Spain grew out of the civil war in Portugal, which was fomented in this country :"+ fomented it certainly was, as indeed has been acknowledged by the ministers themselves, who, in this instance, took their first departure from the "great principle."

But we venture to call in question the very great importance-to those English interests, which alone, again and again, we say, it is England's duty to maintain-of the undisturbed tranquillity of Spain. These phrases run off so glibly, they have been put into king's speeches by so many statesmen of all parties, that nobody inquires what they mean. That question we now venture to ask.

Take, first political dangers. It is doubtless true, that civil war may generate foreign war, and that war between any two other powers may involve England in hostilities; and hostilities we admit with Lord Grey in opposition to Lord Palmerston, ought, if possible, to be avoided.

Is this probability so great, as to require us to enter into stipulations which bind us to an indefinite expenditure, which require the employment of our naval and marine forces, and which involve us, as auxiliaries at least, immediately in war?

But imagine Spain peaceably settledstrong in forces, military and naval. Is flourishing in commerce and navigation, there no danger then? What is it that our ancestors for now more than a century have apprehended? What is it that has, in our own time, we will not say put our fleets in jeopardy, but opposed to them a formidable

*King's Speech, Feb. 4, 1834.
+ Parl. Deb. xxi. 12.

enemy?—The union of France and Spain, | (for he spoke of what occurred when he was Secretary for Foreign Affairs,)* to a ques. tion arising in the very year 1834, as to the more or less extensive purvieu of the treaty.

in a state of internal peace. Has Spain, tranquil at home, been to us at any time an efficient ally? No. Has she been hurtful as the ally of our enemies? Yes.

But the Duke condemned the whole ;-as uniting, contrary to our ancient policy, the two kingdoms of the peninsula, and connect. ing both with France; and as leading to a perpetual interference in the affairs of Spain and Portugal, and embarking us in a series of operations of which no man would see the end. It is at least clear that the treaty in its new form went far beyond the original intention of the prime minister, as avowed by himself. But it appears that Lord Palmerston, master of the cabinet in foreign af

It was the opinion of Sir William Temple, that England's interest lay in the quarrels of all other nations; let them fight among themselves, was his doctrine; let us be neutral and trade with them all. This doctrine of the older Temple we repudiate, because we fear that is not practicable; if we could really preserve our neutrality, it would, in a political view only, be perfectly sound. Our security, the great object of policy, would be increased; our trade would not necessarily be diminished. Neverthe-fairs, had always a more extensive scheme. less for the sake of humanity, and with our principles of commerce, we would gladly see Spain in peace;-but it is clear that the passage in the speech meant much more than a general aspiration for tranquillity. Indeed it was followed at no long interval by the famous Quadruple Treaty.

His first exposition of the treaty claimed it as the alliance between the four powers of the West, England, France, Constitutional Spain, and Constitutional Portugal. Spain under Carlos would not be as efficient an ally for England "in the spirit of the Quad. ruple Alliance as under the queen.

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The maintenance of peace, not only in the peninsula, was the great object which that Quadruple Alliance was intended to ef fect.

Upon this Sir Robert Peel asked,-

This treaty has two parts, concluded at two different times. Great pains have been taken to show that the additional articles of the 18th of August, 1834, grew necessarily out of the original treaty of the 22d of April preceding; and Lord Palmerston has "What nation might not find in such a argued this point with great plausibility in the House of Commons, where it so hap-mestic concerns of another? To interfere on principle a pretext for interfering in the dopened that ministers were not called upon a vague ground that British interests would for an explanation between April and Au- be promoted by intervention, on the plea gust. that it would be for our advantage to see established a particular form of government in a country circumstanced as Spain was, is to destroy altogether the general principle of non-intervention, and to place the independence of every such power at the mercy of a formidable neighbour."

But Lord Melbourne did give an expla nation in the House of Lords, in which he distinctly stated that the main ground of the treaty, on the part of England, was to take care that the march of Spanish troops into Portugal (for the purpose of expelling Don Carlos and Don Miguel) should take place under a treaty which would limit the parties from doing more than was necessary to accomplish the object.*

The additional articles went considerably further, inasmuch as they bound England to furnish arms and stores, to assist the Queen of Spain with a naval force, without any porticular reference to Portugal; and France was to prevent supplies from being sent to the Carlists in Spain.

And this extension of the effect of the treaty, from Portugal, the object of our peculiar protection, to the whole peninsula, constitutes the great difference between the two editions of the treaty. We have the official testimony of the Duke of Wellington

* See Parl. Deb. 5th August, 1834, xxv. 953, and see the reference to this in the debate of 21st April, 1837, xxxviij. 158.

Nothing, surely, could be more vague than Lord Palmerston's exposition. If, aid. ed by subsequent explanations, we under stand him at all, he means that a constitu tional government in Spain was more likely than a despotic government to preserve peace. Is not this a gratuitous assumption;§ but, peace with whom? Does he mean that either Isabella or Carlos were likely to attack England, or in any way to injure us? Does he mean that Carlos would attack Portugal! Admitting (at least for the present) that it is our policy and our duty to defend Portu gal, should we not serve her more effectually

* Debate of 21st April, 1837.
+ August 5th, 1834, xxv. 955.

June 24th, 1835, Parl. Deb xxviii, 1148.
§ See in Foreign Quarterly Review, vol. viii.
404, Mr. Canning's opinion of the comparative
tendency to war in governments of a monarchical
and a republican character.

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