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"Knowledge" may, as Tennyson sings, grow from more to more," but independent familiarity with it will shrink from less to less.

If we dismiss the case of professed students, and think of the great mass of our countrymen, whose main energies are absorbed in the occupations of active life, there can be no room for doubt that, as a rule, their opinions on all subjects lying beyond the circle of the avocations by which they live, must be taken on trust from the opinions of other people.

Enough has been said to show beyond the possibility of dispute, that the priniple of authority plays a predominant part in forming the opinions of all thinking men, except within the narrowest individual limits. If, however, we are to take our opinions in a great measure on trust, we stand in urgent need of some guide to tell us what opinions to adopt. We need, in short, a test by which to discriminate between trustworthy and untrustworthy authority. It will aid us in the search for such a test if we first consider a case which presents considerable analogy to that under discussion.

When a lawsuit comes before a jury, the first step is to establish by evidence the facts of the case. If the evidence is conflicting, the jury have to make up their minds to which of two or more witnesses they will give, and to which refuse, credence. In so far as they accept the evidence of a particular witness, he becomes to them a kind of authority for the time being, though only in a matter of fact, and not of opinion. Still the cases are sufficiently alike for the rules which hold in the one to be applicable mutatis mutandis to the other. Now the requisites to make a man a good witness in a matter of fact are the following:

1. That he was present when the alleged fact occurred.

2. That he observed what took place. 3. That he possesses adequate intelligence and memory to report clearly what he observed.

4. That he is not under the influence

of any personal interest, or other bias sufficiently powerful to overcome his desire to tell the truth.

The great bulk of men in a civilized community evidently possess these qualifications, and are therefore credible witnesses in matters of fact. The corresponding requisites to constitute a man a trustworthy authority in a matter of opinion, are far less easy of attainment. We must be assured that he has enjoyed adequate opportunities of studying his subject, and has availed himself of those opportunities; that his powers of mind are more than a match for the difficulties to be encountered, and his love of truth strong enough to overcome any misleading personal influences which can be brought to bear upon him. Now these are qualifications rarely united in any one individual. It is not hard to find a man of leisure, or a man of energy, or a man of brains, or a man of integrity, but we may search for a long time before we meet with one who combines all these in the high degree which is essential to constitute him an authority in a matter of opinion.

Thus it would seem, at first sight, as if nothing were gained by an appeal to the principle of authority, because it would often be quite as difficult to ascertain what person possessed all the essential marks of trustworthy authority, as to investigate for ourselves the question on which we had to form an opinion. Certainly, if in every such case we had to make out for ourselves whether a particular man had the amount of leisure, devotion to his subject, capacity and honesty of mind sufficient to justify our taking his opinion on trust, the process would, as a rule, be too long to be worth going through. We are, however, relieved from any such necessity by the great principle of agreement among independent investigators. Ecclesiastical tradition supplies us with an incident which aptly illustrates the nature of this principle. We read that when a Greek translation of the Hebrew original of the Old Testament was called for, seventy translators were set to work in separate cells with

out being allowed any communication with each other. Each translated the whole of the Old Testament, and on the completion of the work it was found that all the versions produced agreed word for word throughout. This was held to prove that a supernatural influence had acted on the minds of the translators, and thus guaranteed the absolute perfection of their version. It was not the ability of the several translators on which the stress of this inference was made to rest, but their mutual independence, and the entire agreement of their work.

Let us take a corresponding incident more consonant with modern experience. Suppose that one of the lost works of classical antiquity has been discovered in manuscript in the library of a Greek monastery, and that translations have been made by scholars in different parts of Europe. Without instituting any inquiry into the qualifications of the individual translators, we should at once conclude that those passages of the original as to the meaning of which there existed substantial agreement, had been correctly translated.

In reasoning thus, we should be making one or two tacit assumptions, which, though perfectly legitimate in the case in hand, by no means hold universally. We should take for granted that classical scholars are, on the whole, properly qualified to deal with their subject, not under the influence of misleading class-interests or prejudices, and free to express, without let or hindrance, whatever opinions they may form. The importance of these tacitly assumed conditions will be immediately seen if we examine a few cases in which they are not satisfied. For example, there is a very considerable amount of agreement among a large number of persons calling themselves Spiritualists, in support of the assertion that certain phenomena are due to the agency of departed spirits. The public pays no deference to this agreement, and treats the asserted spiritual agency with general incredulity or indifference. Why is this? Because the cultivators of Spiritualism

have as yet afforded us no ground for thinking that, as a body, they possess the exceptional qualifications requisite for men who undertake to deal with the most difficult problems of physiology and mental science.

Again, at the time of the Anti-Cornlaw agitation, the landed interest with one voice exclaimed that the proposed measure would ruin the country. The nation disregarded their agreement in this opinion. Why? Because it perceived that class interests, and not genuine conviction, raised the outcry. Once more throughout the Middle Ages a vast and most imposing array of theological agreement supported the dogmas of the Roman Church. Yet the voice of the Reformation pronounced the claim of that Church to authority in matters of belief to be an utter usurpation, and treated the mass of consentient opinion which backed it up as a mere delusion. Why? Because the expression of opposite opinion was rendered impossible, and the dominant system enforced by a mechanism of external coercion, of which, for spying vigilance and inexorable rigour, the world has never seen the like. The absolute consent of overt expression on which the Roman controversialists relied, was therefore merely apparent, and it was as unsafe to infer from it a corresponding agreement of internal conviction, as it would be to conclude from the constantly repeated evolutions of a gang of convicts that the treadmill was the mode of taking exercise which above all others their souls loved.

We come, then, to the following result. If a particular subject has been diligently studied by well-qualified and thoroughly independent persons, we may accept their conclusions wherever they possess the guarantee of unanimity, provided always that there exists entire freedom of discussion, that no particular opinions are favoured by restricting posts of emolument and social pre-eminence to such as profess them, and no class of thinkers so persistently assailed, on account of unpopular tenets, with calumny and misrepresentation, as to

silence their opposition to what they conceive to be popular errors.

The views to which we have been led as to the paramount sway of the principle of authority, have undoubtedly something about them rather humbling to human vanity. It will therefore be worth while to bring out a few of the compensating advantages which it bestows on us. In the first place we obtain from it an extent of knowledge out of all proportion to what we could hope to acquire by our own efforts alone. Now in many branches of learning, the results are just the most beautiful and interesting parts. For instance, in astronomy, the great laws of planetary motion have an incomparable grandeur, which any clear-headed person can be made to perceive; whereas the details of observation and calculation which must be gone through in order to demonstrate these laws are in many respects excessively wearisome and repulsive. Further, all progress in knowledge depends on the principle of authority, since by it men are enabled to build higher and higher. One generation makes a single course of bricks firm and secure, the next lays another upon it, and so on. If each generation had insisted on ignoring the work of its predecessor, our temple of knowledge would never have risen beyond a hovel.

But, it may be objected, if we admit these conclusions, we shall have to abandon the ground taken up at the Reformation, and adopt submissive, slavish principles in religion, which have hitherto led, and must always lead, to ecclesiastical tyranny. My answer is, there is no need to do anything of the kind. We have merely to apply to the specimens of so-called Church authority presented to us the few simple tests enumerated in this paper, and we shall find that they are no authorities at all, but mere counterfeits. The test which proves at once fatal to their claim is that which requires entire freedom of discussion as a guarantee of sound authority. This has been so notoriously absent, or rather, its exact opposite has been so persistently present, throughout

history, whether represented by the fires of the Inquisition abroad, or by parliamentary and episcopal tyranny in England, that there is no occasion to go a step further.

It may have seemed to some of my hearers that the topics to which I have directed attention are but distantly connected with the proper objects of a society such as that which I have the honour to address. I hope, however, to be able to show that the conclusions at which we have arrived admit of being applied with great advantage to the field of politics. One of the most essential differences between Liberals and Conservatives lies in the attitude which they respectively assume towards the principle of authority. principle of authority. Men of both parties alike necessarily form the bulk of their opinions by the aid of this principle-in fact, they can no more help doing so than they can help breathing the common air, and basking in the common sunshine. But the Liberal party, not content with merely using the principle, has persistently striven to bring about a more complete fulfilment of those conditions on which, as we have seen, all its validity and soundness depend. The history of the Liberal party is essentially the history of a long struggle for mental freedom and unfettered utterance. The removal, more or less complete, of severe restrictions on the press and on literature-of invidious civil disabilities inflicted on the maintainers of particular theological tenets of enforced subscription to antiquated formularies of belief-has directly tended to increase publicity, diminish hypocrisy, and remove to a great extent the obloquy attaching to impugners of dominant notions; and so most powerfully to enhance that feeling of mutual confidence which practically sums up the guarantees of trustworthy authority. The history of the Conservative party is the history of a persistent effort to hinder the emancipation of the human intellect, and to choke its utterance. The policy of that party has, accordingly, tended to perpetuate mistrust and classsuspicion, and thus to stunt the growth

of the principle of authority. The attitude of the two parties may therefore be described as follows. Both owe their political opinions to authority. Liberals, while perhaps not adequately acknowledging their obligations to this principle, nevertheless strive to bring it to the highest state of efficiency. Conservatives, though never weary of parading their adherence to the principle, cling with unreasoning tenacity to the imperfections which clog its development.

Besides affording us the means of clearly expressing a marked distinction between our party in the State and that of our political opponents, the results we have reached are capable of indicating the kind of personal qualifications which a Liberal constituency should look for when choosing its candidate for a parliamentary election. I have used the word personal advisedly, as I must of course take it for granted that the candidate is at one with his supporters on the general principles and policy of the Liberal party. On these there can be no discussion within the circle of this society.

We all know that the variety of subjects which engage the attention of our legislators is practically unlimited-that there is hardly anything in heaven, on earth, or under the earth, which may not be made the subject of a parliamentary debate and a parliamentary division. No man possesses an independent familiarity with more than an infinitesimally small proportion of the subjects which may thus be brought before him; nevertheless a constituency generally expects its representative to give, by his vote, an opinion on all the most important questions submitted to the test of a division. A member of Parliament has, therefore, necessarily to make more habitual use of the principle of authority, in forming his opinions, than any other class of men in the community. He ought, then, not indeed to be more versed than other men in all kinds of political questions, but to know better than they the right quarter in which to apply for a sound opinion on each question as it presents itself. His

authorities will be as various as the subjects with which he is called on to deal. On many questions the best will probably be the leaders of the political party to which he himself belongs. These men have access to exceptional sources of information, and are specially well informed as to what measures are, not perhaps in the abstract the very best possible, but the best that the strength of the party admits of carrying. We often hear men who vote steadily with their party sneered at, and called place-hunters and office-seekers, but clearly nothing can be more unjust. They are simply adopting the most trustworthy body of opinion within their reach, and probably, in most cases, taking the very best course that circumstances allow of.

A debate is a great opportunity for consulting authorities. On most questions which crop up, there are some members of the House who are entitled, by special study or exceptional means of information, to act as guides of opinion. By weighing these experts against each other, and striking a balance between them, a shrewd, intelligent man may easily come to a right conclusion without any previous inde-. pendent study of the points at issue.

But the legislator must clearly extend his search for authorities far beyond the limits of the assembly to which he belongs. In dealing with private persons who claim to act influentially on public opinion, he will often find the tests of authority adapted to numerous bodies of men inapplicable, and have to depend on negative and less decisive marks, such as the absence of over-statement and mystic airs of infallibility, of concealment and convenient vagueness of expression.

It seems, then, that the requisites needed for the efficient discharge of parliamentary duties-as far as an outsider may presume to judge-are mainly a disciplined intellect, trained to concentrate itself with vigorous rapidity on any subject which may claim its attention, a straightness and uprightness of mind which is ready to follow truth

with confidence, but shrinks instinctively from the touch of falsehood, and a wide knowledge of, and tact in dealing with, men of all classes and conditions. Such I conceive to be the main qualities to be sought for in one who is to stand forth as the representative of other men, the guardian of their interests, and the champion of their rights. When we consider the high trust and dignity involved in such an office, we may even, I think, go a step further, and seek as our candidate one who, besides being a skilled collector of authoritative opinions in general, is, on some one or more questions, an authority himself. A constituent enjoys a feeling of internal satisfaction if he knows that his representative, when speaking on his own. special subject in Parliament, is listened to with the deference which, for instance, is accorded by the House of Commons on more than one subject to the member for Brighton.

I have spoken of the qualifications which have a legitimate claim on the support of a reasonable and thinking elector. Let me, in conclusion, contrast with them certain so-called qualifications, which, though they by no means really qualify a man to perform well the duties of a representative, nevertheless succeed in usurping a predominant influence. I mean great wealth and hereditary connection with the territorial aristocracy.

A very large amount of capital accumulated in the hands of an individual inevitably confers upon him a considerable power over other men.

He can

turn the fertilizing streams of a vast business into what channels he pleases, systematically lay men struggling with difficulties under a yoke of money obligation which they are powerless to shake off, and in a hundred different ways manipulate the interested springs of human action. This is what we call local influence. Let a candidate for a seat in the House of Commons possess it, and we know that he has an excellent chance of being returned, let his personal unfitness for the post he seeks be what it may. On this point I will quote

some vigorous words of Professor Goldwin Smith in an article on the labour question, in the January number of the Contemporary Review:-"Whatever the rich man desires, the finest house, the biggest diamond, the reigning beauty for his wife, social homage, public honours, political power, is ready at his command. Does he fancy a seat in the British House of Commons, the best club in London, as it has been truly called? All other claims, those of the public service included, at once give way. I remember a question arising about a nomination for a certain constituency (a working man's constituency by the way), which was cut short by the announcement that the seat was wanted by a local millionaire. of the millionaire was prise was expressed. asked, any political knowledge or capacity, any interest in public affairs, any ambition? The answer was None.' 'Then why does he want the seat?' 'He does not want it.' 'Then why does he take it?' 'Because his wife does.' Cleopatra, as the story goes, displayed her mad prodigality by melting a pearl in a cup out of which she drank to Antony. But this modern money-queen could throw into her cup of pleasure, to give it a keener zest, a share in the government of the greatest empire in the world."

When the name mentioned, surHas he, it was

Aristocratic birth is also an effective passport to Parliament. Young noblemen are promoted with surprising rapidity from the University to the House of Commons. A good many specimens of this class of men come before us in Cambridge in the course of a few years, so that one can form a pretty accurate estimate of their qualifications for parliamentary duties and responsibilities. As a rule they do not rise above the average level of our undergraduates, either in ability or in power of application. Nevertheless we may reckon with tolerable certainty on seeing them, a year or two after they have left the University, occupying seats in Parliament which far abler men cannot hope to attain until they are grey

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